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Aviation safety management is implemented through reactive, proactive, and predictive
methodologies. Unlike reactive and proactive safety, predictive safety can predict the
next accident and enable prevention before an actual occurrence. The study outlined here
promotes predictive safety management through machine learning technologies using
large amounts of data to facilitate predictive modeling.
The study addresses efforts to reduce General Aviation accidents, an effort that
was renewed in earnest with the Federal Aviation Administration’s 1998 Safer Skies
Initiative. Over the past 22 years, the General Aviation fatality rate has decreased.
However, accidents still happen, and there is some evidence showing the number of
accidents, representing hazard exposure, is increasing. The accident data suggest that the
aviation community still has more to learn about the variables involved in an accident
sequence.
The purpose of the study was to conduct an exploratory data-driven examination
of General Aviation accidents in the United States from January 1, 1998, to December
31, 2018, using machine learning and data mining techniques. The goal was to determine
what model best predicts fatal and severe injury aviation accidents and further, what
variables were most important in the prediction model.
iv

The study sample comprised 26,387 fixed-wing general aviation accidents
accessed through the publicly accessible National Transportation Safety Board Aviation
Accident Database and Synopses archive. Using a mixed-methods approach, the study
employed both unstructured narrative text and structured tabular data within the
predictive modeling. First, the accident narratives were culled using text mining
algorithms to develop text-based quantitative variables. Next, data mining algorithms
were used to develop models based on both text- and data-based variables derived from
the accident reports.
Five types of machine learning models were created using SAS® Enterprise
Miner™, including the Decision Tree, Gradient Boosting, Logistic Regression, Neural
Network, and Random Forest. Additionally, three broad sets of variables were used in
modeling, including text-only, data-only, and a combination of text and data variables.
Three models, Logistic Regression (text-only variables), Random Forest (text-only
variables), and Gradient Boosting (text and data variables), emerged with a similar
prediction capability. The top six variables within the models were all text-based
covering Medical, Slow-flight and stalls, Flight control, IMC flight, Weather factors, and
Flight hours topics. The Logistic Regression (Text) model was selected as the champion
model: Misclassification Rate = 0.098, ROC Index = 0.945, and Cumulative Lift = 3.46.
The results of the study provide insights to the entire General Aviation
community, including government, industry, flight training, and the operational pilot.
Specific recommendations include the following areas: 1) improve the quality and
usefulness of accident reports for machine learning applications, 2) investigate ways to
capture and publish more open-source flight data for use in safety modeling, 3) invest in
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additional medical education and find ways to address impairing medications and high
risk medical conditions, 4) renew efforts on improving flight skills and combatting
decision-based errors, 5) emphasize the importance of weather briefings, pre-flight
planning, and weather-based risk management, and 6) create an aviation-specific corpus
for text mining to improve text analysis and transformation.
Keywords: general aviation, machine learning, text mining, data mining,
predictive safety management
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Chapter I: Introduction
The introduction chapter for this study provides a project overview and lays a
foundation for the follow-on chapters. The foundation begins with a brief background on
general aviation accidents. Following the background is a discussion of the problem
statement, the purpose of the study, and study significance. Next, the research questions
that drive the methodology and research design are presented. Delimitations, limitations,
and assumptions provide the scope and boundaries of the study. Finally, key definitions
of significant terms and concepts are provided to facilitate understanding and knowledge
transfer.
Background/Overview
The analysis of modern aviation accidents may be traced to the 1908 Wright Flyer
crash that killed Thomas Selfridge and injured Orville Wright (Bruno, 1944). While the
flight environment has become more complex, the core components of accident
investigation have remained mostly unchanged. The goal of accident analysis is to
determine what happened to prevent future mishaps. What has changed in the realm of
accident prevention is a move from reactive analysis--a review of what has happened--to
methods of proactive prevention. More recent is the effort to move beyond proactive
accident prevention to predictive methods enabled by machine learning (Shmueli et al.,
2016; Stolzer, Halford et al., 2011). Data mining is a multidisciplinary science concerned
with extracting information from large quantities of data and draws from different areas
such as machine learning, artificial intelligence, neural networks, database technology,
and computer science (Han & Kamber, 2001). Data mining is much more than extracting
data from a database. It is the machine learning intelligence functionality within data
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mining that enables the extraction of knowledge that cannot be detected using traditional
statistical methods or with limited amounts of data (Han & Kamber, 2001). Limitations
of traditional methods such as assumptions of normality, sensitivity to missing values,
and multicollinearity are overcome when data mining large amounts of data (Truong et
al., 2018). As applied to aviation, by using machine learning, it may be possible to predict
specific types of aviation accidents supporting targeted interventions to prevent adverse
outcomes (Burnett & Si, 2017; Liu et al., 2013; Stolzer & Halford, 2007). As noted, an
enabling component of machine learning is access to large blocks of data. One such
source is the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Aviation Accident Database
& Synopses (NTSB, 2020b).
General Aviation Operations
General Aviation (GA) represents a major portion of flight operations within the
United States and encompasses a wide array of operations types, aircraft types, pilot
experience, and operating standards. A standard definition of GA involves a reference to
what is not included in the category. GA operations are civil aviation flights that do not
include scheduled or unscheduled air carriers (FAA, 2017). Operations not involving
scheduled or unscheduled air carriers include such areas as personal use, flight
instruction, business, agriculture, sight-seeing, and air medical flights (FAA, 2020b),
though that list is far from exhaustive. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
(2020) conducts annual surveys of aircraft activities by aircraft types in the categories of
fixed wing-piston, fixed wing-turboprop, fixed wing-turbojet, rotorcraft-piston,
rotorcraft-turbine, gliders, lighter-than-air, experimental, and special light-sport, giving
some indication of the variation in aircraft complexities across the GA fleet. According to

3
the FAA (2018), there are over 220,000 GA aircraft in the United States. Focusing on the
fixed-wing subset of the GA fleet, the FAA (2020) data show that in 2017 there were
167,560 active aircraft that flew 18,336,203 hours. Overall, both the total number of
active GA aircraft and total GA flight hours decreased between 1999 and 2017 with the
lowest numbers in 2013. Since 2013, the total number of active GA aircraft and total GA
flight hours has been increasing (FAA, 2020b), as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1
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Note. Adapted from the FAA General Aviation and Part 135 Activity Surveys (FAA, 2020b). *The active
aircraft and flight hours data for 2011 are presented as averages of 2010 and 2012 because the FAA has not
published the data for 2011.

Pilot Certifications. Just as there is a wide variety of GA aircraft and operations,
there is a wide variety of pilots and certifications. Airmen may earn many different pilot
certificates, including student, sport, recreational, private, commercial, and airline
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transport pilot (ATP). Each requires varying levels of training and flight hours in order to
qualify for the different certificates. All but those who obtain a commercial or ATP
certificate are limited to GA flying. Commercial and ATP pilots are not limited and may
fly under different flight rules in addition to Part 91. At the end of 2018, there were
633,316 pilots with active certifications in the US. (FAA, 2019a). Of the total number of
certificates, 26% are student pilot certificates (FAA, 2019a). Student, sport, recreational,
and private pilot certificates comprise 48% of the active certificates (FAA, 2019a).
Pilot medical requirements. In addition to the variety of GA aircraft and possible
pilot certification levels, each pilot certificate has a different medical requirement that
varies by age. One difference between the airline community and the general aviation
community is that that active airline pilots must retire at 65, whereas there are no upper
age restrictions for GA pilots. Age may have different implications for aviation accidents
given a GA population of over 92,000 pilots age 65 or higher, with 9,188 pilots age 80 or
older (FAA, 2019a). A general description of pilot medical requirements can be viewed
in Table 1.
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Table 1
General Pilot Medical Requirements
Certificate

Medical

Renewal Requirement

Requirement
Sport

Not Required*

*A sport pilot may operate according to their U.S.
driver’s license restrictions.

Recreational Third-Class
Student
Private
Commercial

<40, every 60 months; 40 and over, every 24

Medical

months

Third-Class

<40, every 60 months; 40 and over, every 24

Medical

months

Third-Class

<40, every 60 months; 40 and over, every 24

Medical

months

Second-Class

Every 12 months

Medical
ATP

First-Class

<40, every 12 months; 40 and over, every six

Medical

months

Note. The information contained in the table is general and does not capture all of the possible variables.
The 14 CFR § 61 (Certification: Pilots, 2020) is the source document for all variations of medical
requirements.

The primary reason for considering the different aircraft, types of operations, pilot
certification levels, and medical standards is to frame some of the challenges with
addressing safety issues in GA. Variations in training, flight experience, aircraft speeds,
aircraft complexity, and flying operations present very different hazards than that found
in the airlines and other non-GA commercial operations. Unfortunately, sometimes the
hazards develop into aviation accidents.
General Aviation Accidents
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A review of accident trends between 1998-2016 reveals mixed conclusions. The
Joseph T. Nall reports have been an industry source of GA accident statistical roll-ups
since 1997, with the most recent report covering 2016 (AOPA, 2019). Figure 2 shows the
fixed-wing GA accident data from 1998-2016. The gold bars indicate the total number of
accidents per year. Accident rates per 100,000 flight hours are superimposed as line
graphs. The 2016 data indicate there were 1,036 fixed-wing accidents, of which 159
involved fatalities.

Figure 2
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A review of FAA-provided data, which uses a slightly different accounting
period, shows there were 347 fatalities from GA accidents in the Fiscal Year 2017
(October 1, 2016, through September 30, 2017) (FAA, 2018). The fatalities occurred
from 209 accidents. What the Fiscal Year 2017 numbers do not capture is 961 additional
GA accidents during the same period that did not result in a fatality (NTSB, 2020b). In
pure numbers, since 1998, the number of both total accidents and fatal accidents has
decreased. However, while the number of accidents in 2016 is lower than in 1998,
accidents increased between 2013-2016 after 14 years of a declining accident trend.
Many studies have concluded that human error is either causal or contributory to
the vast majority of GA accidents (Boyd, 2017a; Boyd, 2017b; Houston et al., 2012;
Shappell et al., 2007; Shappell & Wiegmann, 1996; Van Benthem & Herdman, 2016;
Wiegmann et al., 2005; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). The 28th Joseph T. Nall Report
shows that 72.9% of all fixed-wing GA accidents were pilot related. Private pilots were at
the controls of 45.6% of the accidents, commercial pilots 25.2%, and ATP 19%. There
was a second pilot in the aircraft in 18.3% of the accidents. Further, in 26% of the
accidents, there was a certified flight instructor on board, and in 54.2% of the accidents,
there was an IFR certified pilot on board (AOPA, 2019).
Of the 1,036 fixed-wing GA accidents, 74.2% involved single-engine fixed-gear
aircraft. The majority of accidents (73.4%) were listed as personal use, and 17.2% as
instructional flights. The most dangerous flight condition was day VMC accounting for
89.1% of fixed-wing GA aircraft accidents and 78.6% of the fatal accidents. The bulk of
accidents (32%) occurred during the landing phase. The most significant portion of the
landing accidents (47%) involved loss of control (LOC) with airspeed/stall and hard
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landings accounting for another 28%. As a group, 48% of all fixed-wing GA accidents
occurred during landing, takeoff and climb, and descent/approach, in other words, near an
airport (AOPA, 2019).
Many studies and reports have touted the safety record of the airline industry
(Cusick et al., 2017; Ekman & Debacker, 2018; FAA, 2019b; Madsen et al., 2016;
Shappell et al., 2007). The accolades appear well-founded. In 2016, the scheduled airline
accident rate was 0.164 (Bureau of Transportation, n.d.), whereas the GA fixed-wing
accident rate was 5.67 (AOPA, 2019). Interestingly, the difference in total flight hours
between the two groups was only 3%, with the scheduled airlines flying 18,294,000 hours
in 2016 (BTS, n.d.b) compared to the GA fixed-wing community flying 17, 691, 000
flight hours (AOPA, 2019). A comparison of flight hours between GA (Part 91 in blue)
and scheduled airlines (Part 121 in gold) can be seen in Figure 3.
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Figure 3
Flight Hours Comparison, 1998-2016
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*The 2011 flight hours for the Part 91 aircraft data are presented as averages of 2010 and 2012 because the
FAA has not published the data for 2011.

While GA flight hours have decreased since 1998, the accident and fatality rates
have stayed fairly static, as shown in Figure 4. Over the same period, commercial airline
accident rates have remained consistently low with the 2016 accident rate at .164 (Bureau
of Transportation, n.d.).
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Figure 4
Accident & Fatality Rate Comparison, 1998-2016
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Note. Adapted from the Joseph T. Nall reports (AOPA, 2019) and Bureau of Transportation (n.d.) statistics.
The rates are calculated as the number of occurrences every 100,000 flight hours. *The Part 91 accident
rates from 2011 are estimated using the average of the fight hours flown in 2010 and 2012 due to missing
data from the FAA.

General Aviation Safety Initiatives
First introduced in 1998, the FAA launched the Safer Skies Initiative to reduce all
aviation accident fatalities (FAA, 2001). The General Aviation Joint Steering Committee
(GAJSC) was chartered to lead a public-private team with focusing on those areas
representing the majority of GA accidents, including the controlled flight into terrain
(CFIT), loss of control (LOC), pilot decision making, runway incursions, and
survivability. A number of nation-wide sub-initiatives were launched by the FAA and the
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GAJSC partners over the past 20 years, and though there have been incremental
improvements at times, accidents still occur.
More recent works on safety theory have outlined three different categories of
safety efforts. The first is reactive safety, which relies on actual occurrences to develop
safety interventions. The goal is to learn from the past so that the particular accidents are
not repeated. The second is proactive safety, which relies on precursor conditions that, if
identified early, can prevent actual occurrences. Key indicators are determined and
tracked for trends, and participants voluntarily report near-misses so that mitigations can
be implemented. The third is predictive safety, where accident occurrences are predicted
before they occur based on modeling factors that have led to mishaps in the past. By
determining the combination of factors and the relative weight of a factor contributing to
an accident, steps can be taken to prevent accidents.
Unfortunately, published research from governmental and quasi-governmental
organizations regarding GA accident reduction is sparse. However, what appears to be
evident is a reliance on reactive safety methodologies. Accident statistics are compiled,
trends are noted, and initiatives developed to address high-level accident factors.
Proactive safety methodologies are widely accepted as superior to reactive safety because
proactive measures seek to prevent accidents by identifying and mitigating accident
precursors. Proactive programs are robust in the air carrier world. For GA, there appears
to be only one government-based proactive safety program, the Aviation Safety
Reporting System (ASRS). The ASRS promotes anonymous self-identification of
deviation without fear of punishment for the purpose of knowledge sharing. Predictive
safety methodologies strive to provide data-driven knowledge based on past events “to
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identify current behavior that has the same characteristics” (Dean, 2014, p. 16) with the
goal of preventing accident precursors, or incidents, and accidents. A search of
government repositories revealed very little in the way of predictive safety, nor are there
any evident links between predictive safety methods and the FAA and GAJSC accident
reduction efforts.
Research reports from national aviation leaders are sparse providing an
opportunity to explore new ways of analyzing the problem by leveraging the capabilities
of machine learning as applied to vast accident archives. The current study seeks to
augment predictive safety efforts to reduce accidents through data-driven analysis of
NTSB aviation accident reports.
Statement of the Problem
Viable safety systems require continual identification and assessment of its
components, including identification of hazards, assessments of risks, collection of data,
and analysis of the data (Stolzer et al., 2018). Since 1998, there has been a targeted
campaign to reduce GA fatalities, yet fatalities still occur. Data analysis indicates the GA
fixed-wing accident fatality rate—the proportion of accidents involving a fatality—has
decreased overall; however, the total number of GA accidents appears to have remained
at a consistently steady rate (AOPA, 2018b). Further, the fatal accident rate increased
from .94 in 2017 to 1.029 in 2018 (Gilbert, 2019). What remains unclear is why fatal
accidents have generally decreased while the overall accident rate remains consistent.
Perhaps there is undiscovered knowledge to be unlocked in the accident data;
commonalities or factors that, if better understood, could prevent accidents. Reactive
safety is expensive and inefficient in terms of both human lives and property. An accident
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must occur to learn lessons. A better way to approach aviation safety is to predict
accidents before costs are realized. A machine learning approach with big data could help
reduce accidents by understanding variables that predict accidents. There is a gap of
knowledge understanding factors that predict GA accidents (both fatal and non-fatal).
Further, efforts in closing the gap in understanding are constrained by the limitations of
traditional statistical modeling. A predictive exploratory data-driven approach to
analyzing GA accidents through machine learning can potentially advance aviation
knowledge beyond the limits of proactive safety methodologies and traditional
correlational analysis. Once the variables are understood in the context of exploratory
predictive modeling, barriers and mitigations may be instituted to prevent the next
accident.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this data-driven exploratory study was to determine the model that
best predicts the target variable—accident injury level—and determine the variables that
are most important within the model. The variables were derived from quantitative
tabular and qualitative narrative data found in the NTSB aviation accident report archive.
Significance of the Study
Theoretical Significance
Aircraft incidents and accidents form the basis of reactive safety efforts (Stolzer
& Goglia, 2015) and efforts to improve aircraft accident prevention have the greatest
potential impact on operations as safety activities graduate from reactive to predictive
methods (Baugh & Stolzer, 2018; Friend & Kohn, 2018; Stolzer, Halford et al., 2011).
Further, the evaluation of accident precursors using new methods is still needed because
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accidents are still occurring (Erjavac et al., 2018). The study, as envisioned, extends
efforts to reduce GA accidents by using powerful machine learning techniques
(predictive methodology) with a large dataset to detect previously undiscovered
relationships between accident components.
Practical Significance
When aggregated, incidents and accidents drive safety campaigns (Aircraft
Owners and Pilots Association, n.d.; General Aviation Joint Steering Committee, n.d.).
These campaigns appear to have reduced mishaps; however, mishaps continue to occur.
The biggest and most well-defined problems are being addressed. The next logical step is
to investigate areas that are not as easily accessible or under-exploited. The study
outlined here identifies an algorithm that can predict GA accident outcomes, which can
more finely guide safety prevention activities.
The results obtained from this study provide data for use in many academic and
practical arenas, including developing strategies for improving pilot flight performance.
Specific benefits are envisioned for general aviation participants, Federal Aviation
Administration, industry leaders, academic researchers, and flight training institutions.
Human factors and flight safety researchers will benefit by knowing the relevance of
particular predictors of accidents to improve further research efforts. Accident
investigators will benefit from an increased understanding of human error resulting from
combinations of various human factors. Finally, flight training institutions can use the
study outcomes to evaluate the curriculum in light of empirical indications of accident
predictors.
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Research Questions
Two research questions guide this exploratory data-driven study:
RQ1: What model developed with machine learning and data mining techniques best
predicts fatal and severe injury aviation accidents?
RQ2: What variables are most important in the selected model for predicting fatal and
severe injury aviation accidents?
Delimitations
The scope of the current study must be defined to ensure feasibility and provide a
foundation for assessments of generalizability, validity, and reliability. Additionally, the
broad category of Part 91 GA activities covers a myriad of aircraft types, flight
operations, and pilot certifications that make it difficult to make meaningful
generalizations to the entirety of GA. Overall, the research involved Part 91 GA fixedwing aircraft accidents in the United States from 1998 to 2018. Because the study is
interested in the actions of pilots in an accident sequence, crashes involving deliberate,
willful negligence, or criminal actions were excluded.
Given the variety of aircraft types within the GA category, the research focused
only on fixed-wing aircraft. The study excluded the following aircraft: helicopters,
gliders (powered or unpowered), lighter-than-air, weight-shift, gyrocopters, and powered
parachutes. Aircraft operating under rules other than Part 91, such as Part 137
(agriculture aircraft operations) or Part 135 (commuter and on-demand operations), were
also excluded.

16
Limitations and Assumptions
Limitations
The primary limitation relates to the use of archival data. The research project
relies on secondary historical reports captured by outside individuals for purposes that are
not necessarily aligned with research designs (Vogt et al., 2012). Some reports are limited
by the lack of completeness. However, the database is large enough that missing data are
not anticipated to be a factor in the study results (Bordens & Abbott, 2011; Shmueli et al.,
2016; Truong et al., 2018). In most cases, and unlike aircraft operating as commercial air
carriers, there are no onboard data capture devices such as cockpit voice recorders and
flight data recorders. Data is provided based on witness reports, expert judgment, and
post-crash physical evidence.
Assumptions
NTSB reports begin with an investigation outlining the facts surrounding the
incident or accident. While the NTSB can send investigators to the site, in some cases,
the facts are determined by other assigned government agencies or by phone interviews
to individuals at the crash site. Reports submitted by operators are compiled on the NTSB
Form 6120.1, Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident/Incident Report (NTSB, 2013). It is
assumed that those individuals providing information to the NTSB answered questions
honestly.
Further, it is assumed that the NTSB instrument and methodology are valid and
reliable. Once the investigation is complete, a report is generated and published in the
NTSB Aviation Accident Database & Synopses (NTSB, 2020b). Reports are available in
a standardized format as a PDF or HTML document. Data from the report is mirrored in
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the downloadable Microsoft Access database. Addressing the NTSB process for
capturing, storing, and publishing the data, the U.S. Government Accounting Office
(2010) reported that all required quality assurance measures were in place to help ensure
accuracy and correct erroneous entries. The quality assurance process includes
management review, reconciliation of the completeness of the data, a process that
promotes accuracy when entered into the system, a process that validates data entered
into the system, and a process to identify and correct data errors (GAO, 2010). Further,
the NTSB has defined database events to promote replication by third parties, and initial
and recurrent training is provided to system users (GAO, 2010).
Summary
In Chapter I, the subject of the current study was introduced. The nature of the
problem was stated, and the significance of the problem was outlined. Finally, the first
chapter outlined research questions that provide direction for the project.
Chapters II and III complete the setup for the dissertation project. Chapter II
comprises an extensive review of the literature. Chapter III builds on the literature by
providing a methodological foundation for addressing the research questions. The
research design is presented in Chapter III, including details of the population, sample,
and sampling strategy. Finally, major details on conducting the study and the approaches
to analyzing the data will be given. Chapters IV and V present the study results and the
discussion of the results, respectively.
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Definitions of Terms
Aviation Accident

An aviation occurrence involving substantial
damage or serious injury that happens on an aircraft
with intentions to fly. The time period covers
boarding to disembarking the aircraft (Definitions,
2020).

Big Data

Describes a magnitude of compiled data typified by
its volume, complexity, and speed of growth (EMC
Education Services, 2015).

Cause

A deficiency, which if properly eliminated or
mitigated, would likely have prevented the accident
or reduced the accident severity (USAF, 2018;
Wood, 2003). A cause may be related to a single
factor or a combination of factors (Wood, 2003),
and may relate to “actions, omissions, events, [or]
conditions” (ICAO, 2016, p. 1-2) that led to an
accident.

Civil Aircraft

An aircraft not categorized as a public aircraft
(Definitions, 2020).

Class Variable

Used in SAS® EM™, a class variable is
synonymous with a categorical variable (McCarthy,
McCarthy, Ceccucci, & Halawi, 2019; SAS
Institute Inc, 2019a).

19
Confusion Matrix

Describes a table used to visualize classifier
performance. As used in the current study, a 2x2
matrix shows how many times a model correctly
and incorrectly categorized the target in terms of
True Positives (TP), False Positives (FP), True
Negatives (TN), and False Negatives (FN) (EMC
Education Services, 2015).

Data Mining

Extracting information from large quantities of data
using machine learning techniques to detect hidden
associations (Han & Kamber, 2001; Tufféry, 2011).

Decision Tree

A structure resembling branches of a tree that can
be used for predicting the target variable using
“sequences of decisions and consequences” (EMC
Education Services, 2015, p. 192). Data are
segmented hierarchically and partitioned into
disjoint groups where prediction is achieved
(Sarma, 2013).

FAR Part 91

Rules governing general aviation flight (General
Operating and Flight Rules, 2020).

FAR Part 121

Rules governing air carrier flights (Operating
Requirements, 2020).

Fatal Injury

An injury resulting in death 30 days or less from the
accident (49 CFR § 830.2)
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General Aviation

Civil aviation flights not including air carriers
whether or not the air carrier flights are scheduled
or unscheduled (FAA, 2017).

Gradient Boosting Machine

An ensemble machine learning technique built in a
stepwise fashion characterized by combining
prediction models into a more superior model with
greater prediction capability than the individual
models (McCarthy et al., 2019).

Hazard

A condition that creates the “potential for producing
death, injury, illness, fire, property damage,
equipment damage or environmental damage”
(USAF, 2015, p. 143).

Incident

An aviation occurrence that either affects or has the
potential to affect operations safety and does not
meet the definition of an accident (Definitions,
2020).

Latent Variable

Describes a variable not capable of being measured
directly, and is accessed through observed variables
(Field, 2018). An aviation example is the concept of
flight experience which is not directly measured,
but is a combination of factors.

Loss of Control

“Loss of aircraft control while, or deviation from
intended flightpath, in flight” (ICAO, 2017, p. 15).
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Machine Learning

“A branch of artificial intelligence [that] uses
computational algorithms to automatically learn
insights from the data and make better decisions in
the future with minimal intervention” (McCarthy et
al., 2019, p. 12)

Minor Injury

An injury not rising to the level of serious or fatal
(49 CFR § 830.2).

Mishap

Describes unplanned reportable safety occurrences
resulting in injury or damage. The terminology is
primarily used by military services in the United
States (USAF, 2015; Wood, 2003).

Near Miss

A near miss can be described as “an outcome with a
subjective potential negative (or more severe)
consequence” (Thoroman et al., 2019), or more
specifically, “an incident that could have, but did
not, result in death, injury, or illness” (OSHA, 2016,
p. 34).

Neural Network

“A neural network, when used for classification, is
typically a collection of neuron-like processing
units with weighted connections between the units”
(Han & Kamber, 2001, p. 24)

Overfitting

A characteristic where model training becomes
overly complex and includes too much noise (SAS,
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2019a) leading to poor operation in subsequent
samples.
Parent Term

Within the text mining process, words are identified
and categorized. A parent term is one that includes
all stemmed versions of the word. The plus (+)
character indicates the word is a parent term.

Random Forest

An ensemble model for regression and classification
based on multiple decision trees to arrive at a model
with greater stability and prediction capability than
a single decision tree (McCarthy et al., 2019).

Receiver Operating Characteristic

A plot of a model’s sensitivity and specificity using
true positive and false positive rates at various
thresholds (McCarthy et al., 2019).

Safety

A risk-based assessment of an operation. Operations
with acceptable risk are deemed safe, while
operations with unacceptable risk are deemed
unsafe (Wood, 2003).

Serious Injury

An injury resulting in more than 48 hours
hospitalization, bone fractures, severe lacerations,
internal injuries, or burns (second or third-degree)
(49 CFR § 830.2).

Text Mining

A form of data mining involving the quantification
of textual data (Shmueli et al., 2016).
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List of Acronyms
ADM

Aeronautical Decision Making

ADS-B

Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast

AGL

Above Ground Level

ANN

Artificial Neural Network

AoA

Angle of Attack

AOPA

Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association

ARC

Aviation Rulemaking Committee

ASAP

Aviation Safety Action Program

ASRS

Aviation Safety Reporting System

ATP

Airline Transport Pilot

CFIT

Controlled Flight Into Terrain

CFR

Code of Federal Regulations

CG

Center of Gravity

CRM

Crew Resource Management

EAB

Experimental Amateur Built

FAA

Federal Aviation Administration

FAAST

Federal Aviation Administration Safety Team

FAR

Federal Aviation Regulation

FOQA

Flight Operational Quality Assurance

FSF

Flight Safety Foundation

GA

General Aviation

GAJSC

General Aviation Joint Steering Committee
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GAO

Government Accountability Office

HF

Human Factors

HFACS

Human Factors Analysis and Classification System

IAF

Initial Approach Fix

ICAO

International Civil Aviation Organization

IEA

International Ergonomics Association

IFR

Instrument Flight Rules

IMC

Instrument Meteorological Conditions

INCOSE

International Council on Systems Engineering

LOC

Loss of Control

LODA

Letter of Deviation Authority

NTSB

National Transportation Safety Board

OOB

Out-of-Bag

ROC

Receiver Operating Characteristic

SMS

Safety Management System

SQL

Structured Query Language

SRM

Safety Risk Management

SVD

Singular Value Decomposition

SVM

Support Vector Machine

VFR

Visual Flight Rules

VMC

Visual Meteorological Conditions
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Chapter II: Review of the Relevant Literature
There will develop a technique and a language of aerial navigation, and
experts will become skilled in contending with the perversity of special
mechanisms in starting and landing under difficult circumstances, in battling with
fog and rain and storm, in taking advantage of air currents at different levels, and
in seeking out the lanes of the atmosphere in which to add to their speed the
sweep of the trade winds.
And over all will soar with the ease of the gull or drive with the speed of
the whirlwind, the myriad of ships of the air, transforming the face of the heavens.
Of many sizes and at many altitudes, midgets and leviathans, close to the earth
and up in the clouds—in the days of the shadows of their wings will speed over
every corner of all the lands and seas, and in the nights of that future time the eyelike gleams of their search-lights will mingle to the uttermost ends of the earth,
beacons of science and romance and progress and brotherhood. (Victor Lougheed,
1909, p. 41)
Following the study foundation laid in the previous chapter, Chapter II proceeds
with a discussion of general aviation in the literature, findings on general aviation safety,
and general aviation safety initiatives. Next, studies researching aspects of aviation
safety, including studies predicting aviation incidents and accidents, are outlined. Finally,
gaps in the literature are presented.
General Aviation in the United States.
It may be argued that from the beginning of powered flight in the United States,
aviation was “general.” To be sure, early flyers such as the Wright brothers sought to sell
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their aircraft to the military (McCullough, 2015). However, in the years following Kitty
Hawk, many pioneers such as Walter Beech, Clyde Cessna, Glenn Curtiss, Lloyd
Stearman, and the Wrights developed aircraft and aircraft components for a myriad of
personal and business purposes (Crehan & Brady, 2000). While discussions of GA may
evoke images of the ubiquitous Cessna and similar aircraft, GA is defined not by a type
of aircraft but by a kind of operation. The standard FAA (2017) definition states that GA
comprises civil aviation flights, not including air carriers, whether or not the air carrier
flights are scheduled or unscheduled. Rules defining GA flight operations are defined in
14 CFR § 91 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) (General Operating and
Flight Rules, 2020). An abbreviated listing of common aviation CFRs are found in Table
2.
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Table 2
Common CFRs for Aircraft Operations
Part

Heading

61

Certification: Pilots, Flight Instructors, and Ground Instructors

67

Medical Standards and Certification

68

Requirements for Operating Certain Small Aircraft Without a Medical
Certificate

91

General Operating and Flight Rules [for General Aviation]

103

Ultralight Vehicles

121

Operating Requirements: Domestic, Flag, and Supplemental Operations

135

Operating Requirements: Commuter and On Demand Operations and
Rules Governing Persons on Board Such Aircraft

136

Commercial Air Tours and National Parks Air Tour Management

137

Agriculture Aircraft Operations

Note. Adapted from the eCFR table of contents (Aeronautics and Space, 2020).

General aviation operations encompass a wide variety of aircraft types and
activities. Aircraft types include single- and multi-engine piston, single- and multi-engine
turboprop, turbojet, helicopter, experimental, and light sport (AOPA, 2018a). Balloons,
blimps, gliders, powered-parachutes, ultralights, and weight shift control aircraft also
operate under GA rules (NTSB, 2020b). Some of the GA activities that fall under Part 91
include recreational flying, air ambulance, business, freight, and law enforcement
(AOPA, 2018a). The BTS (n.d.a) indicates there were 211,749 GA aircraft as of the 2018
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accounting. In comparison, there were 7,397 aircraft recorded under Parts 121 and 135 air
carrier operations (BTS, n.d.a).
Aviation Safety
The early days of powered flight were fraught with accidents as builders
innovated with different materials and aircraft shapes. Engines, propellers, and even
building techniques all needed to be tested. Improvements were made when designs
failed, and system reliability gradually improved. Learning from accidents in the early
days of aviation was key to aviation progress, beginning with the first fatal crash. On
September 17, 1908, Orville Wright and Lieutenant Thomas E. Selfridge were flying a
final sortie during acceptance trials for a potential aircraft purchase by the U.S. Army.
Shortly after takeoff, the aircraft crashed, injuring Mr. Wright and fatally injuring Lt.
Selfridge. The U.S. Army investigated the cause of the accident and found that a new
propeller contacted rudder guy wires leading to a loss of the aircraft directional control
(Martin, 1999). Recalling the 1908 crash, Stolzer, Halford et al. (2008) wrote:
It is fascinating to read this report from the perspective of a century of aviation
safety evolution, and recognized in the reporter’s work the same painstaking
attention to detail and objective analysis that we have come to expect from
present-day NTSB reports. In the description one can see the progenitors of many
of our present-day accepted practices in forensic analysis—crowd control and the
principle of preservation evidence, description of ‘witness’ marks in the
wreckage, identification of probable cause. (p. 43)
While lacking today’s sophistication, the investigation served its purpose, to prevent
future accidents. The report helped the Wrights to improve the aircraft design and
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“marked the beginning of the flight safety program so familiar to us today” (Martin,
1999, p. 2).
James Reason (2000b) wrote, “avoiding [fatalities, injuries and environmental
damage] as far as possible is the objective of the safety sciences” (p. 4). Implementing
the safety objective is as varied as there are organizations and methods to promote safety
and avoid accidents collectively take various forms. One large aviation organization
stated its policy in part, “The [organization as a whole] shall support hazard identification
and mitigation. …When mishaps do occur, investigations must identify the causes and
allow mitigation of hazards to prevent similar occurrences” (USAF, 2019, p.2). Further,
the policy stated a requirement to provide safety training to the workforce, enabling
proactive hazard assessments (USAF, 2019). The parent company for several GA aircraft
manufacturing operations—Beechcraft, Cessna, and Hawker—stated in part their
commitment to the safety of their employees and other stakeholders, “We will actively
champion environmentally sound practices and safe behaviors. We will continuously
improve our processes, require individual accountability and demonstrate leadership to
strive for zero injuries…” (Textron, 2018, para 5). Textron (2018) also stated their belief
that safety begins at the top levels of management, all injuries are preventable, and
employees must be appropriately trained to realize the desired safety state. For a final
example, a large southeast college flight program in the United States stated their
approach to safety as proactive in nature, combining the principles of mishap prevention,
hazard identification, data collection and analysis, and safety education. Moreover, like
Textron, safety begins with organizational leadership (ERAU, 2020). From large, diverse
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fleets, to GA manufacturing, to GA training, the goal is the same; identify and mitigate
hazards to prevent the next accident.
To be sure, there are hazards associated with flying, and sometimes accidents
occur. Investigations are conducted, and from a safety practitioner’s standpoint,
hopefully, they arrive at a root cause. Once root causes are determined, mitigations can
be instituted. It seems clear from the literature that most GA accidents have a human
error component. However, focusing on the pilot can be counterproductive in preventing
the next accident. First, when pilots feel they are going to be blamed, they are less
inclined to be forthcoming with information. Second, accidents rarely occur in a vacuum.
Reason (1997; 2016) argued for a broader view. Certainly, sharp-enders, “those in direct
contact with the system” (Reason, 2016, p. 2) may be causal in an accident sequence.
However, what may be more valuable to preventing the next accident is understanding
underlying factors that created an environment for the accident to occur. Preventing
mishaps requires addressing both active failures, where sharp-enders act unsafely, and
latent conditions, those conditions without which the accident would not have happened
(Reason, 2016). Maurino et al. (2016) wrote of their belief that the time is past for a focus
on the individual. Instead, it is more beneficial to focus on the organization where the
underlying conditions reside. One way of systematically shifting away from the
individual focus to the organization is through the implementation of a Safety
Management System (SMS).
Safety Management Systems
If a system is “a combination of interacting elements organized to achieve one or
more stated purposes” (INCOSE, 2006, p. 1.5), then a safety management system is a
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mechanism for managing the safety aspects of the defined system. The International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) defines safety as “the state in which the possibility of
harm to persons or of property damage is reduced to, and maintained at or below, an
acceptable level through a continuing process of hazard identification and safety risk
management” (ICAO, 2019b, p. 2-1). Due to the complexity and high risks encountered
in aviation, aviation at large adopted the SMS framework to improve and ensure aviation
safety. Safety practitioners realized safety problems might not just reside at the operator
or the equipment, but can have organizational components. Further, as aviation grew to
be a global system, there was a need to establish international safety standards in the form
of a State safety program (ICAO, 2019b). The State-level safety program in the United
States is directed by 14 CFR Part 5 (Safety Management Systems, 2020) and developed
and managed by the FAA (2016). According to federal law, some types of operations,
such as Part 121, are mandated to develop a formal SMS, while others are highly
encouraged to do so (FAA, 2015). The defining characteristic of an SMS, according to
the FAA, is that it is a system to support safety decision making (FAA, 2015).
Explaining the premise of a system approach to addressing human error, Reason
(2000b) wrote, “Humans are fallible and errors are to be expected, even in the best
organizations. Errors are seen as consequences rather than causes, having their origins not
so much in the perversity of human nature as in ‘upstream systematic factors’” (p. 768).
Recognizing the difficulty in changing the human condition, organizations should focus
their efforts on understanding and changing the operating condition. Further, when
accidents occur, the focus should move from individual blame to understanding the
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defense barriers that were breached (Reason, 200b). To Reason (2000a), “Defenses,
barriers, and safeguards occupy a key position in the system approach” (p. 769).
Swiss Cheese Model
The Swiss cheese model is widely used to explain how accidents may occur. If
one considers aircraft operations, there are any number of hazards that exist that provide
the conditions for an accident. Barriers (represented by a slice of Swiss cheese) are
designed to prevent the hazards from becoming an accident factor. However, barriers are
not perfect (represented by the holes in the Swiss cheese). If the holes in the barriers
align, then an accident occurs. Reason (2000a) explained the nature of the barriers:
In an ideal world each defensive layer would be intact. In reality, however, they
are more like slices of Swiss cheese, having many holes—though unlike in the
cheese, these holes are continually opening, shutting, and shifting their location.
The presence of holes in any one “slice” does not normally cause a bad outcome.
Usually, this can happen only when the holes in many layers momentarily line up
to permit a trajectory of accident opportunity—bringing hazards into damaging
contact with victims. (p. 769)
Active failures, such as a pilot violating a standard operating procedure, and latent
conditions, such as a lax safety culture represent the holes. “Active failures are like
mosquitoes. They can be swatted one by one, but they still keep coming. The best
remedies are to…drain the swamps in which they breed. The swamps, in this case, are the
ever present latent conditions” (Reason, 2000a, p. 769).
Active Failures. Active failures most commonly occur with the operator. The
framework proposed by Maurino et al. (2016) breaks active failures into three areas and
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provides a method of identifying potential errors. Active failures are categorized as
knowledge-based, rule-based, and skill-based. Errors within the active failure categories
can range from skill-based slips and lapses resulting in routine violations to knowledgebased mistakes resulting in exceptional violations.
Latent Conditions. Latent conditions represent the operating environment.
Organizationally, the goal of the SMS is to provide depth in the level of safety barriers;
the more barriers, the less likely the Swiss cheese holes will align, ending in an accident
(Reason, 2016). “The key to proactive safety management lies in identifying latent
failures and remedying them before their consequences are visited upon the organization”
(Maurino et al., 2016, p. 26).
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS).
Shappell and Wiegmann (1997; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003), developed
HFACS to provide a tool for identifying the holes theorized in the Swiss cheese model.
HFACS describes four failure levels: unsafe acts; preconditions for unsafe acts; unsafe
supervision; and organizational influences.
Unsafe Acts. HFACS builds on Reason’s (1990) categories of errors and
violations. Errors can be categorized as skill-based errors, decision errors, and perceptual
errors. Violations can be categorized as routine and exceptional. Interestingly, Reason
(2016) has since adopted some of these expansions in his later works.
Preconditions for Unsafe Acts. One level removed from unsafe acts, HFACS
looks at underlying conditions and begins to look at the operating environment. The
HFACS preconditions fall under three branches. The first is the condition of the operators
further divided into adverse mental states, adverse physiological states, and physical or
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mental limitations. The second condition is environmental factors, which has two
branches, physical and technological. The final condition is comprised of personnel
factors divided by crew resource management and personal readiness.
Unsafe Supervision. Once problems with preconditions for unsafe acts are
understood, HFACS broadens to look at how the preconditions are allowed to exist,
leading to unsafe supervision. Again building on Reason (1990), unsafe supervision is
subdivided into four areas: failure to correct a problem, inadequate supervision, planned
inappropriate operations, and violations by the supervisor.
Organizational Influences. At the broadest level, HFACS examines the
organizational setting from the highest levels of the organization. Organizational
influences are comprised of organizational climate, organizational processes, and
resource management.
SMS Components
An SMS is developed around four core pillars: safety policy, safety risk
management, safety assurance, and safety promotion (FAA, 2015; ICAO 2019b). The
safety policy pillar establishes standards and outlines responsibilities. The safety
assurance pillar outlines the processes necessary to ensure essential policies are
implemented and meeting policy goals. The safety promotion pillar helps ensure all
members of the system know their responsibilities and are trained to implement their role
in safety. Finally, the fourth pillar, safety risk management, will be explained in greater
detail in a separate paragraph.
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Safety Risk Management (SRM)
There is a myriad of hazards associated with flying. However, that does not mean
flying is inherently risky; risk can be a subjective term. Because all risks cannot be
avoided, avoiding unnecessary risk has become a major component of aviation safety
(USAF, 2013) that implies active involvement from participants (Stolzer, Halford et al.,
2008). Safety risk management involves processes for “identifying hazards and
mitigating risk based on a thorough understanding of the organizations’ systems and their
operating environment” (FAA, 2015, pp. 4-5). It is within this component that the
reactive, proactive, and predictive aspects of accident prevention are carried out.
Reactive SRM. Reactive SRM is the traditional tool facilitated by accident
investigation and analysis (Baugh, 2020). Stolzer, Halford et al. (2008) refer to this as the
“fly-crash-fix-fly” (p. 215) approach to safety management. Accidents are investigated,
and the lessons learned are used to reevaluate hazards and implement barriers to prevent
similar events in the future. The primary benefit of reactive SRM is the prevention of
similar occurrences in the future. The apparent limitation with reactive SRM is that
incidents and accidents, also known as losses, will have already occurred.
Proactive SRM. Proactive SRM benefits from analysis of operational trends and
near-misses to provide a basis for change before incidents develop into accidents
(Stolzer, Halford et al., 2008). Proactive SRM requires a knowledge of the operating
environment, data capture, and measurement against operating standards. Proactive SRM
also relies on voluntary self-identification of deviations and hazards to support inferential
analysis (Stolzer, Halford et al., 2008). Trends in the deviations provide the basis for
safety efforts to prevent the precursor activities well before the risks can develop further.
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The primary benefit of proactive SRM is the possibility of preventing accidents without a
loss already occurring. The primary shortfall of proactive SRM is that deviations, also
called near-misses or close-calls, represent risks that, but for some factor, could have
developed into an accident.
Predictive SRM. Predictive SRM represents an advancement over both reactive
and proactive methods. Being able to predict problems enables mitigations prior to
incidents and accidents even developing. Stolzer, Halford et al. (2008) wrote, “If we wish
to move to an even higher level [of safety management], the aviation industry must begin
to embrace methods that allow us to better assess complex systems and predict where the
failures may be” (p. 216). One challenge for safety program leaders is that accident rates,
especially for the airline industry, are quite low, making it difficult to analyze and reduce
the existing risks. However, using predictive tools can provide the information needed to
improve safety (Stolzer, Halford et al., 2008). Predictive SRM uses historical
performance data to identify future states with the same attributes (Dean, 2014). Today
there are vast amounts of data available to fuel prediction modeling. While difficult to
analyze using traditional statistical and inferential methods, one way to advance
predictive SRM is through machine learning techniques that have the capability to build
predictive models from the large amounts of operational and safety data generated.
GA Safety Initiatives
A natural outgrowth of safety management efforts is a number of safety initiatives
designed to better prepare pilots for the hazards of aviation and add barriers to hazards
developing into accidents.
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General Aviation Joint Steering Committee (GAJSC). One organization tasked
at the national level to address general aviation safety is the GAJSC. The GAJSC began
with the 1998 Safer Skies Initiative and is comprised of industry and government
stakeholders. The organization charter has evolved, but their most recent goal was to
reduce the GA fatal accident rate incrementally to just one fatal accident per 100,000
hours by 2018 (GAJSC, 2016). To realize their goal, the GAJSC launched several lines of
work. The products of two lines of work, loss of control and system component failure –
powerplant, produced several safety enhancements that are viewable on the GAJSC
website (GAJSC, n.d.). A third group, controlled flight into terrain, has met, and a
published list of recommendations appears to be forthcoming (Haertlein, 2019). A list of
the loss of control safety enhancements can be seen in Table 3.

Table 3
GAJSC Loss of Control Safety Enhancements
Project

Title

1

Angle of Attack (AoA System – New and Current Production

2

Angle of Attach (AoA) Systems – Existing Fleet

3

Aeronautical Decision Making (ADM)

4

Over Reliance on Automation

5

Transition Training

6

Transition Training Letters of Deviation Authority (LODA) for Experimental
Amateur Built (EAB)

7

Utilization of Type Clubs

8

Flight Training after Period of Inactivity

9

Part 135 Safety Culture
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Project

Title

10

Stabilized Approach and Landing

12

Weather Technology – Weather Cameras

R1

Expanded Weather Camera Network

13

Weather Technology – Use of Available Weather Information

14

Engine Monitoring Technology

15

Flight After Use of Medication with Sedating Effects

16

Flight with Impairing or Incapacitating Medical Conditions – Improve
Medical Records

17

Flight with Impairing or Incapacitating Medical Conditions – Barriers to
Communication

21

Risk Based Flight Review

22

Flight Data Monitoring

23

E-AB/Flight Test

24

Single-Pilot Crew Resource Management (CRM)

25

Reduce Regulatory Roadblocks (R3)- Streamline Novel Technology

26

Reduce Regulatory Roadblocks (R3) – Part 23 Aviation Rulemaking
Committee (ARC)

27

Reduce Regulatory Roadblocks (R3) – Review of 14 CFR 21.8 and 21.9

28

Pilot Response to Unexpected Events

30

Medication List for Pilots

31

Test Pilot Utilization and Experimental Amateur Built (EAB) Proficiency

32

Airman Certification Standards

33

Safety Culture

34

Safety Outreach

Note. Adapted from GAJSC (n.d.).

National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). The NTSB is well known for
its independent role in investigating transportation accidents, conducting safety studies,
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and recommending safety improvements (NTSB, n.d.a). In addition to the causal finding
accident reports, every one to two years, the NTSB publishes a “most wanted list” to
focus attention on safety trends with many issue areas applying to all modes of
transportation. Four topics from 2011-2020 deal specifically with GA operations
including the following areas: preventing LOC in GA (2015-2018); improving GA safety
(2011-2013), identifying and communicating hazardous weather for GA (2014);
enhancing safety in public helicopter operations (2015); and addressing the unique
aspects of helicopter operations (NTSB, 2020a). The full NTSB most wanted lists
applicable to aviation are compiled in Appendix D.
FAA Safety Briefing. The FAA Safety Briefing, published as an online magazine
six times per year, is billed as “the safety policy voice of non-commercial general
aviation” (FAA, 2020a, para. 1) with topics selected by the safety briefing editorial staff.
Topics have included unfriendly weather, knowing your aircraft, flight fundamentals, and
safety culture, among many others. In addition to the safety magazine, the FAA has
produced a series of GA safety topic fact sheets that cover topics to enhance pilot skills.
Many of the fact sheets support both the NTSB's most wanted and GAJSC safety efforts.
A list of the fact sheets can be found in Appendix E.
Studies of GA Accidents and Correlating Variables
Malcolm Ritchie (1988) wrote, “the three classes of aviation in the United States
are military, airlines, and everybody else” (p. 561). The broadness of everybody else
points to the difficulty in researching generalizable GA accident factors. Despite the
challenge, many scholarly studies have been undertaken to research aspects of GA
accidents. With many studies, there are as many ways to categorize them when
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conducting a review. The following paragraphs will outline the primary predictor or
outcome variables that have been used as correlates, a review of studies covering
different categories of GA aircraft, and those studies with a particular Human Factors
focus.
Review of GA Safety Studies
It may be instructive to begin with an overview of GA safety and studies with
broad implications. Boyd (2017a) provided a 33-year look at non-revenue-generating
fixed-wing flight with specific attention given to particular areas: new training and
technology; crashworthiness initiatives; human factors and aviation psychology; and,
pilot physiology and toxicology. Several risk factors were identified, including weather,
mountainous flying, flight distance, night flying, and gender. Studies of flight experience
as a risk factor report mixed results (Boyd 2017a). When considering safety
improvements, Boyd (2017a) reported training improvements to focus on risk
management and relevance to real-world situations. Regarding occupant survivability, the
lack of seatbelt use was implicated as a significant factor for fatalities in survivable
accidents. Other risk factors included unsafe behavior, in-flight decision making, and
pilot health (Boyd 2017a). The factors noted by Boyd (2017b) may be viewed as an
overview of the more recent findings.
Wiegmann and Taneja (2003) conducted a more focused study researching fatal
accident injuries. Blunt trauma was the leading cause of fatalities. Improving
survivability should include further studies into “attenuating the energy of a crash before
it can be transmitted to an individual…[and] further development in the areas of
improving restraint systems” (Wiegmann & Taneja, 2003, p. 576). The final
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recommendation of Wiegmann and Taneja (2003) was for investigators. Reports need to
include crashworthiness factors and documentation of the sources of injuries to
understand the mechanisms of the crash environment.
Perhaps there is no surprise that common categories of variables are used in
accident studies. The reason for some of the commonalities likely relates to how accident
data are recorded. Many accident studies rely on data captured by NTSB investigators,
and, by definition in archival research, one gets what is previously recorded. Differences
in studies often reduce to periods covered, the target sample, variations on variable
combinations used for correlation models, and analysis method. What follows is a
discussion of common variables used in studying GA hazards, risks, and accidents.
Coverage of common demographic variables. Depending on the counting
method, there are hundreds of possible variables in the NTSB database. A pilot’s age,
sex, flight experience, and flight hours are some of the most commonly used variables.
These four variables are introduced in the next paragraphs.
Pilot Age. A pilot’s age has been used as both a predictor and a control variable in
many studies. Age may be a factor in GA accidents since there is a decline in some
cognitive and performance capabilities and health implications with age (Boyd, 2018;
Tsang, 1992; Kennedy et al., 2010; Van Benthem & Herdman, 2016). In airline
operations, a pilot must retire at age 65, and until 2006, the age was 60 (FAA, 2019c),
while there is no age restriction in GA operations (Certification: Pilots, 2020). Some
studies use combinations of a pilot’s age and flight experience to explain the findings (Li
et al., 2003). Older pilots are at a higher risk for accidents (Li & Baker, 2007; McFadden,
2003; Shao et al., 2014a, 2014b), and pilots over 60 were found to have a greater risk of
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involvement in a fatal accident (Bazargan & Guzhva, 2011). Contrarily, Boyd (2015)
found that increased age was not a risk factor for fatal accidents, and Morris (2018) found
younger pilots have a greater probability of being involved in an accident than older
pilots. In Groff & Price (2006), age at the time of earning the first pilot certification
mattered with higher accident risks associated with private pilot certification after age 25.
In Li et al. (2001), the researchers found no association between age (or gender) and
increased probabilities of committing a pilot error.
Tsang (1992) conducted a review of the literature on how age affects key
cognitive functions used by pilots. The core functions are memory, perceptual processing,
problem-solving, and psychomotor coordination. Cognitive slowing begins around age
25, though the degree to which slowing matters in operations is at the heart of the various
studies.
The analysis of the literature indicates that different types of memory are affected
by age. What is not known is if age effects on memory are different in pilots than in the
general population. Studies show an age-related decline in perceptual processing;
however, the research is unclear as to any significance to operations. Age does not appear
to affect problem-solving when considering the person’s area of expertise. Finally,
psychomotor coordination can decline with age; however, the data suggests that
experience and practice can mitigate declines. The broad summary indicated experience
could mitigate aging effects (Tsang, 1992).
Li et al. (2003) designed a study to analyze the risk of accidents with commuter
air carrier and air taxi pilots. The study spanned 1987 to 1997 and included pilots age 4557. They found that the risk of accidents in the targeted age range remained stable.
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Nevertheless, flight experience was shown to be a significant protective factor, especially
for those pilots with 5,000 to 9,999 hours. The research suggested that after 10,000 hours,
the protective effect plateaued.
Van Benthem and Herdman (2016) delved into the relationship of age, pilot
expertise, and cognitive factors through a GA aircraft simulator experiment. Their results
showed that older pilots with fewer flight hours experienced significantly more flight
path deviations in the simulator. They were not willing to say that experience mediates
for cognitive decline because there may be other factors involved such as flying skills.
What seemed clear was that cognitive flexibility, visual attention, speed, and working
memory predict pilot performance (Van Benthem & Herdman, 2016).
Because there is no upper age limit for GA flying, Boyd (2018) developed a study
to determine if medical standards are adequate to address the needs of octogenarian
aviators. What he found was that the accident rate for the 80 and older pilot population
was increasing. Landing accidents, twice the rate of younger pilots, were most prevalent
with many related to flaring errors or loss of directional control. Given the pilot’s
experience in both total time and recency, the problems were not likely skill-based
(Boyd, 2018).
Pilot Sex. The results of studies comparing males and females have shown
varying results. To illustrate, females may be safer than males (Vail & Ekman, 1986),
females may be safer in some phases but not in others (Walton & Politano, 2016), there is
no real difference between males and females in accident rates (Bazargan & Guzhva,
2011; Ison, 2015; Li et al., 2001; McFadden, 1996, 1997; Mitchell et al., 2005), or males
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are at higher risk for fatalities (Bazargan & Guzhva, 2011; Li & Baker, 2007; McKay &
Groff, 2016).
Vail and Ekman (1986) analyzed all accidents from 1972 through 1982 to
determine whether accident rates differ between male and female pilots. They determined
that males had a higher rate of accidents and a higher rate of severe injuries and fatalities
when compared to females. Their conclusion was striking and spoke to the potential bias
of the day (Vail & Eckman, 1986):
This study has shown that not only are females significantly safer pilots as far as
accident rates are concerned, in every way in which the data were compared, but
that they also kill themselves off at a significantly lower rate when they do have
pilot-error accidents, in this still male-dominated profession. (p. 303)
Walton and Politano (2016) conducted their study using the NTSB database with
a sample comprised of GA accidents from 1982 to 2014 to determine differences in
accident severity by females and males. They found that females of lesser experience had
significantly higher accident rates than males, whereas females with higher levels of
experience had significantly fewer accidents (Walton & Politano, 2016).
Burgess, Walton et al. (2018) delved into the relationship of pilot sex to helicopter
accidents, specifically if patterns in the fixed-wing community were present in the rotorwing community. Reviewing 6,678 accidents from 1982 to 2014, the authors researched
the relationship between flight hours, sex, aircraft damage, and injuries. They found no
difference between males and females in terms of aircraft damage and injuries.
Additionally, there were no significant differences with respect to flight hours and

45
accidents. Finally, the results of the rotor-wing pilots were similar to prior studies with
fixed-wing pilots.
Flight Experience. Flight experience is a latent variable that is defined for each
study. Common observed variables used to assess flight experience include combinations
of total flight hours (Burgess, Walton et al., 2018), recent flight hours, pilot certification
level, and advanced certifications (Bazargan & Guzhva, 2007; Bazargan & Guzhva,
2011; Boyd, 2015; Boyd, 2017a; Groff & Price, 2006; Li & Baker, 2007; McFadden,
2003; Shao et al., 2014a, 2014b).
Flight Hours. Many measures of flight hours may be used in accident research.
Standard accounting of hours includes a pilot’s total flight hours, aircraft type, aircraft
make, pilot-in-command, last 24-hours, and last 30/60/90-days (Bazargan & Guzhva,
2007; Houston et al., 2012; McFadden, 1997; Salvatore et al., 1986; Uitdewilligen & de
Voogt, 2009). Flight hours are also used as a component of flight experience and pilot
proficiency (Fanjoy & Keller, 2013).
Coverage of Common Situational Variables
Instructional Flights. A large portion of GA operations involves flight
instruction. Instructional accidents occur with pilots of varying skills from the newest
pilots to those upgrading their certificates or graduating to different aircraft types.
Uitdewilligen and De Voogt (2009) studied accidents of student pilots flying solo
between 2001 and 2005. They found that injury and fatality rates were lower in student
solo flights than with other instructional flights, and most accidents were in the landing
phase with errors in flaring. The results indicated a higher risk of injury when
instructional flights involved pilots with more than 100 hours of flight time.
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In a similar study, Boyd and Dittmer (2012) researched solo student accidents
except with a broader sample covering 1994 through 2013. They found that 90% of the
accidents had minor or no injuries, though 97% of the aircraft had substantial damage.
Similar to Uitdewilligen and De Voogt (2009), Boyd and Dittmer (2012) found that more
than 70% of the accidents were in the landing phase, with a third of those due to excess
speed.
Loss of control in GA instructional flights was the subject of a study by Houston
et al. (2012). The purpose was to discover secondary factors that contributed to LOC
accidents. The majority of the accidents occurred in the landing phase, with a second
significant portion occurring during takeoff, a go-around, or a climb after takeoff.
Through their study of 147 GA instructional accidents, they found a correlation between
accumulated flight hours and crash location, and analyzing the causal chain is vital in
determining accident causes. While not a key aim of the study, the researchers found a
lack of information in many reports where there was no underlying analysis explaining
the factors leading to the LOC condition (Houston et al., 2012).
Lee et al. (2017) studied the reports of 293 accidents involving instructional
flights in the United States. They found that in fatal accidents, it was four times more
likely to be a flight with both a student and an instructor suggesting instructor
deficiencies in supervising the student. Most accidents were local (i.e., not crosscountry), most accidents were in the landing phase, most of the landing accidents were
related to skill-based errors, and most of the landing accidents were nonfatal. Finally, the
researchers found that accidents involving decision deficiencies involved more fatal
outcomes (Lee et al., 2017).
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Flight Distance. Flight distance is often used as a measure of risk exposure and
may be used in measures of nautical miles from the point of departure or may be
categorical like local or cross-country (Boyd, 2015; Boyd, 2017; Lee et al., 2017).
Aircraft Complexity. Complexity is defined by the researchers and is often
defined by the number and type of engines (Bazargan & Guzhva, 2007; Boyd, 2015;
Boyd & Stolzer, 2016), aircraft size (Boyd, 2015), speeds (Boyd, 2015), and landing gear
type (Bazargan & Guzhva, 2007; Rostykus et al., 1998).
Post-crash Fire. The presence of a post-crash fire or explosion has been cited in
several studies and is often associated with off-airport accidents (Ballard et al., 2013;
Boyd, 2015; Handel & Yackel, 2011; Li & Baker, 1999; Li & Baker, 2007; Rostykus et
al., 1998). When a post-crash fire occurs, fatality rates increase (Rostykus et al., 1998).
Air medical flights were shown to have a higher fatality rate than non-medical flights
when a post-crash fire occurred (Handel & Yackel, 2011).
Time of Day. Time of day can be significant in many respects, though it is often
used as an indicator of prevailing visibility (Boyd, 2017; Handel & Yackel, 2011; Li &
Baker, 1999). Different light conditions can hinder a pilot’s ability to judge distances and
see other aircraft (Bazargan & Guzhva, 2007; Boyd, 2015; Handel & Yackel, 2011).
Flying during dark hours typically comes with a higher risk than daylight (Handel &
Yackel, 2011).
Off-airport. A location variable can take different forms, such as on- or offairport or in maneuvering and enroute phases. When it comes to emergency landings,
there are many considerations, though it has been shown that landings off-airport,
especially when combined with a post-crash fire are the most deadly (Ballard et al., 2013;
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Boyd, 2015; Houston et al., 2012; Li & Baker, 1999; Li & Baker, 2007; Rostykus et al.,
1998). While enroute or maneuvering, the terrain feature was shown to be a factor in
accident outcomes, with mountainous areas being the most dangerous for GA flights
(Boyd, 2017; Ison, 2014).
Restraints / Seatbelts. Seatbelts and shoulder harnesses are not typically involved
in the causal portion of the accident. However, their use can make a difference between a
survivable outcome or a fatal outcome (Bazargan & Guzhva, 2007; Boyd, 2017a, Li &
Baker, 1999; Li & Baker, 2007; Rostykus et al., 1998; Wiegmann &Taneja, 2003).
Professional Pilot / Second Pilot. Intuitively it would make sense that
professional pilots perform better than non-professionals due to experience. Ison (2015)
determined that while professional pilots certainly had more experience, they tended to
have more fatalities primarily due to acrobatic mishaps. The presence of a second pilot
would seem to be helpful to assist with the complexities of flight, though this is not
always the case (Bazargan & Guzhva, 2007).
Weather-related Accidents. Numerous researchers have studied accidents with a
weather component (Boyd, 2017a; Handel & Yackel, 2011; Li & Baker, 1999; Liu et al.,
2013). For example, Wiggins and O’Hare (1995) researched weather-related decisionmaking. Specific weather factors such as winds, either straight line, crosswinds, tailwind,
or gusts, may play a factor in an accident (Mclean, 1986; Wiegmann et al., 2005) as well
as general flight conditions such as IMC or VMC (Ballard et al., 2013; Boyd, 2015; Li &
Baker, 2007). A pilot’s perception of weather risks can also be a factor in accidents
(Shappell et al., 2010). Ison (2014) used weather briefings as a variable in studying
accident outcomes.
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One of the more commonly cited works is McLean (1986). He noted that
unfavorable winds on approach and landing accounted for the greatest number of GA
accidents. However, continued VFR flight into IFR was the most frequent cause of fatal
accidents. Perhaps the most significant contribution of the McLean (1986) study is a
discussion of investigation techniques to determine the weather elements vital to the
understanding of accidents.
Shappell et al. (2010) sought to understand factors relating to why pilots
encounter poor weather. The study was somewhat novel in that the research team
interviewed 27 pilots who had been involved in adverse weather events. The results
suggested a misunderstanding or lack of appreciation for the hazards of weather.
Acceptance of unnecessary risks was anecdotally linked to outside influences and
sometimes mechanical issues (Shappell et al., 2010).
Weight and Balance Issues. Given that one-third of Americans are affected by
obesity, and that weight can negatively impact flight characteristics, Boyd (2016)
researched accidents where weight and balance or center of gravity (CG) issues were
implicated. He found no correlation between rising body mass and weight and
balance/CG accident rates. Boyd (2016) did find that 57% of the accidents were fatal,
with the majority related to aircraft out of weight limits but within CG limits.
Coverage of Common Skill-related Variables. Borrowing from HFACS
(Shappell & Wiegmann, 1997; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003), the next set of studies
relate to GA pilot skill-based errors. The research includes landing accidents (Boyd,
2019; Rao & Puranik, 2018), midair collisions (De Voogt and Van Doorn, 2006), and
pilot proficiency (Fanjoy & Keller, 2013; Salvatore et al., 1986).
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LOC. The LOC accident can occur in many phases of flight with different
severity risks and different initiates (Lee et al., 2017; Rao & Marais, 2020). Risk of LOC
can vary by accumulated flight hours (Houston et al., 2012), and may be riskier for
females in helicopter hovering (Burgess, Walton et al., 2018). Risks of a LOC event may
be different by pilot qualification, though Shao et al. (2014a) found that LOC risk did not
vary between IFR and non-IFR qualified pilots in the landing and takeoff phases.
Landing Accidents. Landing accidents for GA fixed-wing aircraft are the single
biggest accident category at almost three times the next category. They account for 44%
of all accidents, yet they account for the smallest number of fatalities (AOPA, 2019).
Attempting to land while unstabilized is a critical factor in landing risk (Rao & Puranik,
2018). Further, most instructional flight accidents occurred in the landing phase (Boyd &
Dittmer, 2012; Lee et al., 2017; Uitdewilligen & De Voogt, 2009)
Rao and Puranik (2018) conducted a study to analyze the causes of unstabilized
approaches in GA accidents. Unstabilized approaches are a well-known hazard in both
airline and GA flying; however, relatively few studies focus attention on GA. “A stable
approach requires a methodical sequence of changes to an aircraft’s state while satisfying
pre-defined safety criteria” (Rao & Puranik, 2018, p. 1). The Flight Safety Foundation
(FSF, 2000) recommended that the criteria for landing are met prior to reaching 500 feet
AGL in VMC/ 1,000 feet AGL in IMC, and should include the following areas:
- The flight path is correct;
- Only small changes are necessary for the aircraft to stay on the flight path;
- The aircraft speed is not too fast or too slow;
- The gear and flaps are set correctly;
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- The sink rate is controlled at 1,000 feet per minute or less;
- Power settings are appropriate according to the flight manuals;
- Required briefings have been completed; and
- Instrument approach tolerances are maintained (FSF, 2000).
Additionally, Rao and Puranik (2018) found the most frequent cause of landing accidents
(42.4%) to be airspeed related, and 29% of those accidents involved stalls on the final
approach due to AoA exceedance. Behind airspeed was a failure to maintain the
necessary glidepath (28%).
Boyd (2019) delved further into the research on GA landing accidents by focusing
on excessive landing speeds and the relation to accident injury severity. Two categories
of landing accidents were identified from the NTSB reports between 1997 and 2016. Low
energy (low airspeed) accidents related to aircraft stalls. High energy (high airspeed)
accidents related to bounces, floating, or porpoising. Boyd (2019) found high energy GA
landing accidents to be correlated with more severe injuries.
Midair Accidents. Using the NTSB reports for 2000-2004, De Voogt and Van
Doorn (2006) looked at midair collisions to determine common situational characteristics
but with a focus on radio communications and aircraft altitude at the time of the collision.
The sample included all Part 91 operations, including public use flights, Part 135
operations, and Part 137 operations. During the study time, there were 48 midair
collisions. De Voogt and Van Doorn (2006) identified a limitation determining
communications issues as in 14 of the accidents there were no indications in the report of
any communications. Interestingly, in 16 of the midair accidents, the aircraft were under
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ATC control. Additionally, while traffic pattern accidents are more frequent than other
types, they are often less fatal.
Pilot Proficiency. A common premise in studies asserts that pilots with an airline
transport pilot (ATP) certificate are safer than those flying under lesser certificates.
Salvatore et al. (1986) conducted a study to compare ATP certified pilots in GA accidents
with private pilots. Overall, the ATPs had fewer accidents than private pilots, and their
accidents were largely non-skill related. Aerobatic accidents accounted for 14% of ATP
accidents and 50% of the ATP accidents fatalities. In other phases of flight, ATPs fared
better overall, likely due to their level of flight proficiency (Salvatore et al., 1986).
Fanjoy and Keller (2013) studied IFR accidents in GA between 2002 and 2012,
specifically looking at the pilot's instrument proficiency check currency and possible
relationships in the approach phase. Within the sample of 31 pilots, the number one cause
of instrument approach accidents was a failure to control the aircraft, followed by a
failure to follow instrument procedures, proceeding below weather minimums, airspeed
issues, spatial disorientation, CFIT, and not initiating a missed approach.
Human Factors
Human factors (HF) is concerned with “understanding interactions among
humans and other elements of a system, and the profession that applies theory, principles,
data, and other methods to design in order to optimize human well-being and overall
system performance” (IEA, 2020, para 1). Practitioners of HF “analyze the factors (e.g.,
human information processing, situation awareness, mental models, workload and
fatigue, human error) that influence decision making and apply this knowledge to identify
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potential hindrances to successful task performance, at both the individual and team
level” (Cuevas et al., 2018, p. 1).
The study of HF in aviation dates back to World War II when increasingly
complex aircraft systems were introduced, and the need to understand the limits of human
capabilities interacting with the systems was recognized (Cuevas et al., 2018; Stone et al.,
2018).
Li (1994) conducted an extensive meta-analysis of the literature concerning pilotrelated factors in an aircraft accident from the 1930s to the late 1990s. More of an
exposition on how to conduct better aviation research, one conclusion of interest is that
violations of regulations needed more attention in the literature. The primary outcome
was that more epidemiologic studies of pilot-related factors are needed, and using stateof-the-art methodologies can assist in identifying accident risk factors.
McFadden and Towell (1999) took a similar approach when reviewing previous
studies on pilot error. They aimed to analyze past methods and propose a framework for
future studies that research more complex HF interactions. While the study was airline
focused, the point of their research applies to GA research; pilot error is a complex study
requiring insight into underlying relationships.
The team of Wiegmann et al. (2005) applied HFACS to 14,436 GA accidents that
occurred between 1990 and 2000. They found that skill-based errors were most common
and accounted for the first HF component in the accident chain in almost half of the
accidents. Accidents involving violations were the most deadly. Comparing the HFACS
classifications with the NTSB cause codes, Wiegmann et al. (2005) found that the top
five skill-based errors were maintaining directional control (on the ground), airspeed,
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stall/spin, aircraft control (in the air), and wind compensation. The top five decision
errors related to in-flight planning, pre-flight planning, managing fuel, terrain selection
(for taxi, takeoff, and landing), and decisions to go-around. Perceptual errors involved
misjudgments of distance, flare, altitude, clearance, and visual/aural perception. Finally,
the top five violations were continued VFR flight into IMC, disregarding known
procedures, operating unsafe aircraft, hazardous maneuvers, and flying into bad weather
(Wiegmann et al., 2005).
Erjavac et al. (2018) sought to model the preconditions to human error in air
carrier and GA operations. Their goal was to determine the relationship between active
and latent factors in Part 91 and Part 121 multi-engine accidents that occurred between
2006 and 2015. One finding was a validation that the Part 91 pilots and the Part 121
pilots came from different populations. Agreeing with Wiegmann et al. (2005), accidents
involving violations resulted in a higher incidence of severe injuries and fatalities
(Erjavac et al., 2018).
Drugs & Alcohol. Just like with motor vehicles, operating an aircraft while under
the influence of drugs or alcohol increases accident risk (Li & Baker, 2007), and drug use
in pilots while flying appears to be increasing (McKay & Groff, 2016). Drugs and
alcohol, along with cardiovascular or cerebrovascular events, are the most probable
causes of pilot incapacitation (Booze, 1987; Taneja & Wiegmann, 2002). Prior alcoholrelated events on the ground provide a risk marker for pilots (Li, Baker, Qiang et al.,
2005), and alcohol use has been specifically implicated in continued VFR flight into IMC
accidents (Li, Baker, Lamb et al., 2005).
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Taneja and Wiegmann (2002) conducted a more narrow HF study to analyze
incidents of in-flight impairment and incapacitation in GA accidents. Reviewing NTSB
and FAA crash data from 1990 through 1998, the authors found 216 accidents relating to
their study. The most common causes of incapacitation were from drugs and alcohol,
accounting for 72.2% of the accidents. Cardiovascular-related causes of impairment
accounted for another 12.03% of the accidents. While pilot health is a concern, the
primary lesson learned is the importance of not flying while under the influence of drugs
and alcohol (Taneja & Wiegmann, 2002). Taneja and Wiegmann (2002) generally agree
with Booze (1987), who also found the most likely causes of incapacitation in GA pilots
to be alcohol, drugs, and cardiovascular/cerebrovascular events. What appears to have
changed is the number of drug and alcohol accidents, only at 7.7 % (Booze, 1987),
although this may be due to different reporting and accounting. Booze (1987) did
determine the risk of incapacitation increased with age, but the risk is less than that in the
general public.
Building on risks related to operating vehicles while intoxicated, Li, Baker, Qiang
et al. (2005) designed a study to assess whether a history of driving while intoxicated
(DWI) served as a risk indicator for GA pilots. They found that of the pilots with a
history of DWI, there was a 43% risk increase of involvement in a future aviation
accident. Less experienced older males were also at an increased risk (Li, Baker, Qiang et
al., 2005). In a related study led by Li and Baker (Li, Baker, Lamb et al., 2005),
researchers focused on pilots from fatal accidents in three states. They noted that alcohol
use was particularly detrimental in its correlation to continued VFR flight into IMC
fatalities.
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McKay and Groff (2016) continued research on drug use in aviation in all forms,
including over-the-counter drugs, prescription medication, and illicit drugs. Using data
from the NTSB and the FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute toxicology database, the
researchers analyzed the information of 6,677 pilots from fatal accidents that occurred
between 1990 and 2012. All pilots in the sample had some form of drugs in their system;
the researchers wanted to know what kinds and the likelihood of impairment. Most of the
pilots were flying as GA (96%) and were primarily male (98%). The study noted an
upward trend in the use of all categories of potentially impairing drugs, with the most
common being diphenhydramine found in many common over-the-counter medicines.
And while not significant, there was an increasing amount of accidents where the pilot
tested positive for marijuana (McKay & Groff, 2016).
Violations. Violations are defined in HFACS as “a willful departure from those
practices deemed necessary to safely conduct operations” (Shappell & Wiegmann, 1997,
p. 274). Fatal and non-fatal accidents can frequently be traced back to violations (Boyd &
Stolzer, 2016; Erjavac et al., 2018; Shappell & Wiegmann, 1997; Wiegmann et al., 2005),
and pilots with a history of violations are at greater risk for future accidents (Li & Baker,
2007). Moreover, violations are often the predecessor to continued VFR flight into IMC
(Detwiler et al., 2008).
VFR to IMC Accidents. The most deadly accidents by percentage involve
continued VFR flight into IMC (AOPA, 2019), a condition that has endured for decades
(McLean, 1986; Wiegmann et al., 2005). These accidents are related to decision errors
and violations (Detwiler et al., 2008), can be linked to overconfidence (Goh &
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Wiegmann, 2001), and are generally associated with lesser pilot certification levels (Ison,
2014).
Inadvertent flight into IMC weather conditions while flying under VFR rules may
not account for the most accidents, but they do account for the highest fatality rate of
weather-related accidents (Detwiler et al., 2008; McLean, 1986). Some of the associated
variables include overconfidence (Goh & Wiegmann, 2001), visibility miscalculations
(Detwiler et al., 2008; Goh & Wiegmann, 2001), and violations (Detwiler et al., 2008;
Ison, 2004).
Goh and Wiegmann (2001) investigated decision-making for continued flight
from VFR to IMC. Using a flight simulator, pilots flew a sortie beginning in VFR
conditions. After about 45 minutes of flying, the weather deteriorated to below VFR
minimums. Pilots were then given a time window to decide to turn back or press on to
their destination. The researchers found 68.75% of the pilots erroneously pressed on to
their destination. Their findings suggest poor diagnoses of the visibility and
overconfidence in piloting skill correlate with continued VFR flight into IMC (Goh &
Wiegmann, 2001).
Detwiler et al. (2008) use HFACS to examine the causal factors behind the GA
pilot’s VFR flight into IMC. Their study included fixed- and rotor-wing accidents
between 1990 and 2004. Subject matter experts reviewed the NTSB findings and
categorized each according to 10 HFACS causal categories. The results indicated that
decision errors, perception errors, and violations were the most prevalent factors in the
accidents (Detwiler et al., 2008).
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Ison (2014) sought to determine the correlates of GA pilot characteristics and
situational factors with continued VFR flight into IMC. Initial input variables included
age, contact with ATC, flight plan filed, pilot certificate, pilot flight hours, terrain, time
of day, and whether the pilot received a weather briefing before the flight. Ison (2014)
found that terrain (mountainous areas being more troublesome) and the weather briefing
(perhaps related to violations) were significant predictors. He found a negative
correlation with pilot certification level and the likelihood of a VFR to IMC accident, and
younger pilots were more likely to press into IMC.
Decision Making. Decision making is one of the human factors studied by
researchers. Topics of research included the decision to fly VFR into IMC (Detwiler et
al., 2008; Goh & Wiegmann, 2001; Ison, 2014; Shappell et al., 2010), the decision to turn
back or to continue to the destination in the face of weather (Wiggins & O’Hare, 1995),
the effects of age on decision making (Kennedy et al., 2010), and the decision to fly in
too close of a proximity to convective weather (Boyd, 2017a).
One of the oft-cited experimental studies came from Wiggins and O’Hare (1995),
where they researched the GA pilot’s weather-related decision making. Using a sample of
pilots from New Zealand, the authors were presented a general problem-solving test and
several aeronautical-based decision-making scenarios. Wiggins and O’Hare found that
experienced pilots were able to make decisions more efficiently, and novices and experts
view problems differently and access information differently. Given the scenario, novice
pilots chose the wrong course of action more times than the intermediate and expert
pilots. Additionally, the time to make the decisions was longer for the novices.
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Kennedy et al. (2010) developed an experimental study using a flight simulator to
study aviation decision-making with respect to age and expertise effects. Using a sample
of 72 GA pilots, all IFR certified, they presented scenarios requiring a land/go-around
decision and holding. They found that older pilots—those over 41-years old—were more
likely to attempt landing below the visibility minima. Age-related factors may affect
certain flying tasks. The hypothesis of better decisions related to more experience was not
supported. When measures of cognition were entered in the model, processing speed
became a significant predictor; faster processing and more experience correlated with
better performance (Kennedy et al., 2010).
More recently, Boyd (2017b) conducted a decision-making study with GA pilots
focusing on thunderstorm-related accidents and whether or not pilots had violated the
FAA-prescribed storm clearance distances. They found that 93% of thunderstorm-related
landing accidents and 77% of enroute accidents involved a violation of the recommended
separation distances. The numbers are significant given a 70% fatality rate in
thunderstorm related accidents (Boyd, 2017b).
Other GA Aircraft Studies
Sport Aircraft. While not large in number, at least two studies looked at aircraft
that were not in the fixed-wing or rotor-wing categories. The first was a descriptive study
by Skelley et al. (2016), who described pilot injuries from powered parachute accidents.
While not germane to discussions on pilot performance, Skelley et al. (2016) made
design recommendations to increase a pilot’s safety in an accident. The second study was
by Van Doorn and De Voogt (2011), who researched sport aviation accidents comprised
of balloons, blimps, gliders, gyroplanes, and ultralights. They determined that risks and

60
accident rates vary within the sport aviation category, but that accidents in amateur-built
aircraft carried a higher chance of fatality by a factor of 1.6 (Van Doorn & De Voogt,
2011).
Oceanic Flight. De Voogt and Heijnen (2009) studied aviation accidents over the
Pacific Ocean. Their research included all GA accidents (fixed- and rotor-wing) that
occurred between 1964 and 2004. Over the 40 years, there were 67 accidents (39 fixedwing; 28 rotor-wing) that fit the search criteria. Ultimately the De Voogt and Heijnen
(2009) study was descriptive and did not delve into correlations and causal chains.
Rotor-wing. De Voogt and Van Doorn (2007) conducted a study of 4,863
helicopter accidents between 1982 and 2006. While the title suggests the study
methodology was data mining, the authors only reported descriptive information and
accident counts. Like fixed-wing accidents, helicopter accidents were most lethal in poor
weather. Additionally, the authors concluded that the primary causes of helicopter
accidents were not specific to rotor-wing operations (De Voogt & Van Doorn, 2007).
De Voogt, Uitdewilligen et al. (2009) built on De Voogt and Van Dorn (2007) by
researching the role of additional crew members in preventing accidents in high-risk
helicopter operations. Analyzing 142 accidents between 1998 and 2005, the authors
found that while the pilots, on the whole, were extremely qualified, the nature of the
operation placed high demands on the pilot. The recommendation was to include
qualified ground crew and possibly additional flight crew members to mitigate the risks.
Because additional crew can become victims, ground crew members seem to be the best
option to reduce accidents (De Voogt et al., 2009).

61
Medical Flights. Handel and Yackel (2011) sought to analyze fixed-wing
medical flight fatalities compared with helicopter medical flights and overall GA fatality
rates. The accidents spanned 1984 to 2009. Several input variables were used, such as
light conditions, time of day, weather conditions, whether or not the accident was in
flight or on the ground, and the presence of a post-crash fire. There were significantly
more fatalities in medical flights, and post-crash fires were the greatest predictor of
fatalities (Handel & Yackel, 2011).
Boyd and Macchiarella (2016) focused on GA helicopter accidents involving
emergency medical transport. Their time frame spanned 1983-2014. The purpose of the
study was to determine accident rates and causes, injury profiles, and adherence to
crashworthiness standards. The underlying correlations and causes were not explored.
Aviation Accidents Prediction Studies
It is well understood that learning from past accidents is essential, but being able
to predict accidents before they happen protects lives and property. Many studies from
different angles have sought to determine variables and create models useful for
predicting accidents. For example, overarching studies looked at GA accident risk factors
(Li & Baker, 2007; Rostykus et al., 1998) predicting fatalities in GA accidents (Bazargan
& Guzhva, 2011; Diamoutene et al., 2018; Shao et al., 2014a, 2014b), factors for
predicting accidents (Ison 2015; Knecht, 2013, 2015; Li & Baker, 1999; Morris, 2018;
Valdés et al., 2018), and factors for predicting airline accidents (McFadden, 1997, 2003).
Studies conducted to predict accidents in specific sub-sets of aviation include air tour
crashes (Ballard et al., 2013), turbine-powered aircraft (Boyd & Stolzer, 2016), business
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aircraft (Burgess, Boyd et al., 2018), helicopters (Rao, 2016), and weather-related
accidents (Groff & Price, 2006; Insua et al., 2019; Ison, 2014).
The purpose of the McFadden (1997) study was to predict aviation accidents in
male and female airline pilots using logistic regression. Model inputs included age, total
flight hours, recent flight hours, and the employer, either a major or non-major airline.
Younger pilots with fewer flight hours flying for a non-major airline were at greatest risk.
Further, there were no significant differences found between females and males
(McFadden, 1997).
Rostykus et al. (1988) studied 8,411 GA landing accidents from 1983 through
1992. Risk factors associated with GA accident fatalities were investigated, and several
factors that increased the risk of pilot fatalities were identified. The two with the highest
risk were aircraft destruction and post-crash fire. Other factors included the use of
restraints, an off-airport crash site, flying a retractable-gear aircraft, and flying a multiengine aircraft. Despite the risks of a fatal landing accident, most accidents in the study
were survivable (Rostykus et al., 1988).
Li and Baker (1999) searched for potential correlations of factors predicting GA
fixed-wing and helicopter fatalities. The regression model indicated that the most
significant factor predicting fatalities was the presence of a post-crash fire. Other
significant factors in the model were the crash location (on or off-airport), weather, time
(daytime or nighttime), and use of restraints (Li & Baker, 1999). Eight years later, Li and
Baker (2007) revisited risk factors encompassing GA flight risks. A post-crash fire
remained a significant factor in fatality risks. Other variables included IMC, an offairport crash, and the use of restraints. Overall, accident risk factors for increased
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accident potential were alcohol use, experience, age, being male, and intentional
violations (Li & Baker, 2007).
McFadden (2003) developed regression models to predict accidents at United
States airlines and whether there were airline-specific factors useful to the model. The
model indicated that airline-specific factors were not useful in predicting accidents.
However, age, experience, and the interaction between age and experience were
significant predictors. The results suggest that in the airlines, as pilots increase in age and
experience, their risk of pilot-related accidents decreases (McFadden, 2003).
Groff and Price (2006) focused their study on determining risk factors for GA
accidents in degraded visibility. Input variables included accident histories,
demographics, experience, length of flight, the purpose of flight, and testing. Significant
predictors in the regression model were for pilots who earn their initial certification after
age 25, who are non-instrument rated, who have a history of prior accidents or incidents,
and who are on a flight 300 nautical miles or greater. Age at certification emerged as a
novel finding (Groff & Price, 2006).
Bazargan and Guzhva (2007) use regression modeling to predict fatalities in GA
accidents from accidents that occurred from 1983 to 2002. Variables of aircraft
characteristics, complexity, experience, flight plan, gender, light condition, phase of
flight, and wind condition were entered into the model. Significant factors include light
condition, IMC, cross-country flying, retractable landing gear, second pilot, restraint use,
total flight time, recent flight time, wind, and phase of flight. Counterintuitive findings
include a higher risk of accident in cruise flight and the presence of a second pilot
(Bazargan & Guzhva, 2007).
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Bazargan and Guzhva (2011) followed their 2007 study with further research on
predicting GA accident fatalities, but with respect to gender, age, and experience. Their
findings suggest that gender is not a factor in predicting pilot-related accidents, though
males were more likely to have a fatal accident. Again, this study found that as
experience increases, pilot-related accidents decrease (Bazargan & Guzhva, 2007).
Ballard et al. (2013) researched a lesser-studied category of GA operations,
commercial air tours. The study covered 152 air tour crashes with at least one fatality
spanning 2000 to 2011. Three risk factors accounted for the most variance in the
regression model: post-crash fire, IMC, and an off-airport crash location (Ballard et al.,
2013).
Knecht (2013) investigated the proposition that there is a range of accumulated
flight hours —the killing zone—where GA pilots were at the greatest risk for an accident.
Working under the supposition that the relationship between flight hours and accident
rates are nonlinear, the author investigated the usefulness of serial nonlinear modeling in
predicting the outcome variable. The researcher concluded that serial-nonlinear models
could be useful in making predictions from flight hours. The major finding is data
suggesting the killing zone may be larger than once thought, perhaps extending to the
2,000-hour range (Knecht, 2013). In a second study, Knecht (2015) again looked at flight
hours and accidents, but this time using a nonlinear gamma-based model. With similar
results to the previous study, the data suggest the killing zone extends wider than
conventional wisdom suggests.
As discussed earlier in the literature review, Ison (2014) investigated correlations
between GA pilot actions or conditions and fatalities from continued VFR flight into
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IMC using eight predictor variables. Creating a regression model, the researcher found
two variables contributed to the model in a significant way; terrain and weather briefing
(Ison, 2014).
Shao et al. (2014a; 2014b) conducted two studies related to instrument-rated
private pilots. The first study to report (Shao et al., 2014b) centered on fatal accident
rates. They found that fatality rates increased for pilots over 65. Significant factors in
IMC accidents included instrument approach deficiency, spatial disorientation leading to
LOC, and lack of obstacle clearance. Significant pilot factors in VMC accidents included
aerodynamic stalls and lack of obstacle clearance. The second study (Shao et al., 2014a)
examined causal factors behind fatal accidents in instrument and non-instrument certified
private pilots. In contrast to popular wisdom, IFR certification did not provide protection
from accidents, and IFR certified pilots were involved in more accidents than the noncertified private pilots. Show et al. (2014a) did not determine a reason though they
speculated there was an increase in exposure because IFR certified pilots tended to fly
longer distances.
Ison (2015) researched accident factors using a sample of two pilot groups; one
group had been involved in accidents, and the other group of pilots had not. Factors that
were input into the regression model included age, flight time, gender, pilot certification
level, professional pilot employment, and the status of the pilot flight review. Significant
factors in the model were age, employment as a professional pilot, and flight time. Lower
ages and flight times were associated with an increased risk of accidents. Additionally,
employment as a professional pilot was associated with a higher risk, though this may be
a factor of increased exposure.
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Boyd (2015) used regression techniques to determine risk factors and causes of
fatal accidents in non-commercial twin-engine piston GA aircraft. Accidents from 2002
to 2012 (n = 376) were extracted from the NTSB aviation accident database. One key
finding is the risk factors for fatalities included lighting conditions, IMC, off-airport crash
site, and post-crash fire. Age was not found to be a factor for fatal accidents, nor was
advanced certification.
Boyd and Stolzer (2016) analyzed the underlying factors of accident causes in
turbine-powered GA aircraft. To begin, they created a unique taxonomy to categorize the
accident factors into 17 areas. Once the data were categorized, the authors continued with
their aim to discover which factors were associated with a higher risk of serious injuries
or fatalities. Using backward elimination in logistic regression, they determined 11 of the
17 categories of the taxonomy contributed to the model. They found that not following
checklists or flight manuals appeared most frequently as a precipitating factor. Next were
flight planning errors and violations to Federal regulations. Other factors that increase
risk were lack of knowledge and experience followed by deficiencies with air traffic
services (Boyd & Stolzer, 2016).
Burgess, Boyd et al. (2018) studied GA business flight accidents searching for
accident rates, risk factors, and causal factors. They found that business flights had a
higher proportion of fatalities than recreational flights. Their regression modeling
indicated that a deficiency in pilot skill, pilot experience, and systems knowledge were
the top causes of accidents followed by regulatory violations (Burgess, Boyd et al.,
2018).
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Morris (2018) attempted to model private pilot accidents by age and recentness of
medical certification. The model indicated that younger pilots had a higher probability of
accidents.
Rao and Marais (2020) used state-based analysis to predict helicopter accidents
using a sample of 6,180 accidents between 1982 and 2015. The researchers reduced the
redundancy within the NTSB database, making it easier to study safe or hazardous states
and the triggers that activate the states. Focusing on LOC in flight, they identified the
primary trigger to be pilots clipping objects. The significant benefit of the state-based
analysis is the ability to identify causal factors not evident in traditional methods.
Machine Learning Studies
The regression analysis has been a staple for research projects, especially when
trying to determine risk factors and build prediction models. Machine learning is
becoming an increasingly popular method of developing models for aviation studies
(Maheshwari et al., 2018) and human factors research (Carnahan et al., 2003). Machine
learning has also shown better prediction results over regression methods (Stolzer &
Halford, 2007). Machine learning has been used for safety analysis (Čokorilo, De Luca,
& Dell’Acqua, 2014) and to predict accidents (Hu et al., 2019), unsafe acts (Harris & Li,
2019), injuries and fatalities (Burnett & Si, 2017), pilot-error (Matthews, Das, Bhaduri,
Das, Martin, & Oza, 2013) and HFACS factors (Liu et al., 2013). Additionally, machine
learning has proven useful in understanding accident complexity (Christopher et al.,
2016) and detecting anomalies (Janakiraman & Nielsen, 2016).
Liu et al. (2013) drew their sample from the NTSB aviation accident analysis
database. The sample comprised 2,568 accidents that occurred from 1990-2002. Using
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subject matter experts, all of the errors listed in the reports were coded into the HFACS
categories of decision-based, perceptual-based, skill-based, and violations. Several nonHFACS factors were also used, including general demographics, pilot experience,
information about the aircraft, and weather information. The variables were then used to
build a series of neural network models to determine factors that best predict fatal or
nonfatal accidents. Twenty variables were kept in the final model. The top five most
influential variables were total hours, ceiling height, taxiing, total aircraft seats, and
female (Liu et al., 2013).
Matthews et al. (2013) demonstrated the use of data mining in finding anomalous
safety events using a multivariate time-series algorithm. They used flight operational
quality assurance data (FOQA), large streams of data produced by aircraft, to explain the
process. They found two previously undiscovered anomalies, namely airspeed drops and
mode confusion. While the study outcome is not directly applicable to most GA
operations, there is a utility in the technique (Matthews et al., 2013).
Čokorilo et al. (2014) used clustering algorithms to analyze 1,500 accidents
across the world that occurred between 1985 and 2010. Through the clustering process,
data were grouped, and a representative accident was chosen. The defining feature of the
clustering activity is no subjectivity in the assignment of members as the algorithms do
the assignment. Each cluster was also assigned a hazard score to denote the level of risk
represented by the cluster. The results were then used to build a predictive model.
Janakiraman and Nielsen (2016) “develop[ed] fast anomaly detection algorithms
using extreme learning machines (ELM) to discover significant anomalies in large
aviation data sets” (p. 1993). Their data source was the radar measurement output from
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the Denver Terminal Radar Approach Control Facility (TRACON). The researchers
noted promise in the technique (Janakiraman & Nielsen, 2016). However, the procedure
is quite complicated and likely not very useful for typical accident analysis.
Burnett and Si (2017) used neural network modeling to predict aviation injuries
and fatalities. The data were extracted from FAA accident records for GA crashes that
occurred from 1975 to 2002. Variables and data were used to create several models:
support vector machines (SVM), k-nearest neighbor, decision trees, and artificial neural
networks (ANN). Each model was duplicated four times using four different
combinations of variables; two of the four were based on odds ratios. The results of the
modeling indicated that the ANN models performed better than the other model types,
with all four variable combinations producing similar abilities to predict fatalities at an
average rate above 91.16%.
Harris and Li (2019) wanted to predict HFACS unsafe acts from the preconditions of unsafe acts using neural network modeling. Their data source was the
accident narratives from the Republic of China Air Force from 1978 through 2002. Each
of the 523 accidents was coded into the HFACS framework by subject matter experts.
The neural network predicted the unsafe acts with a classification rate of over 74%.
Hu et al. (2019) employed text mining to analyze and predict accident causes
based on NTSB aviation accident narratives for airline accidents from 1982 to October
24, 2017. Their goal was to develop a model that can predict flight states and accident
causes. Seven flight states were used: taxi, takeoff, climb out cruise, descent, approach,
and landing. Causes were divided into three categories: aircraft, personnel issues, and
environmental issues. Keywords were developed to aid in model development. Features
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were extracted using the TF-IDF method, which is a factor of how many times a word is
used and how many times it appears in different documents. Because the number of
words was in the thousands, logistic regression was used to select the top 500 words.
Five machine learning methods were chosen: deep neural network (DNN),
gradient boosting decision trees, ImVerde, multinomial naïve Bayes, and support vector
machines (SVM). The DNN is often used in text classification and speech recognition.
Gradient boosting decision trees are a combination of decision trees, where variables are
split into branches and leaves, and boosting, where models are combined to increase
predictive capabilities. ImVerde models the reports as a network and reports similarities.
Multinomial naïve Bayes has been shown to be useful in classifying discrete text features.
Finally, the SVM algorithm works to classify variables according to a “non-probabilistic
binary linear classifier” (Hu et al., 2019, p. 4). Of the five methods, the DNN was the best
at predicting aircraft, personnel, and environmental causal factors.
Theoretical Foundation
The study outlined here is exploratory and data driven, which means there is no
theoretical foundation upon which hypotheses are developed. Rather, the theoretical
foundation relates to the data and text mining methodology for developing predictive
models. The following paragraphs describe the data mining, text mining, and SEMMA
foundation.
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Data Mining
Data mining is explained in many ways, yet with universal themes. Tufféry
(2001) explained, “Data mining is the art of extracting information—that is,
knowledge—from data” (p. 36). Han and Kamber (2001) wrote, “Data mining is a
multidisciplinary field, drawing work from areas including database technology, artificial
intelligence, machine learning, neural networks, statistics, pattern recognition,
knowledge-based systems, knowledge acquisition, information retrieval, highperformance computing, and data visualization” (p. xix). Truong et al. (2018) explained
that data mining is a machine learning methodology that goes beyond traditional
statistical methods by “construct[ing] patterns based not solely on the input data, but also
on the logical consequences of the data” ( p. 31). One of the significant benefits of data
mining is the ability to use large data sources to look for patterns and systematic
relationships among variables while overcoming traditional statistical challenges with the
volume of data (Stolzer, Halford et al., 2008).
Data mining was developed to address the challenge of extracting useful
information from vast amounts of data collected from a myriad of sources. The
compilation of information is known as Big Data. The characteristics of Big Data include
the volume, complexity, and growth of the information captured and stored (EMC
Education Services, 2015). One use of Big Data in aviation is to support a flight
operational quality assurance (FOQA) program where a flight organization can review
digital flight data from day-to-day operations. The organization can then identify trends
and verify the level of compliance with operating procedures (FAA, 2004). One estimate
of how much data can be captured tops over half a terabyte of data per Boeing 787 flight
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(Finnegan, 2013). To facilitate aviation data analytics such as that required by a flight
operational quality assurance (FOQA) program, Airbus launched a data platform called
Skywise. According to Airbus (2020), their platform currently houses over 10 petabytes
of data and connects to over 9,000 airplanes from over 100 airlines. One petabyte is 1015
bytes of data, 1,000 terabytes, or 1 million gigabytes (Smith, 2016). Han and Kamber
(2001) described this condition as a deluge of data requiring ways to automate
classification, analysis, and modeling the data to improve decision making.
Decision Tree. Decision trees are models that begin with a root (target variable)
that is split into branches at nodes representing the predictor variables using if/then rules.
Trees are constructed using recursive partitioning with a training sample and limited, or
cut back, using pruning with a validation sample. Because the project uses a categorical
target variable, a classification tree algorithm is used to make the splits into two
successor nodes (Shmueli et al., 2016). Decision trees are said to work best modeling
variables with non-linear relationships (Wielenga, 2007). They also hold the advantage of
not being subject to the assumptions required in traditional statistics and are robust to
noisy data (Truong et al., 2018; Tufféry, 2011). Overfitting is possible, that is why it is
essential to either stop the tree growth or prune the branches where appropriate. A
maximum depth of six levels will be imposed (Maxson, 2018; McCarthy et al., 2019;
SAS Institute, 2019a), and branches will be pruned if necessary.
Gradient Boosting Machine. Gradient boosting machine algorithms build
prediction models based on combining basic regression and decision tree models (Dean,
2014) “with the goal of minimizing a target loss function” (Bonaccorso, 2018, p. 274).
The algorithm uses a series of trees that become the foundation for a single prediction
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model. The gradient boosting machine functions in a stepwise or additive manner where
data are resampled several times to produce a weighted average of the data just resampled
with the sum of the individual predictions formulating the final prediction (Bonaccorso,
2018; Dean, 2014; McCarthy et al., 2019). By building in an additive manner,
mispredictions from previous trees are corrected. When used on large datasets, “the
combined techniques may produce results that are superior to each individual technique”
(McCarthy et al., 2019, p. 176). A benefit of gradient boosting machine models is that
they are said to be more robust to missing data and outliers than single regression or
decision tree models (McCarthy et al., 2019).
Neural network. The artificial neural network in data mining method mimics
how the human brain makes connections (Stolzer & Halford, 2007) and learns through
experience (Shmueli et al., 2016). Similarly, machine learning neural networks are based
on connecting “simple processing elements” (Liu et al., 2013, p. 155), and, because of its
structure, can solve complex problems. Further, “although each neuron holds a relatively
small processing capacity, it is this interconnected, nonlinear, parallel-processing
architecture that gives this system the computational power to solve complex problems
similar to those solved by biological systems” (Liu et al., 2013, pp. 155-156). Using a
supervised process, a model is constructed by building on inputs, outputs,
backpropagation of error, and weight adjustments improving predictability through each
cycle (Han & Kamber, 2001; Liu et al., 2013; Shmueli et al., 2016; Stolzer, Halford et al.,
2008). Neural networks may be especially useful for modeling non-linear relationships
(Wielenga, 2007), and can model complex variable relationships not possible using other
methods (Shmueli et al., 2016). However, they can be challenging to interpret, and
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variables should be examined a priori so that only necessary variables are used
(Wielenga, 2007). Additionally, neural networks are subject to overfitting due to overtraining the data (Shmueli et al., 2016).
Random Forest. To quote Bonaccorso (2018), “A Random Forest is a bagging
ensemble method based on a set of Decision Trees” (p. 264), or, in other words, a
decision tree forest (McCarthy et al., 2019). Bagging, also known as bootstrapping,
creates a tree ensemble through a series of sampling by replacement and builds new trees
for each sample (Bonaccorso, 2018). The algorithm builds many trees that are weak
classifiers that then “vote in some manner to build a stable and strong classifier that is
better than the average tree created in the forest” (Dean, 2014, pp. 125-126). The benefit
of the Random Forest algorithm is its ability to work with classification and regression
trees so it can be used with binary target variables. They are also said to be less prone to
overfitting compared to a single decision tree (McCarthy et al., 2019).
Regression. Regression is a method of discovering relationships between
variables and may be one of the most popular textbook methods for prediction (Shmueli
et al., 2016). When a change in one variable correlates with a change in another variable,
it is said to be a linear relationship. Logistic regression is used when the target variable is
binary such as in the current study and predicts “the probability of a categorical outcome”
(Shmueli et al., 2016, p. 231). The regression model output will be used to assess a
variable’s worth in predicting the target variable.
Regression in data mining is not restricted to traditional statistical assumptions
because the models are built with machine learning algorithms, and they are capable of
handling noisy data (Truong et al., 2018). Shmueli et al. (2016) advise caution with
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taking an all-in approach with variables. Instead, they suggest using variable subsets as a
possible method of improving model accuracy. When there are multiple variables,
multicollinearity can affect the model. Further, there are tradeoffs between too many and
too few predictors that should be considered; too many uncorrelated predictors can
increase prediction variance, whereas too few could mean valuable predictors have been
left out (Shmueli et al., 2016).
Text Mining
Text mining is also a machine learning methodology, but it processes text inputs
rather than numerical inputs by “undercover[ing] the underlying themes or concepts that
are contained in large document collections” (SAS, 2019b, para 1). Using unstructured
data rather than structured data, text mining “is a method of extracting unknown and
valuable information from randomly organized text data” (Hong & Park, 2019, p. 2).
Text mining is a quantitative methodology employing algorithms to identify parts of
speech based on context (SAS, 2019b). Using a process of parsing, stemming, stop-word
removal, search and retrieval, and text mining (EMC Education Services, 2015; Han &
Kamber, 2001), text is transformed into a “term-by-document frequency matrix” (SAS,
2019, p. 1385) that can be used for data mining. Similar documents will likely have
similar words, and frequency tables can be used to count and classify related terms (Han
& Kamber, 2001), from which text mining algorithms can group similar objects into
clusters (Stolzer & Halford, 2007). Clusters may then be used as predictors in a data
mining model.
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SEMMA Framework
The SEMMA framework operates in activities suggested by its acronym
SEMMA—sample, explore, modify, model, and assess. SEMMA represents a way to
visualize and organize data mining processes. While beginning with sampling, the
processes described by SEMMA are iterative through all phases as the researcher
explores the data and evaluates the models. The SAS® Enterprise Miner™ is designed in
line with SEMMA and was used for the current study.
Sample. The sample activity comprises actions needed to determine the data
required to answer the research question and whether or not the data are available in a
single source or need to be merged from separate sources (Patel & Thompson, 2013).
Once data are aggregated, a sample is extracted and prepared for follow-on processes
beginning with selecting a sample statistically representative of the data (SAS, 2006).
Partitioning the sample facilitates model development and assessment. Depending on the
research needs, data are partitioned into a training sample for model fitting, a validation
sample for assessment, and a test sample to reconfirm the model generalizability (Dean,
2014).
Explore. The explore activity allows the researcher to search for anticipated
relationships (Patel & Thompson, 2013) and discover inconsistencies, abnormalities, and
trends useful for understanding the data (Dean, 2014). Reviewing the quality of the data,
such as searching for missing data and errors, is also within the explore activity (Patel &
Thompson, 2013). SAS (2006) explains exploration as a means of discovering. A number
of methods are available in the process of exploring, including clustering, factor analysis,
and other statistical techniques (SAS, 2006).
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Modify. The modify activity describes molding the variables to facilitate
meaningful modeling. Variables may be grouped or deleted, and outliers may be
transformed (Dean, 2014). Should the data change, researchers may need to revisit the
modify activity and account for new conditions (SAS, 2006).
Model. The model activity uses machine learning algorithms to find combinations
of variables that predict the target variable (Dean, 2014). The Enterprise Miner™ can
develop many different types of models, each with their strengths and weaknesses, to
facilitate the search for the best predicting model for the data. The current study will use
Decision Tree, Logistic Regression, Neural Network, Gradient Boosting Machine, and
Random Forest models in the search for a model that performs the best in predicting the
target variable with the NTSB dataset.
Assess. The assess activity describes evaluating and comparing models between
the partitioned samples (Dean, 2014). Models are built with the training sample and
validated with the validation sample. The models are then assessed for their accuracy
using new data not previously used in training or validation. Depending on the model
type, there are a number of methods for assessing the models, including misclassification
rate, receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve, Gini coefficient, cumulative, and
average squared error (McCarthy et al., 2019). The accuracy will be assessed using the
test sample partitioned from the dataset in the Sample activity. The outcome of the
Assess activity is a determination of the champion model (SAS, 2006).
Gaps in the Literature
Accident analysis and efforts to predict future accidents are prevalent in the
literature. Unfortunately, the underlying combination of variables at the heart of GA
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accidents are still not fully understood; accidents continue and appear to be increasing.
Considering the stated research problem, and a review of the extant literature, several
gaps are evident.
First, aviation is not stagnant. New generations of pilots are trained, the current
generation of pilots mature, aircraft systems change, and the airspace system evolves. A
search of aviation studies revealed that there is a gap in analyzing current data. To
illustrate, GA accident analysis from 2016 to present only appears in four peer-reviewed
studies, with zero analysis of accidents from 2018 to present. An additional six studies
include 2015, and, further, seven additional studies cover 2014.
Second, there have been very few studies that have taken advantage of the
increased abilities afforded by data mining in predicting accidents. In practical terms, that
means that lessons learned through non-parametric model building with large amounts of
data, and potentially hundreds of variables have not been exploited.
Third, text mining has not been fully explored. There is only one known textmining study (Hu et al., 2020) using NTSB data with GA accidents, and that study used
different variables, years, goals, and data mining models from the study reported here. It
is possible that new information emerging from text mining may unlock some of the
answers to reducing GA accidents.
Summary
Given the century-long history of aviation, and the FAA and NTSB focused
attention on GA since 1998, it may seem all lessons have been learned, and safety
improvements are a matter of executing what is already known. However, with GA
accident rates increasing, it appears there is more to learn. The role of the literature
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review was to provide a foundation for the current study, define the variables, and
describe the research gaps. The review covered GA safety, the role of SMS, introduced
many studies seeking to understand GA accident causes and understand variables that
may predict the next accident so that barriers can be put in place and risks mitigated. The
following chapter details the study methodology.
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Chapter III: Methodology
Chapter III proceeds with a detailed discussion of the methodology used in the
current study toward the project’s aim of building a model capable of predicting GA
accidents. The chapter first outlines the selected research methodology and the sampling
strategy. The middle portion of the chapter focuses on the research design, including
procedures used to conduct the study. Finally, the last sections of the chapter introduce
the approach to data analysis.
Research Method Selection
The data-driven exploratory study, as envisioned, employed both text and data
mining techniques to answer the research questions. Data mining is useful for detecting
patterns and relationships among quantitative variables contained in large databases (Han
& Kamber, 2001; Stolzer, Friend et al., 2018; Truong et al., 2018; Tufféry, 2011). Textmining, a method of data mining used with unstructured text data such as the narratives
found in accident reports (Shmueli et al., 2016), was also used. Text mining is a form of
text-based predictive modeling “to find the patterns that emerge when the values of the
target variable are analyzed against the text” (SAS Institute, 2019b, para. 1). The study
first used text mining to analyze and categorize textual components of the dataset and
create quantitative variables from the qualitative inputs. Text-based variables were then
added as quantitative variables in the data mining modeling.
Data Mining
Researchers are taught that research designs are based on the nature of the
research problem and research questions (Cresswell, 2009). The study, as suggested,
seeks to advance the science of aviation accident prevention through exploratory data-
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driven predictive modeling. Further, the dataset is large, and the variables potentially
complex. Data mining provides the capability to address the research questions while
handling the potential variable complexity.
The challenge, as stated by Dean (2014), is that with real data the relationships
between variables are often nonlinear and do not follow assumptions required of
traditional statistical methods. Even where a linear relationship appears to exist, it is
sometimes difficult to describe. However, data mining overcomes obstacles presented by
nonlinear relationships and violations of traditional statistical assumptions. Further, large
amounts of data are sometimes required to observe relationships (Dean, 2014). Perhaps
most importantly, traditional statistical methods are limited in their ability to predict
target variables such as that envisioned in this study.
Text Mining
As stated previously, the overarching goal of the project was to develop predictive
models from data contained in the NTSB aviation accident reports. Reviewing individual
reports revealed a vast amount of the information was in a narrative format. Qualitative
analysis of the report narratives using traditional methods could undoubtedly have led the
researcher to central themes in the text-based data to describe the dataset. However, the
knowledge gained from such a purely qualitative analysis could not be used for
prediction. Conversely, text mining combined qualitative and quantitative aspects and
employed machine learning algorithms that enabled predictive modeling from the text
through a combination of data mining and text-based analytics (Dean, 2014).
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Population/Sample
The current study intended to develop a model that could predict injury-related
GA accidents from variables captured in NTSB aviation accident reports. The following
paragraphs describe the population of interest and the sampling strategy.
Population and Sampling Frame
The population of interest comprised the aviation incidents and accidents from
1998 to present within the GA community. The incidents and accidents were archived in
the NTSB (2020b) Aviation Accident Database & Synopses and made available to the
public. The population size was n = 31,967.
Sample Size
The sample was n = 27,786 and was comprised of all fixed-wing GA incidents
and accidents in the United States, 1998-2018.
Sampling Strategy
The purposive sample derived from the population of interest was all accidents
involving only fixed-wing GA aircraft in the United States, 1998-2018. The definition of
GA adopted for the current study described a type of operation rather than particular
types of aircraft or pilot certifications. Aircraft flown under GA rules ranged from slow
and simple to fast and complex, and pilots ranged from the newest student to the most
accomplished pilots with multiple certifications. The broad range of participants flying
diverse aircraft involving different speeds, training, complexities, and flight envelopes
could have made it difficult to draw meaningful conclusions. Therefore, purposive
sampling was used. As envisioned, all cases within the specific parameters were chosen.
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Samples are smaller representatives of the population useful for research when
using the entire population is impractical or infeasible (Field, 2018). The goal was to
select a sample that represented the whole population of interest to reduce bias in the
research conclusions and improve the study’s generalizability (Bordens & Abbott, 2011).
Various methods of sampling were possible to accomplish research goals included under
the broad categories of random and non-random sampling. Random sampling describes
methods of selecting participants or cases from a population based on probabilities,
where each unit has an equal chance to be chosen for the sample. Variations include
stratified sampling, systematic sampling, and cluster sampling (Bordens & Abbott, 2011).
Non-random sampling does not rely on probabilities for selection and is used when
required knowledge of the population is not available or when random sampling is not
appropriate (Babbie, 2013). Common methods of non-random sampling are convenience
sampling, snowball sampling, and purposive sampling. Purposive sampling, also called
judgmental sampling, describes the selection of participants or cases based on “the
researcher’s judgment about which ones will be the most useful or representative”
(Babbie, 2013, p. 190). As explained, the current study used purposive sampling to select
the class of cases to be data mined.
Data Collection Process
The study used aviation accident report data collected by the U.S. Government
and archived for public use. Because the data were not pre-formatted according to the
scoping requirements of a particular study, pre-processing actions were needed. The
following paragraphs detail procedures used to prepare the data for analysis.
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Design and Procedures
There were several possible ways of obtaining the NTSB aviation accident data.
The primary way for most users is to use the basic search features of the NTSB Aviation
Accident Database & Synopses webpage (NTSB, 2020b). Users can search using basic
event information, aircraft details, operation type, NTSB report status, or geographical
information. The system searches for reports meeting the requested parameters and
provides links to the written reports. However, for the current study, tabular data were
needed. In addition to the written reports, the NTSB made downloadable datasets
available on the same webpage. The datasets were complex and comprehensive, requiring
more advanced procedures to extract and pare the required information. A step-by-step
methodology was used to prepare the data and promote process repeatability, which
began by downloading the data set. The dataset was downloaded as a Microsoft® Access®
file using the process explained below.
Once the files are downloaded, data are commonly extracted using the Access®
query functions and then exported to Microsoft® Excel® for data analysis. To facilitate
data extraction and presentation, the NTSB dataset was instead imported into Microsoft®
SQL Server®, a platform for programming database functions. The NTSB used event
identification (event ID) numbers as anchors making standard query results and the
resulting display cumbersome because each event ID returned multiple lines of data. For
instance, in the case of mid-air or on-ground collisions, a single event ID represented all
of the aircraft involved. As another example, when extracting flight hours, a single event
ID was replicated multiple times to cover each of the various flight hour categories.
Through SQL Server®, the data were extracted and presented using the NTSB report
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number as the anchor. The result was a structured dataset where each aircraft with the
associated variables was contained on a single row. All aircraft were placed in rows, one
aircraft per row, and all variables were placed in single columns. Once the data were
extracted, they were exported to a Microsoft® Excel® file.
The Excel® file containing the NTSB incident and accident data was scoped
according to the planned delimitations. A review of the NTSB product revealed that the
entire database contained over 84,000 line items. The scoping included the following
steps:
Step 1: The study date range—January 1, 1998 – December 31, 2018—was
selected.
Step 2: The country—USA—was selected. Reports without a country listed were
deleted.
Step 3: The type of operation—FAR Part 91—was selected. Reports without an
operation designation were deleted.
Step 4: The aircraft category—AIR—was selected. Reports with an unknown
category or that were coded as a balloon, blimp, glider, gyrocopter, helicopter, poweredparachute, ultra-light, or weight-shift were deleted.
The remaining data included all of the NTSB reports for Part 91 airplane incidents
and accidents in the United States between 1989 and 2018. The next actions involved
building the target variable, combining selected variables, and determining features for
input into the models.
Target Variable Preparation. The target variable called Accident Injury Level
was built as a dichotomous variable. Events involving fatal or serious injuries were
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combined to form the first level of the target variable and labeled as one (1) in the
dataset. Events with minor or no injuries were combined to form the second level and
labeled as zero (0). Events without a specified injury level were deleted.
Text-based Variable Preparation. There were three categories of text-based
information in the NTSB database considered for the projected study. They were the
Occurrence Descriptions, the Findings Descriptions, and the Narratives. Each report
possibly contained several major events, termed occurrences, listed in the report. One
occurrence in each report was designated the defining event while the others described
major events in the accident sequence. Using the CONCATENATE function within
Excel®, all of the occurrences were combined into a single field. Similarly, the reports
listed findings, which were designated as either causal components or factors in the
accident sequence. All findings were combined into a single field. At this stage, the
narratives were not adjusted.
Variable Selection. There were many variables or features available from the
NTSB database as potential inputs into the model. As introduced previously, the target
variable was Accident Injury Level, a two-level dichotomous variable of fatal/serious and
minor/no-injuries. Variables relating to pilot demographics, including age, sex,
certificates held, and flight hours are common descriptors in aviation studies and were
used in the modeling process. Other variables of potential interest related to weather (e.g.,
visual or instrument conditions and precipitation), aircraft details (e.g., homebuilt,
landing gear complexity, and aircraft complexity), and the operating environment (e.g.,
airspace type, mishap location, second pilot on board, and student solo). The final
variables related to the text-based variables that described the accident sequence,
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findings, and occurrences. The a priori study variables are found in Table 4. The
complete variable library is at Appendix C.

Table 4
A Priori Study Variables
Variable

Description

Type

Mid-air

Mid air collision

Dichotomous

Ground collision

On ground collision

Dichotomous

Airport location to crash

Proximity to airport

Categorical

Atmospheric lighting

Lighting condition

Categorical

Wind gusts indicated

Gusts indicated

Dichotomous

TARGET

Accident Injury level

Dichotomous

Basic weather conditions

Basic weather condition

Dichotomous

Flight plan type

Type of flight plan filed

Categorical

Homebuilt

Homebuilt aircraft

Dichotomous

Fixed-retractable gear

Gear type

Dichotomous

Flight purpose

Flight purpose

Second pilot on board

Second pilot on board

Dichotomous

Sightseeing flight

Sightseeing flight

Dichotomous

Air-medical flight

Air medical flight

Dichotomous

Airspace

Airspace

Categorical

Crew position code

Pilot category

Categorical

Age

Pilot age

Interval

Sex

Pilot sex

Dichotomous

Med certificate validity

Medical certificate validity

Professional pilot

Professional pilot

Highest certificate

Highest pilot certificate

Categorical

Total flight hours

Total flight hours, all a/c

Interval

Total PIC hours

PIC hours, all a/cd

Interval

Categorical

Categorical
Dichotomous
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Variable

Description

Type

Hours last 90-days

Hours last 90-days, all a/c

Interval

Hours last 30-days

Hours last 30-days, all a/c

Interval

Hours last 24-hours

Hours last 24-hrs, all a/c

Interval

Total hours make

Total hours in a/c make

Interval

Total hours multi-engine

Total multi-engine hours

Interval

Total hours single-engine

Total single-engine hours

Interval

Total hours at night

Total night hours

Interval

Engine type

Engine type

Multi-engine aircraft

Multi-engine a/c

Defining events

Defining event

Occurrences

Combined occurrence descriptions

Text

Causes

Combined cause descriptions

Text

Factors

Combined factors descriptions

Text

Report narrative

Accident summary/report

Text

Factual narrative

Factual narrative

Text

Cause narrative

Probable cause narrative

Text

Incident narrative

FAA Incident Narrative (8020-5)

Text

Categorical
Dichotomous
Categorical

Apparatus and Materials
The data used for modeling came from archived aircraft incident and accident
information downloaded from the NTSB’s public website. Data were extracted using
Microsoft® Access® and Microsoft® SQL Server® then cleaned and prepared using
Microsoft® Excel®. Descriptive analysis and modeling were conducted using SAS®
Enterprise Miner™.
Sources of the Data
The data for analysis were drawn from the NTSB aviation accident database,
which is a publicly available repository of civil aviation accident reports from 1948 to
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present (NTSB, 2020b). The NTSB database was a relational database; data were stored
in a collection of tables consisting of various attributes and capable of storing thousands
of records with each record identified by a unique key (Han & Kamber, 2001). The
contents comprise both structured and unstructured data (EMC Education Services,
2015). The database contained all of the written accident reports, and the reports were
available for download as PDF or HTML documents. Additionally, all of the report
components were stored as searchable tabular data. As an additional feature,
downloadable datasets in Microsoft® Access® format provided the researcher the ability
to customize data extraction according to the research project requirements. The Access®
database contained all of the information found in the actual accident investigation
reports. The data used for the study were current as of the NTSB’s February 2020
Access® product.
Ethical Consideration
The use of data about people may have serious implications depending on data
access, collection purposes, and legitimate conclusions that can be drawn from the data
(Witten et al., 2017). Considering the data source and purposes, concerns for the ethical
treatment of human subjects were not a factor in the described study as the data were
available for public download according to U.S. Government policies and used for
accident prevention in line with the goals of investigating accidents. Additionally, any
pieces of personally identifiable information for individuals involved in the events were
sanitized by the government prior to the report being made public. Given the data source
and protections provided by the U.S. Government before posting the data, internal review
board consideration was not required.
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Data Analysis Approach
The basic purpose of the study outlined in this chapter was to develop a prediction
model that best predicted the target variable using text mining and data mining tools.
Choosing the best predicting model—the champion—required a methodical development
process and assessments of several candidate models. The study followed the SEMMA
model as previously introduced (SAS Institute, 2019a). The paragraphs that follow within
this section outline the data analysis approach used to conduct the study including the
steps within the SEMMA framework and specific discussions on participant
demographics, reliability, and validity assessments.
Participant Demographics
Descriptive demographics were derived from data captured in the NTSB reports.
The demographics included descriptive statistics regarding the accident pilots’ age, sex,
flight hours, and the highest pilot certification. Derived statistics included the minimum,
maximum, mean, median, and standard deviation values.
Reliability Assessment Method
Reliability is commonly defined in relation to how well an instrument provides
consistent measurements (Field, 2018; Hair et al., 2010). Two components of reliability
in the current study were connected to the reliability of the data and the reliability of the
predictive models (Hair et al., 2010; Odisho, 2020). If the data were corrupted, the
models would not provide consistent predictions with new data. Processes were instituted
by the NTSB to ensure the data entry personnel were trained and the data were qualitychecked (GAO, 2010). Model reliability was assessed using the validation sample in
comparison with the training sample results. Details are provided hereafter; however,
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assessment methods included reviewing ROC curves, lift charts, and miscalculation rates.
Reliable models were those that showed similar results in each sample. Models with the
best results were then used with the test sample. Again, the similar results indicated
reliability.
Validity Assessment Method
Validity refers to whether an instrument measures what it intends to measure and
the level to which results can be inferred (Hair et al., 2010; Vogt, 2005). Validity works
in partnership with reliability; a model that is reliable lacks usefulness in predicting
outcomes if it does not predict well. Validity in the study was assessed using the testretest methodology in SAS, similar to the reliability assessment. Specifically, the validity
was evaluated after the models were built with the training portion of the data and
validated with the second portion of the data. The validation models were then tested
with the third portion of the data.
Validity assessment methods included assessments of prediction accuracy and
predictive power. Miscalculation rate and overall prediction results assisted in assessing
accuracy. The Lift chart, ROC, specificity, and sensitivity analysis assisted in assessing a
model’s predictive power.
Data Analysis Process
Data analysis was a key component in realizing the goals of the current study. As
Dean (2014) described, “Model assessment, stated simply, is trying to find the best model
for your application to the given data” (Dean, 2014, p. 67). While Dean (2014) was
specifically writing about the model, it follows that in order to find the best model, solid
analysis needed to occur in all appropriate points in the project.
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As previously introduced, the text mining activities were conducted first because
the text mining process converted qualitative data into a quantitative format for use in
modeling. The data mining process followed the text mining process and incorporated the
text-based variables. Three groups of models were built. The first grouping of models
was based solely on the text variables. The second grouping was based solely on the
quantitative tabular data. Finally, the third grouping combined both text-based and
tabular data in the models. The champion model was chosen from the models produced in
the three groups. The process and analysis decision points are described below.
Sample Analysis Approach. As the Sample activities appear first in the model, it
was intuitive that they set the stage for the remaining SEMMA activities. Analysis in the
Sample activity was simple yet foundational. First, the overall dataset was analyzed to
determine whether the necessary information existed in the dataset or whether additional
information was required. Upon review, additional information was not needed. Next, the
dataset was assessed against the scoping delimitations to ensure the extraneous data were
removed.
Explore Analysis Approach. During the Explore activities, the data were
assessed for completeness and were cleaned according to the assessment. A descriptive
analysis occurred in order to provide depth and understanding to key pilot demographics
and other appropriate variables in the dataset. During the Explore activities, the data were
assessed for extreme values and data entry errors. Further, new variables were created
from the existing data to facilitate eventual model interpretation.
Modify Analysis Approach. In connection with the Explore analysis, the Modify
analysis entailed assessing the potential impact of such issues as missing variables and
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outliers. Imputation and data transformation were not used. Analysis in the Modify
activity, in conjunction with the Model activities, included assessments of model
adjustments to improve model performance.
Model Analysis Approach. During the Model activity, the various models were
trained. The analysis involved reviewing the model for any unexpected results or
anomalies that could be addressed through modifications, either correcting erroneous data
in the dataset or creating new variables based on findings. Overall, five types of models
were used, including Decision Trees, Gradient Boosting, Logistic Regression, Neural
Network, and Random Forest. The project process is explained in the next paragraphs. A
depiction of the project flow diagram can be viewed in Figure 5.
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Figure 5
Project Flow Diagram

Note. The diagram was built within SAS® Enterprise Miner™. The project flow began with the dataset
node in the top-left portion and flowed to the Final Models Node on the extreme right of the diagram. The
three Metadata Nodes were not required, but they facilitated variable selection for all following nodes.

Text Mining. The text mining portion of the project began with Text Parsing
where a terminology-document frequency matrix was created by the text mining
algorithm. The stop list was edited by the researcher so that the algorithm returned the
most useful terms. Analysis of the Text Parsing process provided insight into document
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terms, how a term was used, how frequently it was used, and whether the term was kept
for follow-on processes. Terms that appeared to have no use yet figured prominently in
the analysis became candidates for the stop list. When words were added to the stop list,
the node was executed again, and the words were dropped from future use. Once the Text
Parsing output was created, the Text Filter process refined the list of words and terms by
applying weights. Words that appeared less frequently were assigned higher weightings
and were potentially more meaningful in the prediction models.
The next two processes of Text Cluster and Text Topic created the text-based
variables using singular value decomposition (SVD) to transform the terminologydocument frequency matrix into a form compatible for quantitative modeling. The first of
the two processes was the Text Cluster, where documents were clustered into disjoint sets
and described with descriptive terms. In the current study, the documents were the
individual aircraft accident reports. In text clustering, each document was assigned to a
specific cluster without crossover between clusters. The second process was the Text
Topic, which associated terms and documents. Unlike the text clusters, terms and
documents could be associated with more than one topic or not associated with any topic
at all. The outcome of the text mining process was a set of new Text Cluster and Text
Topic variables that were added to the quantitative dataset and available for overall
modeling.
Data Mining. Once the text mining process was completed, the data mining
process was executed, beginning with data partitioning at a ratio of 60:20:20. The largest
portion of the partition was allocated for model training and the other two for model
validation and model testing. Three metadata nodes were inserted into the project flow to
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facilitate the different model group variables. One branch of the process flow included
only text variables, a second included only tabular data variables, and a third allowed
both text and tabular data variables as potential model components. In the end, models
were assessed against each other, and a champion model was selected.
Assess Analysis Approach. Several types of models were assessed for usefulness
in predicting GA accidents using SAS® Enterprise Miner™. The models included the
Decision Tree, Neural Network, Random Forest, Gradient Boosting, and Logistic
Regression. The ambition was to discover a model that best predicted the outcome
variable. A checklist of SAS® Enterprise Miner™ settings for each of the nodes can be
found in Appendix F. The checklist was used to promote standardization and process
repeatability, adding to the reliability and validity of the findings.
Decision Trees. The Decision Trees were based on rules that split variables
hierarchically, creating a branch structure. The results represented rules that were used
for predicting the target variable. The splitting rule criterion was based on a Chi-square
test within the algorithm. The algorithm searched for a split “that maximize[d] the
measure of worth associated with the [specified p-value]” (SAS Institute, 2019a, p. 765).
Once a variable node was split, the algorithm considered the new nodes for further
splitting. Splitting ended when further splits failed to meet the Chi-square significance
threshold (SAS Institute, 2019a).
The current study built three Decision Tree models for each of the three groups of
variables based on how many branches the algorithm was allowed to use, either 2-, 3-, or
5-branches. The 3- or 5-branch specification did not force the model to create a certain
number of branches. Rather, it provided a measure of freedom to the algorithm. The
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Decision Tree models were built using the Decision Tree Node in SAS® Enterprise
Miner™.
Gradient Boosting. The Gradient Boosting was another partitioning algorithm
“that searche[d] for an optimal partition of the data defined in terms of the values of a
single variable” (SAS Institute, 2019a, p. 799). Target values were partitioned into
segments in a recursive process. Partition worth was based on partition similarities. When
the optimality criterion was met, the partitions were combined to form a model that
predicted the target variable. The boosting mechanism involved several iterations of data
resampling. The results of the resampling were a weighted average of the original data
set. The algorithm accounted for inaccuracies in each resample iteration to improve
accuracy. Many decision trees were developed and combined in a single model (SAS
Institute, 2019a). The Gradient Boosting models were built using the Gradient Boosting
Node in SAS® Enterprise Miner™.
Logistic Regression. As the target variable used in the current study was binary,
Logistic Regression was appropriate to model the probability that a variable predicted the
target. Four different effect selection methods were possible, including None, Backward,
Forward, and Stepwise. The current study used the Stepwise selection method. The
Stepwise method in SAS® Enterprise Miner™ began with no variables and incrementally
added variables until the algorithm met the stop criterion. The Stepwise method had the
ability to remove variables already in the model if a better variable was encountered
(SAS Institute, 2019a). The Logistic Regression models were built using the Regression
Node in SAS® Enterprise Miner™.
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Neural Network. The Neural Network models operated by searching for
nonlinear linkages between the input variables and the target variable. The network was
based on the neuron units and connections between the neurons. Input neurons were
connected to a hidden layer of neurons where the algorithm made the nonlinear
connections that predicted the target variable. Weights were assigned to connections in an
attempt to minimize prediction error (SAS Institute, 2019a). The Neural Network models
used a supervised algorithm and were built using the AutoNeural Node in SAS®
Enterprise Miner™.
Random Forest. The Random Forest, like Gradient Boosting, involved many
Decision Trees. However, the Random Forest algorithm built the training trees using
sampling without replacement of all the observations, and the input variables were
randomly selected from all variables. The algorithm calculated posterior probabilities
from several trees. Then, using a voting mechanism, “the forest predict[ed] the target
category that the individual trees predict[ed] most often” (SAS Institute, 2019a, p. 1289).
Individual trees used an out-of-bag sample, data the algorithm excluded from the training
sample, to form predictions that are said to have greater reliability than predictions from
the training sample (SAS Institute, 2019a). The Random Forest models were built using
the HP Forest Node in SAS® Enterprise Miner™.
Models were evaluated using the software’s Model Comparison node. Similar
across all of the model results, fit statistics were produced by the Model Comparison
Node. The receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve charts and misclassification rate
values were used for model evaluation (SAS Institute, 2019a). The misclassification rate
was based on the formula of one minus the validation accuracy, with better rates having a
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lower number (Truong et al., 2018). The ROC was based on the model’s true and false
positive rate at a given threshold. When the plots were joined with a line, they formed the
ROC curve. The ROC curve, as a measure of model sensitivity and specificity, provided
an indication of model usefulness (Truong et al., 2018). Area under the curve in a ROC
chart offered another basis for assessment. In general, the model with the highest area
was interpreted as the best performing model (Shmueli et al., 2016). Another output,
cumulative lift, was also used. A baseline was projected on a graph, and the results of the
models were overlaid. The model with the highest lift above the baseline was interpreted
to have the best model fit. Finally, variables were examined for their importance in
predicting the target variable of accident injury severity.
Summary
The purpose of Chapter III is to outline the proposed methodology for the study,
which involved text and data mining. The aim of the project, to create a model that
predicted GA accident severity, is discussed. Procedures for conducting the study are
detailed, including explanations of the tools and techniques to be used. Five families of
models were created, including Decision Tree, Gradient Boosting, Random Forest,
Neural Network, and Logistic Regression. Finally, the data analysis approach is outlined
as a framework for choosing the model that best predicted the target variable.
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Chapter IV: Results
The study was conducted according to the methodology outlined in Chapter III
following the SEMMA framework. Using publicly available NTSB aviation accident data
from 1998-2018, prediction models were developed, validated, and tested through a
series of machine learning techniques. The chapter begins with the demographic findings
within the scoped sample of GA accidents and incidents. Next, the actual text mining
process and results are described. The last portion of the chapter addresses the data
mining process and findings. The different prediction models included Decision Tree,
Gradient Boosting, Logistic Regression, Neural Network, and Random Forest. Further,
the models were built using three combinations of variables: 1) text only, 2) data only,
and 3) text and data. The results of the modeling process are presented here.
Demographic Results
At the beginning of the study, general demographic data were tallied once the
dataset was uploaded into the SAS® library. The final sample size included in the
modeling was n = 26,387. While there may have been more than one pilot on board the
aircraft, the following numbers reflect the pilot at the controls of the aircraft. Further, the
pilot at the controls was not always the designated Pilot-in-Command. Pilot ages ranged
from 16 to 98 years old (mean = 51.7; med = 53; SD = 15.3) as seen in Figure 6.
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Figure 6
Accident Pilot Age Distribution
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Note. Age was not captured in 257 reports.

While age is a typical demographic reported in research, the aviation literature
indicates that correlations between age and a target variable, such as fatal/serious injury
accidents, are complicated because of the relationship of age with associated variables
that comprise experience and situational factors. Of note, Figure 6 captures all of the
accident pilots in the sample, not just those involved in fatal/serious injury accidents.
Additionally, it is notable that age did not appear as a variable in the top three prediction
models and only appeared as a minor contributing variable in three of the 21 prediction
models. The Random Forest (All) model, the fourth-best model, ranked age as #28 in
variable importance. Age did not appear again until the 13th-best Gradient Boosting
(Data) and the 14th-best Random Forest (Data) where age appeared at #15 and #18 in
importance, respectively.
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Pilot sex was not captured in every NTSB report; however, the accident reports
indicated the involvement of 23,071 male pilots and 725 female pilots. An exact
comparison with the demographics of the current GA population is not possible given the
21-year span of the study and the availability of pertinent statistics. However, the average
number of female pilots between 2000 and 2018 was approximately 6% of the pilot
population and ranged from 5.6% in 2000 to 6.9% in 2018 (FAA, 2019a; Goyer, n.d.). A
crosstabs comparison between the accident pilot female-male ratio and the pilot
population female-male ratio indicates a statistically significant difference between the
two groups but, there is not sufficient data to determine if there is a practical significance
between the two groups. A visualization is provided in Figure 7.

Figure 7
Accident Pilot by Sex

3%

97%

Female
Note. Sex was not captured in 2,591 reports.

Male
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The accident reports contained details regarding the pilot’s certification, and a
pilot may hold several certificates. For consistency, only the highest certificate was used
in the demographic analysis. A graph of the number of pilots by highest certificate is
included for ease in visualizing the data (see Figure 8). The numbers can be viewed as a
table in Appendix A, Table A1.

Figure 8
Graph of Pilots by Highest Certificate Held
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Note. The numbers here represent the certificate held by the pilot at the controls of the mishap aircraft.
Information on additional pilots in the aircraft is not included. The category of “none” is assigned by the
investigator to indicate that the individual held no FAA pilot certificate. The pilot data are missing in 138
reports.

Several other demographic markers provide greater insight into the accident pilot
profile. The reports indicated that 1,632 of the accident pilots were employed
professionally as pilots. There were 5,409 pilots with instructor certifications, of which,
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3,926 were certified as instructors in more than one aircraft type. Finally, the reports
indicated that there were 1,894 solo students involved in accidents.
One hallmark of GA is the number of different types of operations. The types of
operations and aircraft involved in GA activities can vary greatly. All of the operations
types were binned into five categories to facilitate modeling. The categories and accident
totals are shown in Figure 9.

Figure 9
Accident Totals by Operation Type
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Note. The categories of Business and Special Purpose differ slightly from the NTSB categories. The
categories were simplified to facilitate modeling, as explained below.

The Personal category is the largest by far and is perhaps the most generic
category assigned in the reports. Instructional flights are those that involve either new
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students or upgrading pilots and may or may not include an instructor pilot. Business
operations can include any flight in the furtherance of business including executive
travel, banner tows, aerial application (non-Part 137), flight test, and aerial observation.
Special purpose flights in the current study are skydiving, airshow, and glider tow
operations. The final category is for flights categorized as Public which could include
local government flights, law enforcement, and firefighting.
There are hundreds of aircraft makes and models involved in the GA aircraft
accident sample. However, there are accessible indicators from which to build an
accident aircraft profile. There are different challenges flying diverse types of aircraft
with varying complexity and associated hazards. Interestingly, the vast majority of
mishap aircraft were factory manufactured single-engine aircraft with a reciprocating
engine configured with tricycle landing gear. Unfortunately, there were too many missing
data points to determine whether or not retractable landing gear figured prominently in
accidents. Charts depicting the aircraft data are included in Appendix B, Figures B1-B4.
The accident reports contain several flight hour categories. Most reports captured a
pilot’s total overall flight hours. Other categories captured flight hours in differing levels
of detail. The flight hours for the accident pilots are found in Table 5, and each category
is also displayed graphically in Appendix B, Figures B5-B11. Broadly speaking, the
demographics provide a profile of an accident pilot who likely will have accrued less than
500 hours overall, less than 100 hours in the particular aircraft make, less than 20 hours
in the previous 90 days, and less than 10 hours in the previous 30 days.
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Table 5
Flight Hours of Accident Pilots
Flight Hours

Mean

Min

Max

Med

Hours last 30-days

19.5

0

238

11

Hours last 90-days

49

0

624

26

Total PIC hours

2,632

0

48,800

848

Total flight hours

3,187

1

55,000

1,000

Total hours make

461

0

31,603

122

Total hours night

450

0

20,000

57

1,607

1

48,500

728

Total hours single-engine

Note: Hours last 24-hours and Total hours multi-engine were not included because of the number of
missing data points.

Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics were compiled by interval variables, shown in Table 6, and
class variables, shown in Table 7. Contained within the two tables are 31 class variables
(categorical variables) and eight interval variables, respectively.
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Table 6
Interval Variable Summary Statistics
Variable

N

Missing

Min

Max

SD

Skew

Kurtosis

Age

26,130

257

16

98

15.30

-0.2217

-0.5753

Hours last 30-

16,861

9,526

0

238

22.79

2.4499

8.1326

18,178

8,209

0

624

60.85

2.5209

8.0842

15,787

10,600

0

48,800

4553.93

3.1976

12.5337

25,463

924

1

55,000

5524.38

3.0458

10.6106

22,304

4,083

0

31,603

1101.11

7.6958

100.8248

14,914

11,473

0

20,000

1323.70

5.9493

46.5419

19,350

7,037

1

48,500

2666.44

4.9633

39.4198

days
Hours last 90days
Total PIC
hours
Total flight
hours
Total hours
make
Total hours
night
Total hours
single-engine
Note. Aside from age, the remaining interval variables are the different types of flight hours logged by the
pilots: time in the past 30- and 90-days, time as pilot-in-command, and total time in all aircraft, the accident
aircraft make, night flying, and single-engine aircraft time.
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Table 7
Class Variable Summary Statistics
Variable

Number of

Missing

Mode

Levels

Mode
Percentage

Airspace

8

11749

44.53

Flight Plan Type

5

969

NONE

78.61

Gear

12

515

TRI

66.53

Highest Certificate

9

138

PRI

49.65

Highest Instructor Cert.

13

1357

NONE

73.34

Multi-platform instructor

4

1369

N

79.93

Instructor

4

1228

N

74.84

Atmospheric lighting

5

149

DAY

88.49

Loss of Control

3

222

0

84.53

Med Certificate Validity

9

3131

WWL

31.55

Multi-engine aircraft

3

117

N

93.62

Seat occupied by pilot

8

2441

LEFT

65.07

Crew position code

8

67

PLT

87.14

Professional pilot

3

7607

N

55.61

Runway condition

19

9868

DRY

51.72

Solo student pilot

4

8

N

92.79

Sex

3

2591

N

87.43

Systems failure

3

222

N

91.25

Type aircraft

6

226

3

73.76

Air-medical flight

4

51

N

99.71

Airport location to crash

3

5

ONAP

53.18

Engine type

7

188

REC

94.78

Ground collision

3

400

N

96.37

Wind gusts indicated

3

4665

N

65.86

Homebuilt

3

7

N

84.94

Mid-air

4

395

N

97.41
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Variable

Number of

Missing

Mode

Levels

Mode
Percentage

Number of engines

6

331

1

89.06

Second pilot on board

3

1619

N

79.65

Sightseeing flight

4

79

N

99.47

Weather not a factor

3

222

0

64.3

Basic weather conditions

4

122

VMC

93.86

Note. The sample size was n = 26,387.

Text Mining Execution
As introduced, the predictive modeling was preceded by the text mining process.
The dataset contained a major text field comprised of the written report narratives. Using
the text mining process, the qualitative data were transformed into a quantitative form
suitable for modeling. The output of the text mining sequence was a series of new
quantitative variables that were used in the predictive models. Two types of text-based
variables are described below including Text Cluster and Text Topic variables. However,
before the variables were created, the narratives needed to be cataloged and filtered using
the Text Parsing and Text Filter functions in SAS® EM™.
The first process, Text Parsing, cataloged all of the words by term, role, attribute,
frequency, and the number of documents in which the terms appeared. Words were
analyzed for their potential usefulness in modeling with the goal of reducing noise and
improving interpretability. Words that did not appear to add value were excluded. The
decision to exclude words was subjective and iterative based on reviewing the Text
Parsing output, running the processes through the Text Topic creation (explained in
greater detail below), and reviewing the output for the topic descriptors. Words were
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added to the stop list, and the cycle of Text Parsing-Text Filter-Text Cluster-Text Topic
was run again. Examples of excluded words included the following: directions (north,
northeast, south, southwest), medical measures (hg, mg), descriptors (agl, msl, c), and
terms referring to accident severity (death, fatal, severe injury, and fatal injury). As an
illustration of the output, a catalog of the top 250 words detected by the Text Parsing
algorithms can be found in Appendix A, Table A2. Figure 10 provides an indication of
the number of words, documents, and frequencies detected in the dataset. While the
figure is a macro-level view, it provides a picture of the magnitude of the parsing process.

Figure 10
Number of Documents by Frequency
+airplane

+landing
+teach

Note. During the Text Parsing process, all words are counted and cataloged. For example, the term
+airplane appears 205,085 times within 25,056 documents. The term +landing has a frequency of 50,455
and appears in 19,392 documents. Finally, the term +teach has a frequency of 98 within 88 documents.
Terms with a plus (+) are parent terms.
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The second text mining process, Text Filter, built upon the first process by adding
weights to words. Words with potentially greater usefulness according to the text mining
algorithm were assigned higher scores based on frequency and usage. Similar to the Text
Parsing results, a catalog of the top 250 terms with the newly assigned weights is located
in Appendix A, Table A3. Figure 11 provides an indication of the number of words,
documents, and weights assigned in the dataset.

Figure 11
Number of Documents by Weight
+teach

+landing
+airplane

Note. During the Text Filter process, the words were assigned weights by the algorithm. Terms with a
weight of zero were dropped from further use. In some cases, the words were automatically dropped by
rule. In other cases, words were dropped via the stop list by the researcher like the word +airplane. The
term +landing was assigned a weight of 1.444. The term +teach was assigned a weight of 9.228. Terms
with a plus (+) are parent terms.
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The third process, Text Cluster, arranged the documents into mutually exclusive
clusters based on the words cataloged and weighted during parsing and filtering. The
Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) algorithm transformed the high dimensional
document-term frequency matrix into a lower dimensional form that enabled the creation
of variables that can be used in modeling (SAS Institute Inc., 2015). The SVD is an
approximation of the weighted frequency matrix and “is the best least squared fit to that
matrix” (SAS Institute Inc., 2018, p. 78). The SVD solution created 24 dimensions and
derived four clusters for a total of 28 possible new variables including 24 Text ClusterSVD variables and four Text Cluster variables. In practice, SVD variables and cluster
variables were not used together in modeling because of the potential overlap or
confounding effects in data representation. Rather, models were developed using each
type, either SVD or cluster, and then compared for their usefulness in the models.
There is an important distinction between the 24 SVD variables and the four text clusters
that factor into their usefulness in model interpretation. The SVD variables numerically
represent the likeness or separateness of one document to another in the algorithmcreated matrix. While the SVD variables may prove extremely useful in a prediction
model’s accuracy, in the SVD form there is no practical way to interpret and explain the
composition of the variable potentially hampering the model’s usefulness for some
applications and end-users. Of potentially greater use to the end-user is the clustering of
the documents. The algorithm determines clusters of documents in the matrix and
extracts words that are key within the clusters. The key words for the current study are
shown in Table 8.
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Table 8
Text Cluster Descriptive Terms
Cluster ID

Descriptive Terms

1.0

+landing +report +runway +gear left

Frequency

Percentage

3875.0

15%

9731.0

37%

2655.0

10%

10126.0

38%

+land +condition visual +damage +plan
+student +nose +prevail +state +time
2.0

+power +engine +fuel +tank +hour
+position +reveal medical last +record
+issue +hold +wing +damage
+instrument

3.0

+record weather last medical +locate
+hold +issue +instrument +mile +hour
+impact +knot +turn +instructor +wind

4.0

+report +runway left +landing
+condition visual +plan +land +damage
+state +prevail +sustain +time +nose
+operate

Note. The plus (+) character indicates the word is a parent term and includes all stemmed versions of the
word.

The final text processing step, Text Topic, also relied on SVD with a different
outcome. Scores were assigned by the algorithm to words and documents. Topics were
created when scoring thresholds indicated strong associations among the words and
documents, allowing the formation of topical groups. Unlike the mutually exclusive Text
Cluster variables, Text Topic words and documents may appear in more than one topic
(SAS Institute Inc., 2018). As text mining is an iterative process, the first iteration
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specified an output of 15 topics as a baseline. A second iteration specified an output of 25
topics and produced more intuitive results, the output of which is shown in Table 9.

Table 9
Text Topic Output
Topic

Variable Label

Topic Terms

Description

ID
1.0

2.0

3.0

Wind Factors
Fuel Issues
IMC Flight

+knot, +wind, +degree,

Landing accidents where

+runway, +gust

wind was noted.

+fuel, +tank, +gallon, +fuel Fuel related accidents
tank, +selector

including human factors.

+controller, +radar,

Flight in instrument

+advise, +acknowledge,

conditions or under ATC.

+tower
4.0

LOC-Stalls

+propeller, +nose, aft,

Stalls and LOC, often

+blade, +approximately

related to abrupt
maneuvers

5.0

6.0

Student Pilots

Forced Landings

+student, +student pilot,

Student flying, especially

solo, +solo flight,

as on solo instructional

instructional

flights.

+engine, +power, forced,

Forced landings often in

+forced landing, +loss

conjunction with engine
issues.

7.0

Landing Gear

+gear, gear, +landing gear,

Landings noting gear

+landing, +extend

issues, including failure to
extend or hard landings.

8.0

Flight Envelope

aircraft, +approximately,

Pilots exceeded the aircraft

Exceedance

+refer, +find, accident

capabilities.

aircraft
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Topic

Variable Label

Topic Terms

Description

Weather Factors

+foot, +cloud, +mile,

Reports where weather

+visibility, +ceiling

factors were prominent.

+hour, total, +time,

Both pilot and maintenance

+engine, +logbook

times figure prominently

+oil, +rod, +connect,

Engine related issues due

+cylinder, +number

to oil loss and related

ID
9.0

10.0

11.0

Flight Hours
Engine Oil Loss

component failure.
12.0

13.0

14.0

Directional LOC

+normal operation,

Loss of directional control

+preclude, +malfunction,

on takeoff or landing; no

+failure, +operation

aircraft problems noted.

+brake, +brake, +apply,

Issues with aircraft brakes

+rudder, +wheel

and braking.

Water-Remote

+airstrip, +passenger,

Accidents by amphibious

Airstrips

+water, +lake, +seat

or float equipped aircraft.

Braking issues

Also, includes remote
airstrips.
15.0

16.0

17.0

Excess Weight

+takeoff, +weight, +foot,

Excess weight and takeoff

+pound, +end

errors.

+instructor, +instruction,

Variation of instructional

+instructional flight,

flights involved in

instructional, +student

accident.

Unstable

+approach, +runway, final,

Errors on approach;

Approach

+airport, +end

includes mid-air collisions

Instructional

on approach.
18.0

Carburetor Icing

+carburetor, +heat, icing,

Accidents where actual or

carburetor heat, ice

suspected carburetor icing
played a major role.

19.0

Loss of Power

+pump, +magneto, +valve,

Engine related events,

+cylinder, +spark

often with fuel issues.

117
Topic

Variable Label

Topic Terms

Description

Slow Flight-Stalls

+witness, left, +hear,

Reports often developed

+state, +turn

with witness testimony;

ID
20.0

includes slow flight and
stalls
21.0

Flight Control

+attach, +aileron, +control,

Focused on flight control

+cable, +remain

surfaces, often recounting
the aircraft had no
problems.

22.0

Surface Accidents

+taxiway, +taxi, +runway,

Airport surface incidents.

+park, +fire
23.0

Engine

+fracture, +bolt, +rod,

Mechanical-related

Component

fatigue, +surface

incidents.

+detect, +witness, medical,

Accidents involving

+test, +brake

medical issues.

+tree, +runway, main,

Landing and takeoff issues,

+landing gear, +tank

on or near a runway, with

Failure
24.0

25.0

Medical
Obstructions

obstructions playing a role.
Note. The short variable label was developed by the researcher to assist readers in recognizing the topics
throughout the study. Because the algorithm-assigned topic words did not always capture themes, a
description of the documents assigned to a particular topic has been provided. Details regarding the number
of terms assigned to each topic and the number of documents in which the topics appear can be found in
Appendix A, Table A4. The plus (+) character indicates the word is a parent term and includes all stemmed
versions of the word. The top-25 associated accident reports for each topic are referenced in Appendix A,
Table A9.
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At the end of the text mining process, four Text Clusters, 24 Text Cluster-SVD
variables, and 25 Text Topic variables, were created. All of the new variables were made
available for modeling.
Data Mining Execution
The data mining portion of the study followed the SEMMA framework of sample,
explore, modify, model, and assess. As SEMMA is iterative in nature, there are natural
overlaps in activities. Where possible, the activities are presented within their respective
categories to facilitate understanding.
Sample Execution
The sample activity began prior to both text and data mining. A general review of
the NTSB database indicated a large amount of data was available across multiple
variables. The researcher determined no additional sources of data were necessary given
the study aims and the available report data. The data were extracted from the NTSB
Access® product using SQL Server® and saved into an Excel® format. In the spreadsheet
format, the data were pared according to the stated delimitations: 1) United States only,
(2) accidents and incidents between January 1, 1998 and December 31, 2018, 3) Part 91
operations, and 4) fixed-wing aircraft.
Another sample activity included the partitioning of the dataset to facilitate model
training, validation, and testing. The data were partitioned 60:20:20 respectively.
Partitioning occurred immediately following the text mining activities.
While not necessarily anticipated, several reports were deleted after the initial
sample selection based on findings while exploring the data. Specifically, 17 accidents
involved stolen aircraft, 20 suicides, 79 parked aircraft, 7 ATC/airfield management-
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caused mishaps, and 17 maintenance accidents (where there was no intent to fly). By
their nature, these events could not provide value in predicting the target.
Exploration Execution
Data exploration built upon the sample activity to help ensure maximum usability
to the modeling algorithms. During the Sample activities, the data were pared using the
information entered into the various data field. However, there were occasions where data
were incorrectly entered or mislabeled. Observations that did not meet the delimitations
were removed. Additionally, variables were reviewed for missing values and extreme
high or low numbers. Where possible, the seemingly extreme values were compared to
the actual NTSB reports. Any detected errors were corrected. For instance, data contained
in the field L24H_ALL indicated impossibilities; the reports indicated that some pilots
flew more than 24 hours in a 24-hour day. All values greater than 18 were verified
against the reports and the original documentation, where available. Ultimately 12 data
points with hours ranging from 24 to 124.6 were deleted. Missing values were also
addressed against the NTSB reports, where possible. Any values found in the written
documents were entered into the study dataset. Once suitable for the study, the dataset
was uploaded into SAS® EM™ for use in modeling.
The dataset included multiple variables containing structured quantitative data.
The StatExplore node was used to conduct an examination of the importance of
individual variables based on their Chi-Square values when set against the target variable.
The results are depicted in Figure 12. The table of results can be viewed in Appendix A,
Table A3.

Airport location to crash
Basic weather condition
Runway condition
Atmospheric lighting
Highest certification
Professional pilot
Homebuilt
Flight purpose
Flight plan type
Second pilot on board
Crew position code
Solo student pilot
Highest instructor cert.
Multi-platform instructor
Instructor
Airspace
Gear
Med certificate validity
Mid-air
Number of engines
Wind gusts indicated
Multi-engine aircraft
Loss of control
Seat occupied by pilot
Engine type
Ground collision
Sex
Systems failure
Weather not a factor
Air-medical flight
Sightseeing flight

Chi-Square
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Figure 12

Chi-Square Variable Importance
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Another way to view variable importance is to assess their worth according to

statistical calculation, as seen in Figure 13. As before, the table of results can be viewed

in Appendix A, Table A4.

Total hours make
Airport location to crash
Total hours single-engine
Hours last 90-days
Hours last 30-days
Total hours night
Total hours PIC
Basic weather conditions
Runway condition
Total flight hours
Atmospheric lighting
Highest certification
Flight purpose
Professional pilot
Homebuilt
Crew position category
Solo student pilot
Second pilot on board
Flight plan type
Highest instructor cert.
Age
Multi-platform instructor
Airspace
Med certificate validity
Instructor
Number of engines
Gear
Wind gusts indicated
Seat occupied by pilot
Loss of control
Mid-air
Multi-engine aircraft
Ground collision
Engine type
Weather not a factor
Systems failure
Air-medical flight
Sex
Sightseeing flight

Worth
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Figure 13

Input Variable Worth
0.08

0.07

0.06

0.05

0.04

0.03

0.02

0.01

0

Examination of the figures and accompanying statistics indicated Air-medical

flight and Sightseeing flight might be candidates for exclusion. Further analysis of the

Sex variable indicated possible exclusion due to the small number of female pilots

included in the sample. The bottom seven variables, according to worth, were considered
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for exclusion. Each was individually eliminated from models to view the effects on the
model. The decision was made to globally exclude Air-medical flight, Sightseeing flight,
and Sex from the list available for the models. All other variables were made available
for modeling.
Modify Execution
A potential outgrowth of the sample and explore activities is the need to modify
variables. Variables may be modified to address outliers, missing data, or to group
variables. Several a priori proposed variables were deleted by rule in the import process
due to the number of missing data points (greater than 50%). The deleted variables were
Fixed-retractable gear, Hours last 24-hours, Total hours multi-engine, Defining events,
Occurrences, Causes, Factors, Factual narrative, Cause narrative, and Incident narrative.
Several quantitative variables were created upon closer inspection of the NTSB database
to make better use of the data for model building and improve usability of model
findings. The new variables were compiled and are shown in Table 10. A comprehensive
list of variables used in the modeling steps is in Appendix C, Table C1.
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Table 10
New Quantitative Variables
Variable

Description

Type

Gear Type

Gear type

Nominal

Highest instructor cert.

Highest instructor rating

Nominal

Multi-platform instructor

Instructor rated in multiple a/c

Dichotomous

Instructor

Pilot possessed instructor rating

Dichotomous

Loss of Control

Loss of control (air or ground)

Dichotomous

Number of engines

Number of engines

Interval

Seat occupied by pilot

Seat position of accident pilot

Nominal

Runway condition

Runway condition

Nominal

Solo student pilot

Solo student pilot

Dichotomous

Systems failure

System failure cited

Dichotomous

Weather not a factor

Weather not a factor

Dichotomous

Model Execution
The prediction models were built in three groupings based on the types of
variables in the dataset; text-only, data-only, and both text and data variables. Ultimately,
21 models were built and then ranked by misclassification rate. The final model process
used to build the models is shown in Figure 14.
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Figure 14
Final Model Process

Text-only Models. The possible text-only variables included the four Text
Cluster, 24 Text Cluster-SVD, and 25 Text Topic variables. The first task was to
determine which text-based variables produced the best predicting models. The variables
were iteratively introduced into the seven basic model types and then assessed according
to their misclassification rates. The possible variable combinations were Text Cluster-
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only, Text Cluster-SVD-only, Text Topic-only, Text Cluster/Text Topic, and Text
Cluster-SVD/Text Topic, noting that the two cluster variable types were not used
together in the same models. The results in Table 11 indicate that three of the five
combinations produced models with a misclassification rate less than 0.10. As explained
previously, the internal workings of the Text Cluster and Text Cluster-SVD variables are
not readily translatable to the general audiences intended to use the models. Given the
similarity of the misclassification rates and the usability factors, the researcher opted to
use only the Text Topic variables in the final models.

Table 11
Text-based Model Comparison Summary
Model

Text-

Text

Cluster

Text Topic

Text Topic/

Text Topic/

Cluster-

Text

Text

SVD

Cluster

ClusterSVD

Random Forest

0.20750

0.10063

0.09873

0.09627

0.09987

Neural Network

0.20750

0.11162

0.12583

0.09665

0.09077

Logistic Regression

0.20750

0.10707

0.09816

0.09911

0.09816

Gradient Boosting

0.20750

0.11256

0.10290

0.10309

0.10006

DT (5-branch)

0.20750

0.11256

0.10498

0.10498

0.10555

DT (3-branch)

0.20750

0.11294

0.10726

0.10669

0.10574

DT (2-branch)

0.20750

0.11768

0.10707

0.10839

0.10460

Note. The bolded numbers in each column represent the best predicting model by variable combination
based on the validation misclassification rate. DT = Decision Tree.
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Data-only Models. Seven models were developed using only structured data.
Unlike the text-based variables, no additional work was necessary to determine the best
predicting model by data type. The findings are shown in Table 12.

Table 12
Data-based Model Comparison Summary
Model

Misclassification Rate

Gradient Boosting

0.16771

Random Forest

0.17908

Decision Tree (2-branch)

0.18287

Decision Tree (3-branch)

0.18571

Decision Tree (5-branch)

0.18666

Logistic Regression

0.26492

Neural Network

0.28918

Note. The models within the table presented here only used data variables.

Combined Text and Data Models. The final set of seven models used both text
and data variables. As with the final text-only models presented earlier, the Text Topic
variables were used in the combined models. The results of the combined text and data
models are shown in Table 13.
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Table 13
Combined-data Model Comparison Summary
Model

Misclassification Rate

Gradient Boosting

0.09930

Random Forest

0.10063

Decision Tree (5-branch)

0.10479

Decision Tree (3-branch)

0.10707

Decision Tree (2-branch)

0.10821

Logistic Regression

0.22873

Neural Network

0.28482

Note. The models within the table presented here used both text and data variables.

Assess Execution
The final process in the SEMMA framework involved assessing the 21 models
and selecting the champion model. All 21 models, their rankings, and the associated
misclassification rates are contained in Table 14. A full accounting of the model
prediction and accuracy numbers are shown in Appendix A, Table A7.
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Table 14
Model Comparison Summary
Model

Variables

Valid: MR

Test: MR

Used

ROC

Ranking

Index

Logistic Regression

Text

0.09816

0.09850

0.945

1

Random Forest

Text

0.09873

0.09358

0.938

2

Gradient Boosting

All

0.09930

0.09528

0.937

3

Random Forest

All

0.10063

0.09225

0.937

4

Gradient Boosting

Text

0.10290

0.10059

0.933

5

Decision Tree (5-br.)

All

0.10479

0.10684

0.902

6

Decision Tree (5-br.)

Text

0.10498

0.10722

0.901

7

Decision Tree (3-br.)

All

0.10707

0.11082

0.907

8

Decision Tree (2-br.)

Text

0.10707

0.10513

0.875

9

Decision Tree (3-br.)

Text

0.10726

0.10968

0.908

10

Decision Tree (2-br.)

All

0.10821

0.10551

0.875

11

Neural Network

Text

0.12583

0.12616

0.915

12

Gradient Boosting

Data

0.16771

0.17181

0.863

13

Random Forest

Data

0.17908

0.18072

0.854

14

Decision Tree (2-br.)

Data

0.18287

0.18716

0.807

15

Decision Tree (3-br.)

Data

0.18571

0.18810

0.810

16

Decision Tree (5-br.)

Data

0.18666

0.18886

0.809

17

Logistic Regression

All

0.22873

0.21993

0.814

18

Logistic Regression

Data

0.26492

0.26596

0.715

19

Neural Network

All

0.28482

0.28396

0.551

20

Neural Network

Data

0.28918

0.28888

0.529

21

Note. For MR, lower numbers indicate better performing models. For ROC Index, also known as Area
Under the Curve, a higher number generally indicates better performance. The column listing variables
used refers to the type of variables introduced in the model. For instance, “text” indicates only text-based
variables were used. Models using both text- and data-based variables have the notation “all.”
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As shown, three models achieved misclassification rates less than 0.10: Logistic
Regression (Text), Random Forest (Text), and Gradient Boosting (All). Because of the
similarity, details of the top three models are presented in the next paragraphs. The
combined results are introduced first followed by a discussion of the top three models
individually.
One way to visualize the performance of the models is with the Receiver
Operating Characteristic (ROC) graphs. A ROC curve within the graph depicts the
misclassification rates according to Sensitivity on the y-axis and Specificity on the x-axis.
Sensitivity and specificity are measures of how well a model performs in predicting the
target events (SAS Institute Inc., 2018). Better performing models have higher sensitivity
and specificity for a given threshold. Another way to describe the ROC curve is with the
accompanying ROC Index or Area Under the Curve. The previous table showed the top
three models had a ROC Index of 0.95 for the Logistic Regression (Text) and 0.94 for
both the Random Forest (Text) and the Gradient Boosting (All). The Receiver Operating
Characteristic (ROC) graphs for the top three models (see Figure 15) illustrate pictorially
what the misclassification numbers indicate.
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Figure 15
ROC Diagrams—Top Three Models

Note. The graphs depict model performance from training to validation and from validation to test. The
expectation is that the validation models perform as well or better than the train models. Additionally, the
test models should be consistent with the validate models.

The Cumulative Lift graph is another tool to visualize model performance. Better
predicting models again have a higher area under the curve, also described as lift. Similar
to the ROC, the models should be consistent across the three samples. The similarity of
the top three models is indicated by the proximity of the lift lines to each other. The
Cumulative Lift graphs for the top three models are shown in Figures 16-18.
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Figure 16
Cumulative Lift (Train)—Top Three Models

Note. The figure depicts each model’s cumulative lift from the model training activity. There is no expected
performance as the training step builds the models and provides the baseline for validation and testing.
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Figure 17
Cumulative Lift (Validate)—Top Three Models

Note. The figure depicts each model’s cumulative lift from the model validation activity. In general, the
models should perform in a similar manner to the training sample. Additionally, the graph indicates the
closeness of the three models in their prediction capability.
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Figure 18
Cumulative Lift (Test)—Top Three Models

Note. The figure depicts each model’s cumulative lift from the model test activity. The validation and test
lift charts should be similar if the models perform well.

Logistic Regression (Text). The model ranked highest by misclassification rate
was the Logistic Regression only using the text variables. Inspection of the Cumulative
Lift chart (see Figure 19) provides an indication of the model performance between Train
and Validate samples. The lines in close proximity indicate model consistency. The
Cumulative Lift value is 3.46. Additionally, the chart indicates that at the cumulative lift
of 2.0 (where the model predicts 2x better than random), 45% of the fatal/severe injury
accidents are predicted. At the 1.5 level, the prediction is 65%, and at the at the 1.25
level, 80%.
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Figure 19
Cumulative Lift—Logistic Regression (Text)

Note. The model has a Cumulative Lift of 3.46.

Plots showing the misclassification rates are not produced for regression models.
Instead, an Effects Plot is produced, as shown in Figure 20. The bars represent the
individual variables used in the model with blue indicating variables with a positive
impact. The height of the bars indicates the absolute values of the variable coefficients,
and in the figure provide an indication of relative importance.
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Figure 20

Topic 8

Topic 19

Topic 4

Topic 18

Intercept

Topic 11

Topic 17

Topic 15

Topic 7

Topic 10

Topic 9

Topic 3

Topic 1

Topic 13

Topic 12

Topic 23

Topic 21

Topic 20

Topic 24

Effects Plot—Logistic Regression (Text)

Note. The variables are shown here according to their absolute coefficient values. Of most interest to the
current study are the variables in blue that have a positive relationship to the target variable. The variable
identification numbers were inserted into the chart to aid in identification. The variables are explained in
greater detail in subsequent paragraphs and tables (see Table 19).

The fit statistics for the Logistic Regression (Text) model are shown in Table 15.
The statistics most commonly referenced in the table are the Misclassification Rate and
the Average Squared Error. The better predicting models will show consistent values
across the three samples.
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Table 15
Fit Statistics—Logistic Regression (Text)
Fit Statistic
Akaike's Information Criterion

Train

Validation

Test

7931.96

Average Squared Error

0.07

0.08

0.07

Average Error Function

0.25

0.25

0.25

Degrees of Freedom for Error

15812

Model Degrees of Freedom

19

Total Degrees of Freedom

15831

Divisor for ASE

31662

10554

10558

7893.96

2632.63

2536.52

Error Function
Final Prediction Error

0.07

Maximum Absolute Error

1.00

0.99

0.9

Mean Square Error

0.07

0.08

0.07

Sum of Frequencies

15831

5277

5279

0.27

0.27

0.27

0.27

Number of Estimate Weights

19

Root Average Sum of Squares

0.27

Root Final Prediction Error

0.27

Root Mean Squared Error

0.27

Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion

8077.69

Sum of Squared Errors

2314.03

791.82

762.33

31662

10554

10558

0.09513

0.09816

0.09850

Sum of Case Weights Times Freq
Misclassification Rate

Random Forest (Text). The model ranked second by misclassification rate was
the Random Forest using only text variables. The Random Forest model behaves
differently than other models in that the Cumulative Lift lines (see Figure 21) between
the Train and Validate samples are somewhat separated at the beginning and then
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converge as the depth increases. The expectation of a good model is the validate lift will
be less than the train lift given a tendency to overfit a solution. The Random Forest (Text)
model has a Cumulative Lift score of 3.45. The graph indicates that at the 2.0 lift level,
the depth is 45, at 1.5, the depth is 65, and at 1.25, the depth is almost 80 which is very
similar to the Logistic Regression (Text) model.

Figure 21
Cumulative Lift—Random Forest (Text)

Note. The validate model has a Cumulative Lift of 3.45.

The iteration plot depicting the misclassification rate is shown in Figure 22. The
expectation is that as the Out of Bag and Validate rates improve, the lines will converge,
and then the lines will flow in close proximity, as the number of trees increase.
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Figure 22
Iteration Plot—Random Forest (Text)

The fit statistics for the Random Forest (Text) model are shown in Table 16. As
with the previous model, the statistics most commonly referenced in the table are the
Misclassification Rate and the Average Squared Error. Again, the better predicting
models will show consistent values across the three samples. However, with the Random
Forest model, the Train values may be significantly less than the Validation values. The
Text sample values are especially important here to provide an indication that the model
is well trained and not overfit.
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Table 16
Fit Statistics—Random Forest (Text)
Fit Statistic

Train

Validation

Test

0.01243

0.07552

0.07368

31662

10554

10558

0.53

1

1

15831

5277

5279

Root Average Squared Error

0.11151

0.27482

0.27143

Sum of Squared Errors

393.663

797.0808

777.872

Frequency of Classified Cases

15831

5277

5279

Misclassification Rate

.00006

0.09873

0.09358

1

521

494

Average Squared Error
Divisor for ASE
Maximum Absolute Error
Sum of Frequencies

Number of Wrong Classifications

Gradient Boosting (All). The third ranked model according to misclassification
rate was the Gradient Boosting using both text and data variables. Similar to the previous
two models, the Cumulative Lift chart (see Figure 23) gives an indication of model
performance between samples. The model has a Cumulative Lift of 3.46, and the lift lines
between the samples are in close proximity. At the 2.0 lift, the depth is 45, at 1.5, the
depth is 65, and at 1.25, the depth is just over 80.
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Figure 23
Cumulative Lift—Gradient Boosting (All)

Note. The validate model has a Cumulative Lift of 3.46.

The Gradient Boosting model produces a Subseries Plot (see Figure 24) depicting
misclassification rate changes across the iterations. Based on how the models are built,
the graph shows the rate dropping steeply in the first several iterations and then steadily
decreases until the algorithm reaches the prescribed stopping point. The better predicting
models will behave similarly throughout the iterations and run in close proximity to one
another.
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Figure 24
Iteration Plot—Gradient Boosting (All)

The fit statistics for the Gradient Boosting (All) model are shown next in Table
17. Once more, the statistics most commonly referenced in the table are the
Misclassification Rate and the Average Squared Error. Model performance is indicated
by consistency between the Train, Validation, and Text sample values.

142
Table 17
Fit Statistics—Gradient Boosting (All)
Fit Statistic

Train

Validation

Test

Sum of Frequencies

15831

5277

5279

Sum of Case Weights Times Freq

31662

10554

10558

Misclassification Rate

0.09380

0.09930

0.09528

Maximum Absolute Error

0.96186

0.96374

0.96143

Sum of Squared Errors

2,349.152

823.933

792.230

Average Squared Error

0.07419

0.07807

0.07504

Root Average Squared Error

0.27239

0.27941

0.27393

Divisor for ASE

31662

10554

10558

Total Degrees of Freedom

15831

Variable Importance
Assessing variable importance is an Assess activity within SEMMA and is related
to at least two general research aims: 1) improving the model performance, and 2)
providing practical information for model implementation. While the model output
formats vary by model, the variable importance of the top three models is presented in
this section.
Logistic Regression (Text) Variables. Text variables important to the Logistic
Regression (Text) model are shown in Table 18.
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Table 18
Logistic Regression (Text) Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter

Estimate

Standard

Wald

Pr >

Error

Chi-Sq

ChiSq

Standardized

Exp

Estimate

(Est)

Intercept

-2.6566

0.0741

1283.66

<.0001

0.071

Medical

24.2622

0.8373

839.64

<.0001

0.7473

999.000

15.3506

0.6828

505.36

<.0001

0.4481

999.000

10.8613

0.6283

298.82

<.0001

0.4402

999.000

4.6725

0.4880

91.68

<.0001

0.1803

106.966

4.2627

0.5194

67.34

<.0001

0.1711

71.001

4.1343

0.4984

68.80

<.0001

0.1643

62.449

3.5586

0.5057

49.53

<.0001

0.1105

35.112

3.4771

0.5802

35.91

<.0001

0.1075

32.365

2.7163

0.5192

27.37

<.0001

0.0931

15.124

2.4448

0.6130

15.91

<.0003

0.0872

11.529

2.0081

0.4452

20.34

<.0001

0.0788

7.449

(TT 24)
Slow FlightStalls
(TT 20)
Flight Control
(TT 21)
IMC Flight
(TT 3)
Weather Factors
(TT 9)
Flight Hours
(TT 10)
Excess Weight
(TT 15)
Unstable
Approach
(TT 17)
Engine Oil Loss
(TT 11)
LOC-Stalls
(TT 4)
Loss of Power
(TT 19)
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Parameter
Flight Envelope

Estimate

Standard

Wald

Error

Chi-Sq

1.9797

0.5185

-2.5487

Pr >

Standardized

Exp

ChiSq

Estimate

(Est)

14.58

.0001

0.0615

7.241

0.5037

25.61

<.0001

-0.0801

0.078

-4.0391

0.7609

28.18

<.0001

-0.1431

0.018

-5.5085

0.6321

75.95

<.0001

-0.1823

0.004

-7.0504

0.9049

60.71

<.0001

-0.2135

0.001

-7.1902

0.7602

89.47

<.0001

-0.2205

0.001

-7.7403

0.6550

139.65

<.0001

-0.2212

0.000

Exceedance
(TT 8)
Carburetor Icing
(TT 18)
Landing Gear
(TT 7)
Wind Factors
(TT 1)
Braking Issues
(TT 13)
Directional LOC
(TT 12)
Engine
Component
Failure
(TT 23)
Note. The Degrees of Freedom = 1 for all variables. TT = Text Topic. The full variable descriptions were
presented in Table 10.

Random Forest (Text) Variables. Variable importance in a Random Forest
model is assessed using the Out-of-Bounds (OOB) Gini Reduction scores, as shown in
Table 19.
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Table 19
Random Forest (Text) Variable Importance
Variable Name

Number of OOB: Gini
Splitting

Reduction

Rules
Medical

5597

OOB:
Margin
Reduction

0.06433

0.14439

(TT 24)
Flight Hours

3285

0.03871

0.08899

4655

0.02511

0.06543

5182

0.01361

0.04251

4813

0.00388

0.02421

(TT 4)

+propeller, +nose, aft,
+blade, +approximately

6682

0.00269

0.02782

(TT 9)

+foot, +cloud, +mile,
+visibility, +ceiling

IMC Flight
(TT 3)

+witness, left, +hear,
+state, +turn

(TT 20)

Weather Factors

+attach, +aileron, +control,
+cable, +remain

Stalls
LOC-Stalls

+hour, total, +time,
+engine, +logbook

(TT 21)
Slow Flight-

+detect, +witness, medical,
+test, +brake

(TT 10)
Flight Control

Label

0.00222

0.0189

4314

+controller, +radar,
+advise, +acknowledge,
+tower

Engine Oil Loss

2731

0.0022

0.01427

(TT 11)
Excess Weight

+cylinder, +number
3346

-0.0007

0.01049

(TT 15)
Fuel Issues

(TT 12)

+takeoff, +weight, +foot,
+pound, +end

3373

-0.0019

0.0074

(TT 2)
Directional LOC

+oil, +rod, +connect,

+fuel, +tank, +gallon, +fuel
tank, +selector

3257

-0.0025

0.00652

+normal operation,
+preclude, +malfunction,
+failure, +operation
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Variable Name

Number of OOB: Gini
Splitting

Reduction

Rules
Instructional

2836

OOB:

Label

Margin
Reduction

-0.0028

0.00436

(TT 16)

+instructor, +instruction,
+instructional flight,
instructional, +student

Braking Issues

3163

-0.0029

0.00478

(TT 13)
Wind Factors

+rudder, +wheel
2623

-0.0041

0.00134

(TT 1)
Carburetor Icing

+knot, +wind, +degree,
+runway, +gust

3060

-0.0042

0.00186

(TT 18)
Engine

+brake, +brake, +apply,

+carburetor, +heat, icing,
carburetor heat, ice

4112

-0.0045

0.00446

Component

+fracture, +bolt, +rod,

Failure

fatigue, +surface

(TT 23)
Forced Landings

5229

-0.0046

0.00788

(TT 6)
Loss of Power

+forced landing, +loss
3398

-0.0046

0.00277

(TT 19)
Unstable

+engine, +power, forced,
+pump, +magneto, +valve,
+cylinder, +spark

3534

-0.0049

0.00206

Approach

+approach, +runway, final,
+airport, +end

(TT 17)
Water/ Remote

2951

-0.0051

0.00062

Airstrips

+airstrip, +passenger,
+water, +lake, +seat

(TT 14)
Obstructions
(TT 25)

4076

-0.0058

0.00185

+tree, +runway, main,
+landing gear, +tank
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Variable Name

Number of OOB: Gini
Splitting

Reduction

Rules
Student Pilots

4007

OOB:

Label

Margin
Reduction

-0.0059

0.00125

(TT 5)

+student, +student pilot,
solo, +solo flight,
instructional

Surface

3851

-0.0063

0.00048

Accidents

+taxiway, +taxi, +runway,
+park, +fire

(TT 22)
Flight Envelope

5643

-0.0075

0.00261

aircraft, +approximately,

Exceedance

+refer, +find, accident

(TT 8)

aircraft

Landing Gear

4993

-0.0079

0.00078

(TT 7)

+gear, gear, +landing gear,
+landing, +extend

Note. The plus (+) character indicates the word is a parent term.

Gradient Boosting (All) Variables. Variable importance for the Gradient
Boosting (All) model is shown in Table 20.
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Table 20
Gradient Boosting (All) Variable Importance
Variable Name

Description

Number of

Validation

Splitting

Importance

Rules
Medical

+detect, +witness, medical, +test,

26

1

(TT 24)

+brake

Flight Control

+attach, +aileron, +control, +cable,

16

0.41985

(TT 21)

+remain

Slow Flight-

+witness, left, +hear, +state, +turn

28

0.44596

Flight Hours

+hour, total, +time, +engine,

7

0.34715

(TT 10)

+logbook

IMC Flight

+controller, +radar, +advise,

11

0.29600

(TT 3)

+acknowledge, +tower

Total hours

Total flight time in the accident

7

0.22847

make

aircraft make.

Weather Factors

+foot, +cloud, +mile, +visibility,

8

0.25234

(TT 9)

+ceiling

Airport location

Accident proximity to an airport.

6

0.19135

LOC-Stalls

+propeller, +nose, aft, +blade,

3

0.15849

(TT 4)

+approximately

Excess Weight

+takeoff, +weight, +foot, +pound,

9

0.10808

(TT 15)

+end

Hours last 30-

Total flight time in the past 30-days.

3

0.10676

Directional LOC

+normal operation, +preclude,

4

0.10312

(TT 12)

+malfunction, +failure, +operation

Stalls
(TT 20)

to crash

days

149
Variable Name

Description

Number of

Validation

Splitting

Importance

Rules
Braking Issues

+brake, +brake, +apply, +rudder,

3

0.09127

(TT 13)

+wheel

Total hours

Total flight time in single-engine

2

0.07900

single-engine

aircraft.

Total PIC hours

Total flight time as pilot-in-

1

0.07031

2

0.06963

2

0.04653

Total hours night Total flight time at night.

2

0.05453

Obstructions

+tree, +runway, main, +landing gear,

3

0.03915

(TT 25)

+tank

Fuel Issues

+fuel, +tank, +gallon, +fuel tank,

1

0.04269

(TT 2)

+selector

Engine Oil Loss

+oil, +rod, +connect, +cylinder,

1

0.04227

(TT 11)

+number

Homebuilt

Aircraft homebuilt or factory

1

0.04612

1

0.01352

command.
Forced Landings

+engine, +power, forced, +forced

(TT 6)

landing, +loss

Engine

+fracture, +bolt, +rod, fatigue,

Component

+surface

Failure
(TT 23)

manufactured.
Carburetor Icing

+carburetor, +heat, icing, carburetor

(TT 18)

heat, ice

Note. TT = Text Topic. The plus (+) character indicates the word is a parent term.
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Reliability and Validity Testing Results
The final area under Assess in SEMMA is an analysis of the model’s reliability
and validity. To summarize, reliability is the level to which an instrument provides
consistent performance, and validity is the level to which an instrument measures what is
intended. Reliability and validity begin with the input data. The quality of the data
sourced from the NTSB was generally acceptable overall, providing consistent model
outputs. However, during the initial data exploration, errors were noted between the
Access® data, the written reports, and the public dockets containing the source
documents for many of the accidents. Many errors were detected and addressed using a
hi/lo search of the variables. For instance, there were several pilots with ages less than 16
years and more than 98 years. Each case was cross-checked with the reports to either
correct the age or delete the entry. In many cases, zero was used for missing data rather
than leaving the field blank. Total flight hours provide a second example where several
entries indicated 999,999 flight hours. Closer examination in the reports revealed the
entry indicated missing data. Many variables contained missing data. Where possible, the
variables were checked against the reports and corrected in the study dataset. Where
reference to the original was not possible, no attempt to impute variables was made given
the general robustness of data mining to missing variables.
Each model was assessed for reliability and validity using the techniques outlined
in Chapter III. Overall, models were trained, validated, and tested using different portions
of the sample, enabling assessments of model performance. The results from the top three
models are presented in the following sections.
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Reliability Assessment
Model reliability was assessed using ROC, Cumulative Lift, and Miscalculation
Rate scores. The ROC graphs represent sensitivity and specificity scores at various
threshold levels. When plotted, the plots are joined in a “curve” that depicts model
performance. Reliable models show consistency across measurement, as seen in the ROC
graphs in Figure 25.

Figure 25
ROC Graphs—Top Three Models

Note. The Logistic Regression (Text) ROC curve is depicted by the bold blue line.

Cumulative Lift provides a visual representation of model strength. A model that
is no better than random guessing will have a lift approaching 1 or no lift. Higher lift
scores indicate better predicting models (McCarthy et al., 2019). The Cumulative Lift
graph for the top three models shows model reliability in the closeness of the lines from
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different samples. Upon inspection, the graph shows strong predictability over a random
guess. To illustrate, at the 2.0 level—the point where a model predicts two-times better
than no model—approximately 45% of the Fatal/Severe Injury cases are predicted with
all three models. At the 1.5% level, the prediction is approximately 65%, and at the 1.25
level, the number is almost 80%. The Cumulative Lift graph is shown in Figure 26.

Figure 26
Cumulative Lift (Validation Sample)—Top Three Models

Further examination of the misclassification rates also provided an indication of
reliability, as found in Table 21. With misclassification rates, a lower score is better.
Average Squared Error, which is related to model bias, should also be low, indicating less
bias (McCarthy et al., 2019). Model reliability is indicated by the similarities between the
Valid and Test scores.
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Table 21
Misclassification Rate Comparison—Top Three Models
Model & Measure

Train

Validate

Test

Misclassification Rate

0.09513

0.09816

0.09850

Average Squared Error

0.07267

0.07461

0.07250

Misclassification Rate

0.00006

0.09873

0.09358

Average Squared Error

0.01243

0.07552

0.07368

Misclassification Rate

0.09380

0.09930

0.09528

Average Squared Error

0.07419

0.07807

0.07504

Logistic Regression (Text)

Random Forest (Text)

Gradient Boosting (All)

Validity Assessment
Validity indicators include test-retest performance and measures of accuracy and
predictability. The ROC diagram shown previously (see Figure 25) charts
misclassification rates by measuring sensitivity and specificity. Sensitivity is a measure
of a model’s capability to detect targets of interest or events (Shmueli et al., 2016).
Specificity is a measure of a model’s ability to correctly rule out false targets or nonevents (Shmueli et al., 2016). In other words, the ROC displays the model’s true and false
positive scores at a given threshold. When the plots are joined with a line, they form the
ROC curve. Recalling the current study specifics, the target of interest is the Fatal/Severe
Injury aviation accident. The best predicting model, as represented by the ROC curve
where all targets were classified correctly without any error would have data points at 1,0
on the graph or in the top left corner. A ROC Index, or Area Under the Curve (AUC)
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measures the space created by the curve, the higher number the better with a ROC Index
of 1 representing a perfect predicting model.
Test-Retest performance is shown in the Cumulative Lift Graphs across all three
samples; train, validation, and test. The expectation is that all of the graphs will display
similar results. The stacked graphs are shown in Figure 27 and provide a visual indication
of model validity.

Figure 27
Cumulative Lift Graphs—Top Three Models
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Several formulas were used to calculate model performance. To begin, actual and
predicted classification scores were entered into a 2x2 confusion matrix (EMC Education
Services, 2015). The classification scores were True Positives (TP), False Positives (FP),
False Negatives (FN), and True Negatives (TN). The confusion matrix with associated
scores is shown in Tables 22-24.

Table 22
Logistic Regression (Text) Confusion Matrix
Actual

Predicted

Fatal/Serious Injury (1)

Minor/None Injury (0)

Fatal/Serious Injury (1)

1,145 [TP]

138 [FP]

Minor/None Injury (0)

380 [FN]

3,614 [TN]

Note. TP = True Positive; FP = False Positive; FN = False Negative; TN = True Negative.

Table 23
Random Forest (Text) Confusion Matrix
Actual

Predicted

Fatal/Serious Injury (1)

Minor/None Injury (0)

Fatal/Serious Injury (1)

1,130 [TP]

126 [FP]

Minor/None Injury (0)

395 [FN]

3,626 [TN]

Note. TP = True Positive; FP = False Positive; FN = False Negative; TN = True Negative.
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Table 24
Gradient Boosting (All) Confusion Matrix
Actual

Predicted

Fatal/Serious Injury (1)

Minor/None Injury (0)

Fatal/Serious Injury (1)

1,114[TP]

113 [FP]

Minor/None Injury (0)

411 [FN]

3,639 [TN]

Note. TP = True Positive; FP = False Positive; FN = False Negative; TN = True Negative.

The formulas that build on the confusion matrix are shown in Table 25, including
the scores derived from the formulas. While assessed separately, better Accuracy, True
Positive Rate (TPR), Specificity, and Precision scores are closer to 1.0. Better False
Positive Rate and False Negative Rate scores are closer to 0.0.
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Table 25
Model Precision and Accuracy Formulas
Measure

Formula

𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁
𝑇𝑃
True Positive Rate
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁
(TPR), Sensitivity
Accuracy

Specificity
False Positive
Rate (FPR)
False Negative
Rate (FNR)
Precision

Score
LR (Text)

RF (Text)

GB (All)

0.902

0.901

0.901

0.75

0.74

0.73

𝑇𝑁
𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁
𝐹𝑃
𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁

0.96

0.97

0.97

0.036

0.034

0.030

𝐹𝑁
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁

0.25

0.26

0.27

𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃

0.894

0.900

0.908

Note. TP = True Positive; FP = False Positive; FN = False Negative; TN = True Negative; LR = Logistic
Regression; RF = Random Forest; GB = Gradient Boosting.

When all of the indicators were combined, the results suggested that the top three
models are all good predictors of Fatal/Severe Injury aviation accidents. First, the ROC
index shows a 95%, 94%, and 94% probability that the models can distinguish between
classes. Second, accuracy for all models is greater than 90%. Third, precision is just
under 90% for the first model and at or slightly above 90% for the second and third.
Fourth, the False Positive Rate (FPR) or Type I error is 3.6%, 3.4%, and 3%,
respectively. Fifth, the False Negative Rate or Type II error is 25%, 26%, and 27%,
respectively. Sixth, the True Positive Rate (TPR) or Sensitivity is 75%, 74%, and 73%
(acceptable). And seventh, the Specificity is 96%, 97%, and 97% (good). All of the
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numbers for the top three models suggest they are acceptable prediction models (Truong
et al., 2018).
Summary
The hallmark of data mining is the ability to work with large amounts of data.
One source of aviation accident data is the NTSB Aviation Accident and Synopses
publicly available for download in both structured and unstructured data formats. Text
and data mining tools were used to make use of the NTSB data to develop models that
predict Aviation Accident Severity. In total, the results of 21 prediction models were
presented across five model types and three variable groupings (text-only, data-only, and
both text and data). The models included Decision Tree, Gradient Boosting, Logistic
Regression, Neural Network, and Random Forest. Three models emerged as potential
champions based upon their prediction performance; Logistic Regression (Text), Random
Forest (Text), and Gradient Boosting (All).
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Chapter V: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
The purpose of this study was to conduct data-driven exploratory research into
creating models that predict aviation accident injury levels using machine learning
techniques. Aviation safety is underpinned by reactive, proactive, and predictive
methodologies. Both reactive and proactive approaches rely on various levels of actual
safety occurrences. While it is essential to learn from past accidents and near-misses and
then prevent them from happening again, prediction methodologies provide a way to
prevent accidents before they happen in the first place, protecting lives and property.
The current study successfully employed machine learning tools to build, validate,
and test several prediction models based on 21 years of data from fixed-wing GA
accidents and incidents in the United States. Unique to the study was the introduction of
text-based quantitative variables derived through text mining the accident report
narratives. Using the text mining process produced a different insight into variables that
contribute to fatal and severe injury accidents. The lessons gleaned from this research
could provide new directions in the efforts to reduce aircraft accidents and improve flight
safety.
Discussion
Wiegmann and Shappell (2017) wrote, “Simply focusing on unsafe acts is like
focusing on a fever without understanding the underlying illness that is causing it” (p.
56). Standard measures of safety include different counts of occurrences from which
safety mitigations are developed; the type of accidents with the highest occurrences
become the target of safety efforts. Traditional statistical methods have been used in an
attempt to understand variables in an accident sequence. However, these methods are
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limited by their ability to address complexity and data non-normality. Data mining
overcomes these limitations, and machine learning enables researchers to delve into the
underlying factors and patterns undetectable using traditional statistical tools.
Research Question 1
RQ 1 asked, what model developed with machine learning and data mining
techniques best predicts fatal and severe aviation accidents? Analysis of 21 prediction
models revealed that the Logistic Regression (Text) model had a misclassification rate
(MR) of 0.098 or a 9.8% MR in the validation data. In practicality, the Logistic
Regression (Text) model showed a 90.2% capability to correctly predict the target of
accident injury severity level.
The practical usefulness of a prediction model is based on the application and
operating environment, and sometimes the best predicting model is not the most useful to
those who rely on the model’s interpretability (Truong et al., 2018). For this reason, it is
beneficial to look at models with similar performance. In the current study, the secondand third-best models by MR had similar scores to the Logistic Regression (Text) model.
The second-best model by MR was the Random Forest (Text). It is similar to the
Logistic Regression (Text) model using only text-based variables. The MR = 0.9873 or
9.9%, which equated to a 90.1% capability to correctly predict the target. The third-best
model by MR was the Gradient Boosting (All), which was also the first model that
integrated data-based variables. The MR = 0.0993 or 9.9%, which also equated to a
90.1% capability to correctly predict the target.
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Research Question 2
RQ2 asked, what variables are most important in the selected model for predicting
fatal and severe injury aviation accidents? A comparison of variable importance across
the top three models revealed commonality between the models with Medical (TT 24),
Slow flight-stalls (TT 20), and Flight control (TT 21) playing prominent roles. IMC flight
(TT 3), Weather factors (TT 9), and Flight hours (TT 10) also figured prominently in all
three models. The most important variables are discussed here according to their
importance in the model output. A review of the NTSB written accident reports linked to
the particular Text Topic provided context to the topic assignment. Only the top topics
are discussed here. However, a listing of the top 50 accident reports by topic weight for
each of the 25 topics can be viewed in Appendix A, Table A9.
Text Topic 24 (Medical). Text Topic 24 was the most important variable in all of
the top three models. Keywords for the variable included +detect, +witness, medical,
+test, and +brake, noting the plus (+) indicates a parent term. According to the accident
reports corresponding to the topic variable, many pilots had medical problems that were
or could have been factors in the accident. Some medical problems noted during the
forensic analysis were unreported to the FAA and could have had medical certificate
implications. A common problem noted by investigators was the use of potentially
impairing over-the-counter drugs, prescription medication, and illegal substances.
Alcohol impairment was also implicated in many accidents. One challenge with GA
accidents is that there are often no data or voice recorders on board making witness
statements important in determining the accident sequence.
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Text Topic 20 (Slow Flight-Stalls). Text Topic 20 was the second most
important variable in the Logistic Regression (Text) model, fourth in the Random Forest
(Text) model, and third in the Gradient Boosting (All) model. The keywords assigned by
the algorithm included +witness, left, +hear, +state, and +turn. As with the previous text
topic, witnesses were important to the accident analysis, though some reports point to the
limitation of the non-aviation bystander witnesses. The use of the term “left” had two
common uses in the reports. The first use references left turns, often indicating standard
traffic pattern turns either on landing or takeoff. The second use references the yawing
action or P-factor associated with the clockwise propeller rotation and the need for rightrudder to counteract the force. Many times the yawing action appeared to occur just
before a loss of control.
Text Topic 21 (Flight Control). Text Topic 21 ranked third in the Logistic
Regression (Text) and Random Forest (Text) models and second in the Gradient Boosting
(All) model. The terms +attach, +aileron, +control, +cable, and +remain are the
descriptors for the topic. In some cases, the accidents referred to aircraft hitting power
wires or radio tower cables. In other cases, the terms directly related to the analysis of the
aircraft wreckage, sometimes in connection with pilot control issues. The term control
was used in several ways, including references to aircraft control surfaces, aircraft
controls, and loss of control or failure to maintain directional control.
Text Topic 3 (IMC Flight). Text Topic 3 ranked fourth in the Logistic
Regression (Text) model, seventh in the Random Forest (Text) model, and fifth in the
Gradient Boosting (All) model. Key terms for the variable included +controller, +radar,
+advise, +acknowledge, and +tower. Interactions with air traffic control figured
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prominently within the topic. In some of the incidents, the controllers were contributing
factors in the accident. However, a more widespread factor was the environment
surrounding the accident sequences. Common components included inadequate flight
planning and unexpected flight from VMC into IMC, where the controllers were doing
their jobs providing assistance to the pilots.
Text Topic 9 (Weather Factors). Text Topic 9 ranked fifth in the Logistic
Regression (Text) model, sixth in the Random Forest (Text) model, and seventh in the
Gradient Boosting (All) model. Key terms for Text Topic 9 included +foot, +cloud,
+mile, +visibility, and +ceiling. The accident reports linked to Text Topic 9 all have a
weather component contributing to mishaps. Many of the accidents involved continued
VFR flight into IMC. Often the pilot did not receive a weather briefing or disregarded a
weather briefing that outlined IMC conditions or stated, “VFR flight is not
recommended.” Lastly, many of the pilots were not instrument rated or had little recent
experience flying IFR.
Text Topic 10 (Flight Hours). Text Topic 10 ranked sixth in the Logistic
Regression (Text) model, fifth in the Random Forest (Text) model, and fourth in the
Gradient Boosting (All) model. The variable here included the terms +hour, total, +time,
+engine, +logbook. A common attribute of the reports assigned to Text Topic 10 was a
detailed accounting of pilot flight times and engine operating times facilitated by the
investigator’s access to logbooks. The finding may be notable because, while required,
logbooks were not available for all accident investigations. Unfortunately for
interpretation purposes, the term engine was not always definitive with a positive or
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negative outcome, as many reports stated that engine problems were not a factor in the
accident.
The Gradient Boosting (All) was the only model in the top three to include databased variables. The variable of Total Hours Make (total flight time in the accident
aircraft make) appeared sixth in variable importance. The variable Airport location to
crash (accident location in reference to an airport) appeared eighth. The variable Hours
last 30-days (total flight time in the past 30-days) appeared eleventh. Other data variables
in the model with somewhat lesser importance scores (< 0.10) were Total hours singleengine (total flight time in single-engine aircraft), Total hours night (total flight time at
night), and Homebuilt (whether or not an aircraft was manufactured in a factory).
Surprisingly, none of the data-only models could perform at a level better than the
0.16771 misclassification rate. One possible reason relates to how the data mining
algorithms calculate and account for error, whereas in traditional statistics such as logistic
regression, models assume no error in the model. Another possible reason could relate to
the broadness of the GA sample, including a wide variety of pilots, operations, and
aircraft capabilities. A third possibility is the quality of the data; missing data likely
hampered the predictive capability of the models. As an example, studies cited by Boyd
(2017a) showed that flight hours could be a risk factor, yet they did not appear in the top
two models. The total hours in aircraft make, hours in the previous 30-days, single-engine
time, and flight time at night did appear in the third-best model, with impact lower than
text-based variables.
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Conclusions
According to James Reason (200b), “There are no final victories in the struggle
for safety” (p. 4). The meaning seems to be that one must always be looking for new
safety challenges; the work is never done. Experience has shown that as systems evolve,
new problems can arise where problems previously did not exist. The research reported
here does not discount previous efforts. On the contrary, the research adds to the body of
knowledge in several theoretical and practical ways.
Theoretical Contributions
The greatest contribution to the science of aviation safety management and
machine learning theory relates to the text mining findings. The novel results add to the
body of literature that addresses predictive safety using machine learning and discusses
the capabilities of data mining in building predictive models within an aviation paradigm.
The findings agree with Malaszek (2017), who wrote, “Models with a properly conducted
text-mining process have better classification quality than models without text variables”
(p. 1). Interestingly, in the current study, models with only text variables outshone those
that included both text and data or only data. Further, in the third best performing model,
which was the first model that incorporated both types of variables, the data variables
featured lower in importance. The results suggest that while not often used in aviation
studies, the accident report narratives contain valuable information that can be used in
predictive accident prevention efforts. Indeed, the current project was the first known
study to use unstructured-text narratives as they appeared in the accident reports to
predict accident outcomes, and provides a baseline for future text mining-based
prediction efforts in aviation.
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Other contributions include a new understanding of variables that predict GA
accidents and provide a basis for future studies. The study answers the call for continual
reassessment of safety system components to ensure the viability of the system (Stolzer,
Friend et al., 2018). Further, the findings build on previous literature such as Baugh and
Stolzer (2018), Friend and Kohn (2018), and Stolzer, Halford et al. (2011), extolling the
benefits of predictive safety methodologies and advance the research in predictive safety
risk management.
Practical Contributions
Prior to this point in the manuscript, the results of the top three prediction models
were presented for consideration, and it was shown that all three performed within 0.1%
of each other, according to their ability to correctly classify the target. However, what
remains is the selection of the champion model based on all modeling factors and
usability for the intended population. Using a holistic view, the Logistic Regression (text)
model is selected as the champion model. It has a slightly better misclassification rate,
and it performed more consistently than the other models between the validation and test
samples indicating a higher degree of validity. While it has a slightly higher False
Positive Rate, it has a lower False Negative Rate, which is seen as a good factor. In other
words, the model errs on adding cases to the fatal/severe injury side. This helps ensure
the right variables are represented and not left out when making safety management
decisions. Of greater importance, logistic regression models are reputed for their
understandability to larger audiences.
As suggested, the research here discovered new areas of concentration and
variables that have value in more finely guiding safety prevention activities. The research
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extends knowledge of machine learning in aviation human factors from such efforts as
Liu et al. (2013) and Burnett and Si (2017). Both teams respectively showed the value of
machine learning in predicting HFACS components using NTSB reports and aviation
fatalities and injuries with FAA accident records. Additionally, the results provide insight
into complex and undetected links between accident components, combinations of
factors, and accident outcomes. Further, the results suggest the need for continued
research into the underlying and compounding interaction of variables that led to the
defining events.
A question arises regarding the top variables in the models and whether anything
new was discovered. Indeed, the broad areas are well-known in the GA community. The
primary lesson-learned here is that text mining detected some important nuances that add
value to accident reduction efforts. The nuances emerged by going beyond the typical
defining event (e.g., loss of control in flight, controlled flight into terrain, and low
altitude operation) and primary accident causes (e.g., decision making/judgement, aircraft
control, and incorrect action selection), which are commonly charted and reviewed in the
literature.
The first new area of discovery is the prominence of the Medical topic (TT 24) in
the prediction models, suggesting an area where additional focus is needed, specifically
with unreported medical conditions and the use or abuse of all forms of medication.
Hidden within this topic is the limitation of determining accident factors in a fleet of
aircraft largely not equipped with cockpit voice and data recorders. Slow flight and stalls
(TT 20) encompasses a known-hazard, but points to a need to look deeper into
combinations of factors including speed control, remedial actions, basic pilot skills,
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situational awareness, task management, and distractions. Flight control (TT 21) covers
LOC accidents; however, a new contribution is a suggestion to research deeper into why
pilots fail to maintain directional control. IMC Flight (TT 3) points to a need to
reexamine inadequate flight planning. Weather factors (TT 9) is a well-known area for
aviation hazards. However, a new suggestion by the topic is to focus on pilots who do not
obtain weather briefings, do not obtain adequate briefings, or disregard the briefing,
especially when the briefer states, “VFR flight is not recommended.” While many pilots
are not instrument certified, the topic suggests a need to address the importance of recent
IFR experience for those pilots who are instrument certified. Finally, the topic Flight
hours (TT 10) is not new, as the literature is replete with examples of research
surrounding flight hours. However, the topic suggests a new area for research: logbooks.
Many accidents reports do not contain flight hours because logbooks were unavailable for
a myriad of reasons.
The current study was made possible by the data captured in the accident reports
by teams of expert aviation investigators. The findings of the study provide a treatise for
current and future accident investigators. Prediction modeling is only as accurate as the
input data, and the current study shows the strengths and weaknesses of the accident
reports. The primary strength is the report narrative itself. The study results indicate
words matter; they can help researchers move beyond data and provide crucial context.
The richness of the descriptions provided data capable of producing models with a
prediction capability greater than 90%. The primary weakness of the reports is the
amount of missing quantitative data. The literature indicates data mining models should
improve by adding text variables. Strikingly, the current models were not able to
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capitalize on the tabular data, and the missing data is likely the greatest reason why the
data-only prediction models did not have a prediction capability greater than 83%.
Regarding future text mining research, the study provides a basis for building an aviationspecific corpus for a more accurate analysis of accident reports.
Finally, the findings provide new areas to target aviation safety efforts. Indeed,
the major components identified in the accident reports remain valid such as speed errors,
task saturation, loss of control, and continued VFR flight into IMC. What these results
provide is additional awareness into some potential precursors such as poor decision
making, marginal flight planning, and unresolved or pilot-induced medical issues.
Limitations of the Findings
Archival-based research is inherently subject to limitations because the data are
out of the control of the researcher; the data have already been captured, often without the
possibility of clarifying points of interest or adding new reference points. While the
prediction models performed well, they were limited by missing data, omissions, and
errors between the source documents, the written reports, and the database. Additionally,
source documents were not available online for accidents prior to 2009, limiting the
ability to check discrepancies. Where a potential discrepancy was discovered, the only
option was to remove the data from consideration. Unfortunately, several variables of
potential value (e.g., defining events, factors, and occurrences) were deleted because of
missing data.
The study was purposely broad to match the variety of GA participants and
capture as many reports as possible to improve the amount of data available for
modeling. Even with the “global” GA breadth, several models were still able to predict at
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a 90% level. While generalizability across the board is good, the results may not
generalize at the same level using different subgroupings of the data.
Finally, conclusions related to flight hours beyond basic demographics are
problematic. One factor relates to the first limitation above. The amount of missing data
limited the conclusions in some instances and caused others to be eliminated because of
the amount of missing data. In some cases, the aircraft was destroyed, and the pilots
killed, making it impossible to recreate flight hours. In other cases, the reports are silent,
even when the pilot survived. Another limitation is the number of accident reports that
used different accounting (i.e., last six months) instead of the standard of last 24-hours,
last 30-days, and last 90-days.
Recommendations
In reactive aviation safety, understanding complex aviation accident factors is
vital for preventing future occurrences. Proactive safety goes further by adding the nearmiss occurrences into safety equations. By adding predictive methodologies, enabled by
machine learning and vast amounts of data, the paradigm can change. No longer will an
accident be the basis for future safety; the prediction models can provide the necessary
information that enables stakeholders to prevent that first accident from happening.
Recommendations for the Target Population
The results of the study lead to several recommendations that will address both
the quality of the data, and by extension, the prediction models, and address areas where
safety enhancements might be made.
Recommendation 1. The first recommendation addresses the accident report.
Specifically, the quality of the accident reports should be improved with a focus on the
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needs of predictive modeling. Quality checks should be instituted to ensure continuity
between the source documents, the written reports, and the database. Additionally, there
needs to be an emphasis on consistency in reporting missing data (e.g., leaving the data
field blank instead of reporting a zero for age or a series of nines for flight hours). An
easy target would be for improvements at the NTSB level. However, the issue is not just
for one government agency subject to competing priorities and resource constraints.
Pilots also bear responsibility for report quality. Many of the reports begin with the
mishap pilot submitting the NTSB Form 6120.1, Pilot Operator Aircraft
Accident/Incident Report (NTSB, 2013). Cross-checking NTSB accident reports with the
original NTSB Form 6120.1 revealed that many forms are incomplete or completed in
error.
The investigators should also strive for consistency in terminology and word use
to facilitate text mining and predictive modeling. For example, the word “solo” is often
used to describe a student pilot conducting a flight without an instructor on board the
aircraft. However, in many cases, the word was used to describe the sole occupant of the
aircraft.
Another part of this recommendation is for investigators to capture variables
consistently. A prime example is reporting flight hours in non-standard measures such as
hours in the previous six months, rendering many reports unusable for modeling. The
flight hours should conform to the categories found in the NTSB Form 6120.1 and the
standard categories of the NTSB database.
Recommendation 2. The second recommendation addresses the data. The FAA
and aviation organization partners should investigate ways to capture and publish more
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flight data for use in safety modeling. Lack of diverse data will be the greatest hindrance
to incorporating more predictive methods in GA safety management. One reactive
starting point could be the implementation of online pilot logbook records. A pilot’s
flight times can be crucial points in the accident root-cause analysis. With a digital
platform, the data could be made available to investigators following an accident.
Recommendation 3. Moving to the model results, a third recommendation is
based on medical findings. The results of the current study complement the previous
research by McKay and Groff (2016), who noted an increase in pilot drug use (over-thecounter, prescription, and illegal substances) while flying, and studies by Booze (1987)
and Taneja & Wiegmann (2002) on medical conditions likely to cause pilot
incapacitation. The recommendation here is to continue to invest in medical education
and build on FAA and GAJSC efforts addressing impairing medication and high risk
medical conditions.
Recommendation 4. The fourth recommendation involves focusing efforts to
improve flight skills and combat decision-based errors. The FAA, partners, and flight
training organizations should refocus efforts on improving a pilot’s ability to control the
aircraft when faced with unexpected events in time-critical situations. As an example, an
additional focus should be placed on countering the effects of carburetor icing,
identifying conditions conducive to carburetor icing, and training pilots on strategies to
overcome the effects of suspected carburetor icing. Additional efforts should focus on the
areas of stabilized approaches, forced landings, power management, and slow flight.
Recommendation 5. Weather components are common in accidents, as seen by
their inclusion in different text-based variables. Agreeing with many studies, continued
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VFR flight into IMC was an important factor in accidents and efforts to combat the
practice should continue. A surprising theme is the number of times pilots either did not
receive a weather brief prior to the flight or did not follow the recommendation to avoid
VFR flight given the observed or forecast conditions. The FAA, partners, and flight
training organizations should refocus efforts on weather briefings, pre-flight planning,
and weather-based risk management.
Recommendations for Future Research
A novel component of the current study was the inclusion of aviation accident
report narratives transformed from their qualitative format into quantitative variables
through a text mining process. The outcome showed great promise for future work given
the importance of text-based variables in the top 12 of 21 models created in the project.
Future research should focus on how to make the text mining process produce tighter
topic and cluster variables. One way to do this could be researching and creating an
improved aviation corpus used within the algorithm to ensure important concepts specific
to aviation are captured to produce more precise (and by extension, more interpretable)
Text Topics and Text Clusters. Qualitative studies of the report narratives could provide
greater insight into word use and issues with interrater reliability between the writing
styles and report quality of different investigators and under what circumstances.
Another avenue of future research is an investigation into the performance of the
data variables in the prediction models. Having this understanding would improve the
prediction models and enhance the usability of the models toward other focus areas
unavailable in the current models.
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Flight safety efforts often focus on preventing the worst outcomes like those in
the current study. However, focusing on just fatal and severe injury accidents misses the
vulnerability represented by accidents with less extreme outcomes. Future data mining
research should focus on predicting accidents with either minor or no injuries. By
addressing the important variables in non-injury accidents, other major accidents might
be prevented.
The cornerstone of data mining is access to large blocks of data and where
appropriate, including data from many sources. The prediction models here relied solely
on archived data from a single source. Future efforts should focus on integrating
additional data sources like the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), Aviation
Safety Action Program (ASAP), and Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast
(ADS-B) data.
Finally, the discussion on the limits of global generalizability offers an avenue of
research into the different sub-groups contained in the current study. Different types of
operations (e.g., business, personal, and instructional) or aircraft attributes (e.g., tailwheel or multi-engines) may yield models with more specific applicability to that
community. Additionally, other GA communities excluded from the current study like
helicopters and gliders could benefit from prediction modeling with machine learning
methodologies.
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Table A1
Pilots by Highest Certificate Held
Certificate Type

Count

Percentage

Airline Transport Pilot

3,508

13.4%

Certified Flight Instructor

2,778

10.6%

Commercial

4,377

16.7%

Private

13,100

49.9%

Recreational

19

0.1%

Sport

263

1.0%

1,903

7.2%

301

1.1%

Student
None

Note. The certificates represent the certificate held by the pilot at the controls of the mishap aircraft.
Information on additional pilots in the aircraft is not included. The category of “None” is assigned by the
investigator to indicate the individual held no FAA pilot certificate. The pilot data are missing in 138
reports.
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Table A2
Text Parsing Top 250 Terms
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195

196

197

198
Table A3
Text Filter Top 250 Words

199

200

201

202
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Table A4
Text Topic Output—Terms and Docs
Topic

Topic Terms

Description

ID
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0

Number of

# Docs

Terms
+knot, +wind, +degree,

Landing accidents where wind

+runway, +gust

was noted.

+fuel, +tank, +gallon, +fuel tank,

Fuel related accidents including

+selector

human factors.

+controller, +radar, +advise,

Flight in instrument conditions

+acknowledge, +tower

or under ATC.

+propeller, +nose, aft, +blade,

Mechanical issues often noted

+approximately

with the propeller.

+student, +student pilot, solo,

Student flying, especially as on

+solo flight, instructional

solo instructional flights.

+engine, +power, forced,

Forced landings often in

+forced landing, +loss

conjunction with engine issues.

+gear, gear, +landing gear,

Landings noting gear issues,

+landing, +extend

including failure to extend or

778.0

3972.0

454.0

2978.0

602.0

1780.0

1157.0

3383.0

332.0

2457.0

910.0

4515.0

813.0

1915.0

558.0

2523.0

1180.0

2494.0

981.0

4006.0

hard landings.
8.0
9.0
10.0
11.0

aircraft, +approximately, +refer,

Pilots exceeded the aircraft

+find, accident aircraft

capabilities.

+foot, +cloud, +mile, +visibility,

Reports where weather factors

+ceiling

were prominent.

+hour, total, +time, +engine,

Both pilot and maintenance

+logbook

times figure prominently.

+oil, +rod, +connect, +cylinder,

Engine related issues.

916.0

1729.0

+normal operation, +preclude,

Accidents where there were no

534.0

3176.0

+malfunction, +failure,

malfunctions noted.
Largely landing accidents.

688.0

2193.0

+airstrip, +passenger, +water,

Accidents by amphibious or

1206.0

3446.0

+lake, +seat

float equipped aircraft. Also,

+number
12.0

+operation
13.0

+brake, +brake, +apply, +rudder,
+wheel

14.0

includes remote airstrips.
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Topic

Topic Terms

Description

ID
15.0

Number of

# Docs

Terms
+takeoff, +weight, +foot,

Takeoff accidents.

936.0

3045.0

+instructor, +instruction,

Variation of instructional flights

543.0

2267.0

+instructional flight,

involved in accident.
Landing accidents.

958.0

3581.0

+carburetor, +heat, icing,

Accidents where actual or

757.0

2074.0

carburetor heat, ice

suspected carburetor icing
Engine related events.

1131.0

3262.0

+witness, left, +hear, +state,

Reports often developed with

1072.0

3635.0

+turn

witness testimony; includes slow
1092.0

2986.0

Airport incidents.

1130.0

2163.0

Mechanical-related incidents.

1095.0

2067.0

+detect, +witness, medical,

Accidents involving medical

1344.0

3033.0

+test, +brake

issues.

+tree, +runway, main, +landing

Landing and takeoff issues, on

1303.0

3134.0

gear, +tank

or near a runway, with

+pound, +end
16.0

instructional, +student
17.0

+approach, +runway, final,
+airport, +end

18.0

played a major role.
19.0

+pump, +magneto, +valve,
+cylinder, +spark

20.0

flight and stalls.
21.0

+attach, +aileron, +control,

Focused on flight control

+cable, +remain

surfaces, often recounting the
aircraft had no problems.

22.0

+taxiway, +taxi, +runway,
+park, +fire

23.0

+fracture, +bolt, +rod, fatigue,
+surface

24.0
25.0

obstructions playing a role.
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Table A5
StatExplore Variable Importance
Input

Chi-Square

Df

Prob

Airport location to crash

3417.7967

2

<.0001

Basic weather conditions

1471.1524

2

<.0001

Runway condition

1230.9093

18

<.0001

Atmospheric lighting

462.6179

4

<.0001

Highest certificate

376.5766

8

<.0001

Professional pilot

362.0299

2

<.0001

Homebuilt

356.4551

2

<.0001

Flight purpose

336.2555

5

<.0001

Flight plan type

323.6753

4

<.0001

Second pilot on board

306.5209

2

<.0001

Crew position code

298.7658

7

<.0001

Solo student pilot

263.6320

3

<.0001

Highest instructor cert.

256.1608

12

<.0001

Multi-platform instructor

248.7324

3

<.0001

Instructor

205.7463

3

<.0001

Airspace

195.7200

7

<.0001

Gear

191.8177

11

<.0001

Med certificate validity

180.9837

8

<.0001

Mid-air

145.9344

2

<.0001

Number of engines

142.0536

5

<.0001

Wind gusts indicated

108.3157

2

<.0001

Multi-engine aircraft

100.2272

2

<.0001

Loss of control

99.2032

2

<.0001

Seat occupied by pilot

94.8832

7

<.0001

Engine type

71.1847

6

<.0001

Ground collision

46.2084

2

<.0001

Sex

35.3855

2

<.0001

System failure

21.8658

2

<.0001

Weather not a factor

19.5206

2

<.0001

Air-medical flight

3.7046

3

0.2952

Sightseeing flight

3.5618

3

0.3128
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Table A6
StatExplore Variable Worth
Variable

Importance

Worth

Total hours make

1

0.069741

Airport location to

2

Variable

Importance

Worth

Wind gusts indicated

28

0.001732

0.051725

Seat occupied by pilot

29

0.001724

3

0.047146

Loss of control

30

0.001687

Hours last 90-days

4

0.044737

Mid-air

31

0.001528

Hours last 30-days

5

0.042283

Multi-engine aircraft

32

0.00125

Total hours at night

6

0.033061

Ground collision

33

0.00066

Total PIC hours

7

0.030906

Engine type

34

0.00063

Basic weather condition

8

0.022074

Weather not a factor

35

0.00037

Runway condition

9

0.018009

Systems failure

36

0.00030

Total flight hours

10

0.00682

Air medical flight

37

0.00017

Atmospheric lighting

11

0.006807

Sex

38

0.00017

Highest certificate

12

0.006323

Sightseeing flight

39

0.00009

Flight purpose

13

0.005632

Professional pilot

14

0.005431

Homebuilt

15

0.004903

Crew position code

16

0.004722

Solo student pilot

17

0.004435

Second pilot on board

18

0.004331

Flight plan type

19

0.004135

Highest instructor cert

20

0.003478

Age

21

0.003212

Multi-platform

22

0.003127

Airspace

23

0.002724

Med certificate validity

24

0.002708

Instructor

25

0.002368

Number of engines

26

0.002045

Gear

27

0.00202

crash
Total hours singleengine

instructor

Model Prediction and Accuracy Comparison

Table A7
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Table A8
Model Statistics Comparison Chart—Top Three Models
Fit Statistics

Statistics Label

Logistic

Random

Gradient

Regression

Forest (Text)

Boosting (All)

0.382

0.475

0.352

0.745

1

0.748

0.07267

0.012433

0.07420

1

0.939

34.45488

34.60782

34.45488

17.23837

17.30391

17.17282

0.09816

0.09873

0.09930

(Text)
BINNED_KS_

Train: Bin-Based Two-Way

PROB_CUTO

Kolmogorov-Smirnov

FF

Probability Cutoff

KS

Train: Kolmogorov-Smirnov
Statistic

_AIC_

Train: Akaike's Information

7896.171

Criterion
_ASE_

Train: Average Squared Error

_AUR_

Train: Roc Index

0.944

_AVERR_

Train: Average Error Function

0.248

_CAPC_

Train: Cumulative Percent
Captured Response

_CAP_

Train: Percent Captured
Response

_CRITERION

Selection Criterion: Valid:

_

Misclassification Rate

_DFE_

Train: Degrees of Freedom for

15809

Error
_DFM_

Train: Model Degrees of

22

Freedom
_DFT_

Train: Total Degrees of Freedom

_DISF_

Train: Frequency of Classified

15831

15831
15831

Cases
_DIV_

Train: Divisor for ASE

31662

31662

_ERR_

Train: Error Function

7852.171

_FPE_

Train: Final Prediction Error

0.07287

_GAIN_

Train: Gain

244.3531

245.8816

244.3531

_GINI_

Train: Gini Coefficient

0.887

1

0.877

_KS_BIN_

Train: Bin-Based Two-Way

0.743

0.985

0.746

Kolmogorov-Smirnov Statistic

31662

210
Fit Statistics

Statistics Label

Logistic

Random

Gradient

Regression

Forest (Text)

Boosting (All)

0.273

0.451

0.252

(Text)
_KS_PROB_C

Train: Kolmogorov-Smirnov

UTOFF

Probability Cutoff

_LIFTC_

Train: Cumulative Lift

3.44353

3.45882

3.44353

_LIFT_

Train: Lift

3.44571

3.45882

3.43261

_MAX_

Train: Maximum Absolute Error

0.99980

0.53

0.96186

_MISC_

Train: Misclassification Rate

0.09513

0.00006

0.09380

_MSE_

Train: Mean Square Error

0.07277

_NOBS_

Train: Sum of Frequencies

15831

15831

15831

_NW_

Train: Number of Estimate

22
0.26958

0.11151

0.27239

Weights
_RASE_

Train: Root Average Sum of
Squares

_RESP_

Train: Percent Response

99.62121

100

99.24242

_RESPC_

Train: Cumulative Percent

99.55808

100

99.55808

393.663

2349.152

Response
_RFPE_

Train: Root Final Prediction

0.26995

Error
_RMSE_

Train: Root Mean Squared Error

0.26976

_SBC_

Train: Schwarz's Bayesian

8064.905

Criterion
_SSE_

Train: Sum of Squared Errors

2300.903

_SUMW_

Train: Sum of Case Weights

31662

31662

Times Freq
_WRONG_

Train: Number of Wrong

1

Classifications
VKS

Valid: Kolmogorov-Smirnov

0.74

0.735

0.725

0.074610

0.07552

0.07807

0.945

0.938

0.937

0.38

0.337

Statistic
_VASE_

Valid: Average Squared Error

_VAUR_

Valid: Roc Index

_VAVERR_

Valid: Average Error Function

_VBINNED_

Valid: Bin-Based Two-Way

KS_PROB_C

Kolmogorov-Smirnov

UTOFF_

Probability Cutoff

0.24832
0.376
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Fit Statistics

Statistics Label

Logistic

Random

Gradient

Regression

Forest (Text)

Boosting (All)

34.62295

34.55738

34.62295

17.31148

17.2459

17.31148

(Text)
_VCAPC_

Valid: Cumulative Percent
Captured Response

_VCAP_

Valid: Percent Captured
Response

_VDISF_

Valid: Frequency of Classified

5277

Cases
_VDIV_

Valid: Divisor for VASE

10554

10554

10554

_VERR_

Valid: Error Function

2620.719

_VGAIN_

Valid: Gain

246.0328

245.3774

246.0328

_VGINI_

Valid: Gini Coefficient

0.889

0.875

0.875

_VKS_BIN_

Valid: Bin-Based Two-Way

0.734

0.734

0.721

0.259

0.301

0.296

Kolmogorov-Smirnov Statistic
_VKS_PROB_

Valid: Kolmogorov-Smirnov

CUTOFF_

Probability Cutoff

_VLIFTC_

Valid: Cumulative Lift

3.46033

3.45377

3.46033

_VLIFT_

Valid: Lift

3.46033

3.44722

3.46033

_VMAX_

Valid: Maximum Absolute Error

0.98891

1

0.96374

_VMISC_

Valid: Misclassification Rate

0.09816

0.09873

0.09930

_VMSE_

Valid: Mean Square Error

0.07461

_VNOBS_

Valid: Sum of Frequencies

5277

5277

5277

_VRASE_

Valid: Root Average Squared

0.27315

0.27482

0.27941

100

99.81061

100

100

99.62121

100

797.0808

823.9326

Error
_VRESPC_

Valid: Cumulative Percent
Response

_VRESP_

Valid: Percent Response

_VRMSE_

Valid: Root Mean Square Error

0.27315

_VSSE_

Valid: Sum of Square Errors

787.4203

_VSUMW_

Valid: Sum of Case Weights

10554

10554

Times Freq
_VWRONG_

Valid: Number of Wrong

521

Classifications
TKS

Test: Kolmogorov-Smirnov

0.743

0.74

0.735

0.07250

0.07368

0.07504

Statistic
_TASE_

Test: Average Squared Error
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Fit Statistics

Statistics Label

Logistic

Random

Gradient

Regression

Forest (Text)

Boosting (All)

0.94

0.937

0.389

0.385

0.339

34.53473

34.4692

34.53473

17.2346

17.19991

17.2346

(Text)
_TAUR_

Test: Roc Index

_TAVERR_

Test: Average Error Function

_TBINNED_K

Test: Bin-Based Two-Way

S_PROB_CU

Kolmogorov-Smirnov

TOFF_

Probability Cutoff

_TCAPC_

Test: Cumulative Percent

0.947
0.24101

Captured Response
_TCAP_

Test: Percent Captured Response

_TDISF_

Test: Frequency of Classified

5279

Cases
_TDIV_

Test: Divisor for TASE

10558

10558

10558

_TERR_

Test: Error Function

2544.571

_TGAIN_

Test: Gain

245.2819

244.6267

245.2819

_TGINI_

Test: Gini Coefficient

0.894

0.88

0.874

_TKS_BIN_

Test: Bin-Based Two-Way

0.739

0.74

0.73

0.258

0.321

0.288

Kolmogorov-Smirnov Statistic
_TKS_PROB_

Test: Kolmogorov-Smirnov

CUTOFF_

Probability Cutoff

_TLIFTC_

Test: Cumulative Lift

3.45282

3.44627

3.45282

_TLIFT_

Test: Lift

3.44627

3.43933

3.44627

_TMAX_

Test: Maximum Absolute Error

0.99366

1

0.96143

_TMISC_

Test: Misclassification Rate

0.09850

0.09358

0.09528

_TMISL_

Test: Lower 95% Conf. Limit

0.09059

for TMISC
_TMISU_

Test: Upper 95% Conf. Limit for

0.10686

TMISC
_TMSE_

Test: Mean Square Error

0.07250

_TNOBS_

Test: Sum of Frequencies

5279

5279

5279

_TRASE_

Test: Root Average Squared

0.26927

0.27143

0.27393

99.81061

99.62121

99.81061

99.42068

99.62121

Error
_TRESPC_

Test: Cumulative Percent
Response

_TRESP_

Test: Percent Response

99.62121

_TRMSE_

Test: Root Mean Square Error

0.26927
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Fit Statistics

Statistics Label

Logistic

Random

Gradient

Regression

Forest (Text)

Boosting (All)

777.872

792.2298

(Text)
_TSSE_

Test: Sum of Square Errors

765.5014

_TSUMW_

Test: Sum of Case Weights

10558

10558

Times Freq
_TWRONG_

Test: Number of Wrong

494

Classifications
TKS

Test: Kolmogorov-Smirnov
Statistic

0.743

0.74

0.735
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Table A9
Text Topic Associated Accident Reports
Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

TT_1

0.477

DEN01LA054

TT_1

0.372

LAX03LA028

TT_1

0.466

CHI04FA043

TT_1

0.366

LAX99LA194

TT_1

0.445

SEA01LA174

TT_1

0.366

SEA02LA052

TT_1

0.441

WPR16FA007

TT_1

0.363

CHI05LA012

TT_1

0.430

CHI99LA133

TT_1

0.363

CEN12LA345

TT_1

0.429

CHI99LA124

TT_1

0.362

IAD01LA085

TT_1

0.425

CEN15LA149

TT_1

0.361

CHI06CA277

TT_1

0.423

LAX05CA127

TT_1

0.360

WPR16FA144

TT_1

0.413

LAX06CA279

TT_1

0.359

CHI06LA061

TT_1

0.477

DEN01LA054

TT_1

0.359

CHI06CA209

TT_1

0.466

CHI04FA043

TT_1

0.359

SEA02LA004

TT_1

0.406

LAX01LA135

TT_1

0.355

ERA09CA219

TT_1

0.395

CEN14LA086

TT_1

0.353

WPR11FA155

TT_1

0.394

LAX02LA222

TT_1

0.352

DEN03LA080

TT_1

0.391

LAX08LA179

TT_1

0.352

CHI04LA036

TT_1

0.387

CHI04LA097

TT_1

0.352

DEN01FA028

TT_1

0.385

IAD99LA037

TT_1

0.351

IAC02LA006

TT_1

0.383

IAD98LA040

TT_1

0.351

FTW01LA080

TT_1

0.382

SEA04LA056

TT_1

0.350

SEA01LA081

TT_1

0.378

LAX99LA142

TT_1

0.349

DEN05LA069

TT_1

0.377

DEN99LA069

TT_1

0.349

CEN14FA102

TT_1

0.376

LAX02LA068

TT_1

0.348

DFW05CA173

TT_1

0.375

CEN18LA172

TT_1

0.348

DEN05LA109

TT_1

0.373

WPR09LA221

TT_1

0.347

FTW02LA066

TT_1

0.372

LAX03LA195

TT_1

0.347

CHI07CA223

Note. The topic label is Wind Factors. The topic terms include +knot, +wind, +degree, +runway, +gust. The
plus (+) indicates a parent term.

215
Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

TT_2

0.893

ERA12FA023

TT_2

0.729

WPR11FA403

TT_2

0.809

CEN13LA283

TT_2

0.728

ANC06LA078

TT_2

0.809

NYC00LA157

TT_2

0.727

IAD00LA045

TT_2

0.796

WPR16LA128

TT_2

0.724

CHI01LA088

TT_2

0.792

CEN16LA380

TT_2

0.722

WPR10LA001

TT_2

0.790

ERA12LA001

TT_2

0.721

ERA13LA117

TT_2

0.784

MIA07LA152

TT_2

0.719

ERA10LA454

TT_2

0.783

IAD03LA064

TT_2

0.717

WPR18LA040

TT_2

0.782

CEN13LA330

TT_2

0.713

ERA16LA062

TT_2

0.776

ERA19LA024

TT_2

0.710

LAX05LA033

TT_2

0.775

ERA14LA183

TT_2

0.709

ANC14LA038

TT_2

0.775

ERA16FA289

TT_2

0.709

ATL07LA014

TT_2

0.769

NYC01LA153

TT_2

0.708

WPR12LA246

TT_2

0.767

MIA03LA184

TT_2

0.707

ERA09LA004

TT_2

0.767

CEN16LA115

TT_2

0.704

MIA03LA131

TT_2

0.765

ERA12LA480

TT_2

0.703

CEN17LA242

TT_2

0.765

NYC03LA116

TT_2

0.701

SEA06LA057

TT_2

0.755

ERA13LA179

TT_2

0.701

LAX01LA247

TT_2

0.753

ERA14LA378

TT_2

0.699

DEN03LA051

TT_2

0.746

ANC18FA022

TT_2

0.699

CEN13LA381

TT_2

0.735

CHI03LA288

TT_2

0.698

ATL04LA024

TT_2

0.733

NYC04LA151

TT_2

0.697

MIA01LA185

TT_2

0.731

GAA17CA472

TT_2

0.696

ERA16LA090

TT_2

0.730

CHI01LA038

TT_2

0.691

CHI04LA101

TT_2

0.729

NYC01LA026

TT_2

0.690

ANC99LA097

Note. The topic label is Fuel Issues. The topic terms include +fuel, +tank, +gallon, +fuel tank, +selector.
The plus (+) indicates a parent term.
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Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

TT_3

0.959

ERA15FA340

TT_3

0.697

CEN14FA032

TT_3

0.879

NYC01FA040

TT_3

0.695

CEN13LA088

TT_3

0.877

ERA09FA145

TT_3

0.69

MIA06FA008

TT_3

0.871

NYC02FA060

TT_3

0.689

MIA08FA163

TT_3

0.822

SEA07FA262

TT_3

0.687

NYC07FA041

TT_3

0.801

ERA09FA514

TT_3

0.687

MIA05LA083

TT_3

0.792

WPR11FA147

TT_3

0.685

LAX98FA188

TT_3

0.784

NYC98FA095

TT_3

0.684

LAX01LA110

TT_3

0.775

MIA03FA071

TT_3

0.678

WPR16FA054

TT_3

0.773

ERA15FA099

TT_3

0.674

DEN04LA055

TT_3

0.761

MIA03FA025

TT_3

0.673

ERA15FA144

TT_3

0.751

CHI01LA322

TT_3

0.673

MIA99FA172

TT_3

0.749

MIA99FA034

TT_3

0.669

ERA09FA083

TT_3

0.744

WPR11FA073

TT_3

0.668

ERA14FA192

TT_3

0.739

NYC02FA044

TT_3

0.667

ERA17FA135

TT_3

0.736

LAX06FA066

TT_3

0.665

WPR16FA041

TT_3

0.725

ERA14FA232

TT_3

0.663

ERA09FA376

TT_3

0.719

SEA02GA053

TT_3

0.662

WPR14FA349

TT_3

0.717

ATL04FA093

TT_3

0.658

MIA03LA012

TT_3

0.715

IAD01FA070

TT_3

0.656

LAX01FA004

TT_3

0.713

CEN11FA557

TT_3

0.655

LAX03FA072

TT_3

0.712

ERA14LA117

TT_3

0.655

MIA01FA152

TT_3

0.712

LAX05FA032

TT_3

0.653

WPR11FA170

TT_3

0.708

MIA04FA100

TT_3

0.650

CEN11FA302

TT_3

0.708

ERA18FA114

TT_3

0.641

DEN06FA114

Note. The topic label is IMC Flight. The topic terms include +controller, +radar, +advise, +acknowledge,
+tower. The plus (+) indicates a parent term.
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Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

TT_4

0.557

CHI00FA180

TT_4

0.388

SEA98FA170

TT_4

0.520

CHI99FA341

TT_4

0.388

ATL04FA061

TT_4

0.504

CHI01FA100

TT_4

0.384

ATL02FA074

TT_4

0.502

CHI00FA234

TT_4

0.384

ATL02FA074

TT_4

0.501

CHI99FA167

TT_4

0.379

SEA98FA179

TT_4

0.495

CHI98FA287

TT_4

0.378

MIA99LA091

TT_4

0.493

CHI02FA006

TT_4

0.378

CEN11FA195

TT_4

0.488

DEN03FA113

TT_4

0.374

DEN03FA137

TT_4

0.481

DEN01FA033

TT_4

0.370

ANC00FA052

TT_4

0.454

CHI01FA247

TT_4

0.369

DEN02FA050

TT_4

0.454

DEN03FA025

TT_4

0.368

ERA14FA077

TT_4

0.454

DEN03FA074

TT_4

0.366

MIA99FA126

TT_4

0.446

DEN04FA057

TT_4

0.366

CEN10FA493

TT_4

0.443

ATL04FA079

TT_4

0.365

FTW03LA209

TT_4

0.435

SEA00FA033

TT_4

0.365

FTW03FA225

TT_4

0.432

DFW05FA065

TT_4

0.363

SEA99FA150

TT_4

0.421

ATL04FA130

TT_4

0.363

CHI01FA220

TT_4

0.420

ATL04FA099

TT_4

0.363

DEN05FA124

TT_4

0.415

CEN10FA324

TT_4

0.362

FTW02FA211

TT_4

0.409

DEN06FA028

TT_4

0.362

ERA11LA150

TT_4

0.405

ATL05FA082

TT_4

0.361

ANC12FA009

TT_4

0.399

SEA98FA042

TT_4

0.360

ATL02FA076

TT_4

0.398

CHI99FA003

TT_4

0.360

ATL02FA076

TT_4

0.395

DEN03FA114

TT_4

0.358

ERA10FA259

TT_4

0.391

DEN06FA018

TT_4

0.358

FTW03FA027

Note. The topic label is LOC-Stalls. The topic terms include +propeller, +nose, aft, +blade,
+approximately. The plus (+) indicates a parent term.
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Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

TT_5

0.858

NYC07FA196

TT_5

0.583

ATL02LA014

TT_5

0.713

ATL00LA045

TT_5

0.570

WPR09LA040

TT_5

0.680

ATL05CA134

TT_5

0.566

ATL99LA110

TT_5

0.669

FTW03LA157

TT_5

0.566

IAD00LA022

TT_5

0.660

DEN04FA002

TT_5

0.565

NYC04LA169

TT_5

0.637

CEN13LA342

TT_5

0.562

ATL06CA068

TT_5

0.633

FTW00LA260

TT_5

0.562

ERA17LA267

TT_5

0.620

IAD98LA041

TT_5

0.56

CHI08LA273

TT_5

0.610

ATL06CA025

TT_5

0.558

ERA09LA189

TT_5

0.609

CHI01LA280

TT_5

0.554

SEA03LA053

TT_5

0.609

LAX05CA017

TT_5

0.553

CEN10CA328

TT_5

0.609

ATL05CA015

TT_5

0.551

ERA12FA540

TT_5

0.607

NYC02LA016

TT_5

0.550

NYC05CA112

TT_5

0.606

FTW04CA163

TT_5

0.548

ATL04CA133

TT_5

0.602

NYC02FA173

TT_5

0.547

SEA04LA002

TT_5

0.600

NYC00LA235

TT_5

0.547

ERA19LA078

TT_5

0.598

CHI07CA192

TT_5

0.546

ERA10CA392

TT_5

0.598

NYC00LA224

TT_5

0.546

ATL06CA046

TT_5

0.597

GAA17CA337

TT_5

0.545

NYC03LA014

TT_5

0.593

LAX06LA032

TT_5

0.544

ERA18LA034

TT_5

0.591

ATL07CA095

TT_5

0.542

NYC04FA171

TT_5

0.589

ERA13LA347

TT_5

0.538

NYC99LA168

TT_5

0.588

NYC99LA196

TT_5

0.538

IAC02LA067

TT_5

0.587

ATL01LA089

TT_5

0.538

WPR11LA067

TT_5

0.583

FTW04LA138

TT_5

0.536

ATL98LA044

Note. The topic label is Student Pilots. The topic terms include +student, +student pilot, solo, +solo flight,
instructional. The plus (+) indicates a parent term.
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Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

TT_6

0.483

FTW03LA026

TT_6

0.388

ERA11LA395

TT_6

0.458

CEN11FA274

TT_6

0.387

CEN15LA038

TT_6

0.454

ERA16LA040

TT_6

0.383

ERA14LA281

TT_6

0.452

CEN09LA024

TT_6

0.383

NYC03LA075

TT_6

0.446

CEN18LA229

TT_6

0.382

CEN15LA297

TT_6

0.442

CEN15LA243

TT_6

0.381

CHI02LA091

TT_6

0.428

CEN18LA363

TT_6

0.379

CEN16LA082

TT_6

0.424

FTW01LA212

TT_6

0.379

DFW07LA009

TT_6

0.417

CEN15LA392

TT_6

0.377

WPR11LA284

TT_6

0.416

DFW06LA199

TT_6

0.376

WPR10LA284

TT_6

0.414

DFW07LA017

TT_6

0.376

FTW01LA207

TT_6

0.408

CHI07LA307

TT_6

0.375

CEN17LA065

TT_6

0.406

FTW02LA191

TT_6

0.375

FTW98LA305

TT_6

0.401

ERA17FA210

TT_6

0.375

WPR13LA078

TT_6

0.400

ERA13LA214

TT_6

0.374

CEN11FA433

TT_6

0.400

ERA16LA268

TT_6

0.374

NYC03LA155

TT_6

0.398

MIA03LA186

TT_6

0.373

FTW04LA119

TT_6

0.395

ANC03LA039

TT_6

0.373

CEN16LA078

TT_6

0.394

ERA12LA034

TT_6

0.372

ERA14LA388

TT_6

0.393

FTW98LA366

TT_6

0.371

ERA12LA312

TT_6

0.393

CEN14LA234

TT_6

0.371

FTW04LA059

TT_6

0.393

FTW99FA199

TT_6

0.371

CHI98LA160

TT_6

0.392

ERA15LA071

TT_6

0.370

CEN11FA228

TT_6

0.390

ERA14LA085

TT_6

0.370

CEN17LA263

TT_6

0.388

MIA01LA109

TT_6

0.369

CEN12FA520

Note. The topic label is Forced Landings. The topic terms include +engine, +power, forced, +forced
landing, +loss. The plus (+) indicates a parent term.
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Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

TT_7

0.729

LAX07LA215

TT_7

0.579

ERA10LA478

TT_7

0.721

MIA03LA009

TT_7

0.569

LAX05LA168

TT_7

0.717

ATL04IA054

TT_7

0.564

CHI03LA032

TT_7

0.682

ERA11LA231

TT_7

0.560

LAX06LA034

TT_7

0.674

WPR12FA193

TT_7

0.555

ERA18LA215

TT_7

0.652

WPR18LA057

TT_7

0.554

FTW04IA078

TT_7

0.652

WPR17LA210

TT_7

0.554

LAX07LA158

TT_7

0.642

CHI03LA039

TT_7

0.553

MIA06CA139

TT_7

0.638

WPR16LA015

TT_7

0.55

LAX00LA112

TT_7

0.636

ERA16LA042

TT_7

0.55

CHI06LA080

TT_7

0.632

LAX06LA114

TT_7

0.549

ERA16LA135

TT_7

0.631

DEN08LA021

TT_7

0.546

MIA03LA033

TT_7

0.625

CEN16LA374

TT_7

0.544

ERA13LA398

TT_7

0.619

WPR10LA347

TT_7

0.541

LAX02LA027

TT_7

0.618

WPR16LA058

TT_7

0.539

CHI00LA161

TT_7

0.615

CEN12LA387

TT_7

0.535

WPR18LA022

TT_7

0.614

MIA98LA248

TT_7

0.532

CEN16LA190

TT_7

0.609

WPR10LA140

TT_7

0.532

GAA16CA074

TT_7

0.607

MIA06LA055

TT_7

0.531

LAX99LA278

TT_7

0.604

CEN11LA494

TT_7

0.527

GAA17CA126

TT_7

0.598

ERA16LA190

TT_7

0.527

CEN17LA148

TT_7

0.598

ERA17LA287

TT_7

0.522

ERA16LA271

TT_7

0.592

NYC08LA162

TT_7

0.518

ANC18LA009

TT_7

0.586

MIA04LA038

TT_7

0.516

LAX98LA229

TT_7

0.581

ANC05LA029

TT_7

0.514

ERA15LA249

Note. The topic label is Landing Gear. The topic terms include +gear, gear, +landing gear, +landing,
+extend. The plus (+) indicates a parent term.
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Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

TT_8

0.602

FTW98FA100

TT_8

0.431

SEA99FA104

TT_8

0.576

SEA00LA110

TT_8

0.427

SEA04LA110

TT_8

0.535

DEN08IA130

TT_8

0.426

WPR16LA080

TT_8

0.519

SEA03FA041

TT_8

0.420

SEA99LA058

TT_8

0.499

SEA00FA023

TT_8

0.419

SEA04FA009

TT_8

0.495

SEA03FA015

TT_8

0.418

LAX00FA148

TT_8

0.489

SEA03FA173

TT_8

0.413

SEA00LA186

TT_8

0.478

SEA99LA081

TT_8

0.412

SEA03LA007

TT_8

0.478

SEA04LA014

TT_8

0.41

SEA04FA188

TT_8

0.475

SEA02LA012

TT_8

0.408

SEA01LA120

TT_8

0.474

FTW02FA112

TT_8

0.406

SEA00LA104

TT_8

0.472

LAX99FA080

TT_8

0.403

SEA01LA102

TT_8

0.470

SEA99FA116

TT_8

0.401

SEA02LA084

TT_8

0.468

SEA99FA176

TT_8

0.400

DEN00FA086

TT_8

0.467

SEA04FA143

TT_8

0.400

LAX99FA311

TT_8

0.464

LAX98FA141

TT_8

0.399

SEA03FA121

TT_8

0.460

CEN09LA440

TT_8

0.394

CHI99FA105

TT_8

0.458

SEA02FA171

TT_8

0.394

LAX00FA209

TT_8

0.445

SEA02FA005

TT_8

0.392

CHI00LA085

TT_8

0.445

FTW04LA072

TT_8

0.389

SEA04CA105

TT_8

0.443

MIA99LA057

TT_8

0.387

SEA98FA047

TT_8

0.441

MIA01LA228

TT_8

0.383

SEA98FA040

TT_8

0.440

SEA99FA105

TT_8

0.383

SEA04FA060

TT_8

0.432

LAX98LA279

TT_8

0.382

SEA05LA188

TT_8

0.431

DEN99FA120

TT_8

0.380

SEA05CA150

Note. The topic label is Flight Envelope Exceedance. The topic terms include aircraft, +approximately,
+refer, +find, accident aircraft. The plus (+) indicates a parent term.

222
Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

TT_9

0.597

ANC99FAMS1

TT_9

0.497

ANC02FA025

TT_9

0.592

ERA15FA220

TT_9

0.497

LAX08LA253

TT_9

0.590

SEA06FA036

TT_9

0.497

ERA14FA093

TT_9

0.587

ANC98GA036

TT_9

0.494

WPR11FA256

TT_9

0.579

FTW03FA016

TT_9

0.493

SEA04LA095

TT_9

0.578

LAX99FA020

TT_9

0.492

CEN14FA019

TT_9

0.558

CEN11FA347

TT_9

0.491

ERA11FA074

TT_9

0.555

LAX02FA179

TT_9

0.488

DEN06FA065

TT_9

0.549

LAX01FA208

TT_9

0.484

WPR12FA305

TT_9

0.544

WPR15FA166

TT_9

0.483

MIA08FA001

TT_9

0.543

LAX05FA076

TT_9

0.481

FTW98FA121

TT_9

0.540

FTW01LA032

TT_9

0.481

CEN15FA092

TT_9

0.537

ANC98FA043

TT_9

0.480

ERA14LA006

TT_9

0.532

SEA01FA070

TT_9

0.479

ANC99FA108

TT_9

0.532

CHI04FA043

TT_9

0.479

LAX04LA324

TT_9

0.531

LAX05FA167

TT_9

0.474

WPR12FA136

TT_9

0.526

ANC03LA029

TT_9

0.470

SEA99FA152

TT_9

0.524

NYC00FA245

TT_9

0.469

FTW00FA144

TT_9

0.522

CEN15FA174

TT_9

0.467

DEN07FA054

TT_9

0.519

FTW01FA101

TT_9

0.466

WPR09FA192

TT_9

0.510

DFW08FA204

TT_9

0.466

IAD03FA069

TT_9

0.508

NYC00FA257

TT_9

0.465

CEN09FA340

TT_9

0.507

CEN10LA055

TT_9

0.465

MIA02FA173

TT_9

0.505

NYC04FA157

TT_9

0.464

SEA05FA092

TT_9

0.500

CHI00FA123

TT_9

0.462

ERA09LA392

Note. The topic label is Weather Factors. The topic terms include aircraft, +foot, +cloud, +mile, +visibility,
+ceiling. The plus (+) indicates a parent term.

223
Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

TT_10

0.543

ERA11FA354

TT_10

0.407

ATL98FA060

TT_10

0.506

CHI01FA044

TT_10

0.407

ATL98FA060

TT_10

0.496

CHI06FA077

TT_10

0.407

CEN09FA518

TT_10

0.495

LAX05LA215

TT_10

0.406

CHI00FA039

TT_10

0.493

ERA11FA391

TT_10

0.406

LAX08FA122

TT_10

0.490

ANC07FA006

TT_10

0.404

CEN11FA431

TT_10

0.490

LAX02FA214

TT_10

0.401

DEN05FA045

TT_10

0.479

FTW02FA004

TT_10

0.400

CEN13FA352

TT_10

0.460

CHI05FA260

TT_10

0.398

CHI02FA177

TT_10

0.458

SEA05FA105

TT_10

0.395

CHI06FA010

TT_10

0.456

CEN16FA158

TT_10

0.395

CHI06FA010

TT_10

0.447

CEN14FA057

TT_10

0.394

LAX05FA184

TT_10

0.441

CEN10LA427

TT_10

0.391

LAX00GA158

TT_10

0.439

CHI02FA284

TT_10

0.391

FTW98FA186

TT_10

0.435

CEN09FA070

TT_10

0.391

CEN17FA005

TT_10

0.434

DEN03FA068

TT_10

0.388

DFW07FA044

TT_10

0.431

CEN16FA224

TT_10

0.388

WPR09FA398

TT_10

0.429

LAX04FA057

TT_10

0.387

CEN14FA522

TT_10

0.429

CHI05FA189

TT_10

0.384

NYC07FA065

TT_10

0.429

ERA14FA144

TT_10

0.384

DEN99FA075

TT_10

0.417

WPR13FA115

TT_10

0.382

CHI03FA080

TT_10

0.416

CHI06FA232

TT_10

0.382

CHI08FA027

TT_10

0.416

FTW03FA229

TT_10

0.382

CEN13FA338

TT_10

0.411

ERA09FA345

TT_10

0.381

MIA04FA049

TT_10

0.410

CEN11LA669

TT_10

0.381

CEN13FA141

Note. The topic label is Flight Hours. The topic terms include aircraft, +hour, total, +time, +engine,
+logbook. The plus (+) indicates a parent term.

224
Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

TT_11

0.782

SEA03FA038

TT_11

0.573

LAX98LA131

TT_11

0.762

CEN10IA059

TT_11

0.570

CEN12LA326

TT_11

0.719

LAX07LA236

TT_11

0.569

NYC01LA013

TT_11

0.698

CHI07LA121

TT_11

0.564

WPR15LA157

TT_11

0.682

ERA13LA382

TT_11

0.562

MIA99LA032

TT_11

0.670

WPR15LA032

TT_11

0.558

NYC01LA194

TT_11

0.669

CEN16LA391

TT_11

0.554

DEN05LA070

TT_11

0.659

WPR15LA175

TT_11

0.554

ERA17LA109

TT_11

0.649

ERA10FA074

TT_11

0.552

CEN16LA107

TT_11

0.639

WPR13LA015

TT_11

0.546

ERA15LA189

TT_11

0.631

WPR09LA362

TT_11

0.545

ERA16FA329

TT_11

0.627

FTW01LA143

TT_11

0.535

LAX05LA273

TT_11

0.626

SEA03LA082

TT_11

0.535

ERA12LA394

TT_11

0.625

LAX08LA008

TT_11

0.532

WPR11LA038

TT_11

0.613

IAD99FA025

TT_11

0.531

ERA16LA114

TT_11

0.610

DEN01LA103

TT_11

0.530

WPR13FA169

TT_11

0.604

WPR09LA458

TT_11

0.526

NYC00LA125

TT_11

0.602

CEN18LA031

TT_11

0.524

CHI03LA095

TT_11

0.601

MIA04LA013

TT_11

0.522

WPR17LA038

TT_11

0.597

WPR12LA108

TT_11

0.519

LAX07LA058

TT_11

0.591

ERA16LA022

TT_11

0.518

MIA01LA168

TT_11

0.584

CEN17LA058

TT_11

0.518

ERA10LA335

TT_11

0.578

ERA17LA185

TT_11

0.517

WPR12LA161

TT_11

0.578

CEN14LA204

TT_11

0.516

LAX05LA172

TT_11

0.574

ANC17LA006

TT_11

0.516

CEN12FA025

Note. The topic label is Engine Oil Loss. The topic terms include aircraft, +oil, +rod, +connect, +cylinder,
+number. The plus (+) indicates a parent term.

225
Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

TT_12

0.317

WPR13CA327

TT_12

0.277

GAA18CA569

TT_12

0.299

GAA18CA285

TT_12

0.276

GAA17CA550

TT_12

0.297

GAA17CA449

TT_12

0.276

GAA18CA055

TT_12

0.296

GAA17CA339

TT_12

0.276

GAA18CA395

TT_12

0.294

GAA18CA448

TT_12

0.276

GAA17CA054

TT_12

0.291

GAA18CA219

TT_12

0.275

GAA18CA225

TT_12

0.291

GAA17CA363

TT_12

0.275

GAA18CA018

TT_12

0.291

GAA17CA281

TT_12

0.275

GAA17CA441

TT_12

0.289

GAA18CA303

TT_12

0.275

GAA17CA469

TT_12

0.288

GAA17CA499

TT_12

0.275

GAA17CA209

TT_12

0.287

GAA17CA518

TT_12

0.275

GAA18CA056

TT_12

0.287

GAA19CA072

TT_12

0.275

GAA18CA279

TT_12

0.286

GAA18CA527

TT_12

0.274

GAA17CA091

TT_12

0.285

GAA17CA486

TT_12

0.274

GAA17CA270

TT_12

0.284

GAA18CA176

TT_12

0.274

GAA18CA201

TT_12

0.283

GAA18CA298

TT_12

0.274

GAA18CA556

TT_12

0.283

GAA18CA196

TT_12

0.274

GAA17CA059

TT_12

0.283

GAA17CA062

TT_12

0.274

GAA17CA396

TT_12

0.282

GAA18CA130

TT_12

0.273

GAA18CA339

TT_12

0.282

GAA19CA081

TT_12

0.273

GAA17CA364

TT_12

0.281

GAA17CA377

TT_12

0.272

GAA18CA317

TT_12

0.278

GAA18CA481

TT_12

0.272

GAA18CA328

TT_12

0.278

GAA18CA523

TT_12

0.272

GAA18CA372

TT_12

0.278

GAA17CA011

TT_12

0.271

GAA17CA290

TT_12

0.277

GAA17CA280

TT_12

0.271

GAA19CA023

Note. The topic label is Directional LOC. The topic terms include aircraft, +normal operation, +preclude,
+malfunction, +failure, +operation. The plus (+) indicates a parent term.

226
Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

TT_13

0.738

NYC08LA273

TT_13

0.555

ERA19LA055

TT_13

0.731

ERA16LA113

TT_13

0.544

CEN12CA567

TT_13

0.699

WPR17LA141

TT_13

0.534

DFW06LA038

TT_13

0.687

WPR17LA192

TT_13

0.531

WPR15LA253

TT_13

0.670

ERA14LA022

TT_13

0.531

WPR15LA253

TT_13

0.665

ERA16LA213

TT_13

0.529

SEA99LA131

TT_13

0.644

CEN16LA274

TT_13

0.525

WPR17LA114

TT_13

0.636

WPR12LA207

TT_13

0.523

IAD99LA049

TT_13

0.613

LAX05LA109

TT_13

0.519

WPR15LA218

TT_13

0.612

ANC17LA005

TT_13

0.515

DEN01LA160

TT_13

0.611

CEN19LA046

TT_13

0.515

CEN12LA023

TT_13

0.608

CHI07LA135

TT_13

0.511

WPR13FA430

TT_13

0.604

WPR18LA089

TT_13

0.510

ERA15LA186

TT_13

0.594

MIA05LA143

TT_13

0.510

ERA19LA030

TT_13

0.590

ERA13IA192

TT_13

0.504

NYC01LA216

TT_13

0.584

WPR18LA216

TT_13

0.504

CEN15LA057

TT_13

0.584

ERA17LA290

TT_13

0.503

ATL07CA047

TT_13

0.583

ANC07LA059

TT_13

0.496

ERA17LA262

TT_13

0.579

ERA15LA322

TT_13

0.496

MIA06LA052

TT_13

0.575

SEA98LA178

TT_13

0.494

WPR12LA135

TT_13

0.575

ATL07CA058

TT_13

0.493

ERA12LA016

TT_13

0.571

CHI01LA126

TT_13

0.493

GAA16CA042

TT_13

0.570

WPR09LA307

TT_13

0.492

CHI08CA032

TT_13

0.565

ERA18LA023

TT_13

0.489

LAX98LA081

TT_13

0.563

GAA18CA432

TT_13

0.485

CEN12LA516

Note. The topic label is Braking Issues. The topic terms include aircraft, +brake, +brake, +apply, +rudder,
+wheel. The plus (+) indicates a parent term.

227
Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

TT_14

0.349

CHI07LA013

TT_14

0.250

ANC98LA127

TT_14

0.329

CHI99LA307

TT_14

0.249

ANC00LA134

TT_14

0.323

ANC04LA012

TT_14

0.249

ANC98LA088

TT_14

0.321

ANC01LA040

TT_14

0.249

ANC00LA111

TT_14

0.312

ANC05FA098

TT_14

0.249

ANC98LA107

TT_14

0.296

ANC08LA075

TT_14

0.248

CEN17LA283

TT_14

0.294

ANC02FA106

TT_14

0.245

ANC09LA103

TT_14

0.290

ANC05LA133

TT_14

0.241

ANC08LA047

TT_14

0.288

ANC05LA009

TT_14

0.241

ANC09TA005

TT_14

0.279

ANC98TA128

TT_14

0.240

ANC01LA067

TT_14

0.275

ANC01LA113

TT_14

0.239

ANC03LA021

TT_14

0.270

ANC08FA079

TT_14

0.238

ANC00LA079

TT_14

0.268

ANC03LA064

TT_14

0.237

ANC05CA122

TT_14

0.267

ANC00LA116

TT_14

0.236

ANC00LA016

TT_14

0.266

ANC05LA073

TT_14

0.236

ANC98LA147

TT_14

0.265

ANC02LA126

TT_14

0.236

ANC01LA142

TT_14

0.263

ANC98LA080

TT_14

0.235

ANC03LA112

TT_14

0.262

ANC99LA088

TT_14

0.234

ANC05CA151

TT_14

0.262

FTW98LA105

TT_14

0.234

ANC02LA088

TT_14

0.261

ANC99LA078

TT_14

0.233

ANC99FA070

TT_14

0.260

ANC00LA019

TT_14

0.233

ERA16LA181

TT_14

0.259

ANC05TA106

TT_14

0.232

ANC07LA092

TT_14

0.258

ANC00LA050

TT_14

0.232

WPR12FA385

TT_14

0.258

ANC06FA136

TT_14

0.232

ANC00LA043

TT_14

0.256

ANC04CA089

TT_14

0.232

ANC03LA116

Note. The topic label is Water – Remote Airstrips. The topic terms include +airstrip, +passenger, +water,
+lake, +seat. The plus (+) indicates a parent term.

228
Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

TT_15

0.659

ERA10LA377

TT_15

0.422

NYC01LA012

TT_15

0.519

ERA16FA257

TT_15

0.420

NYC00LA166

TT_15

0.513

DEN99LA156

TT_15

0.418

ANC16LA054

TT_15

0.490

LAX05LA160

TT_15

0.418

FTW98FA365

TT_15

0.485

CHI01FA312

TT_15

0.417

LAX04LA328

TT_15

0.481

ATL07LA111

TT_15

0.415

ERA13LA370

TT_15

0.479

ERA10LA267

TT_15

0.414

ERA16LA224

TT_15

0.478

ERA13LA037

TT_15

0.411

CHI98LA191

TT_15

0.472

LAX07FA258

TT_15

0.410

LAX07CA254

TT_15

0.462

WPR16FA095

TT_15

0.409

ERA17LA024

TT_15

0.461

CHI05LA257

TT_15

0.406

SEA98LA066

TT_15

0.460

WPR10FA449

TT_15

0.404

ERA10LA055

TT_15

0.454

NYC08LA271

TT_15

0.403

NYC00FA001

TT_15

0.451

ERA13LA264

TT_15

0.403

ERA09LA530

TT_15

0.450

CHI03LA158

TT_15

0.401

WPR17FA166

TT_15

0.448

ERA15LA282

TT_15

0.394

NYC00LA120

TT_15

0.445

NYC00FA226

TT_15

0.394

NYC06LA197

TT_15

0.443

GAA17CA347

TT_15

0.391

CEN13LA539

TT_15

0.440

WPR12FA339

TT_15

0.385

NYC04IA054

TT_15

0.437

DEN05LA088

TT_15

0.384

NYC02FA166

TT_15

0.429

SEA02LA152

TT_15

0.383

WPR18LA179

TT_15

0.427

CEN18TA374

TT_15

0.380

CHI04CA266

TT_15

0.427

CHI99FA174

TT_15

0.379

LAX01LA177

TT_15

0.425

DEN99LA101

TT_15

0.379

ERA11LA451

TT_15

0.423

LAX08LA179

TT_15

0.378

ERA15LA238

Note. The topic label is Excess Weight. The topic terms include +takeoff, +weight, +foot, +pound, +end.
The plus (+) indicates a parent term.

229
Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

TT_16

0.639

LAX08FA109

TT_16

0.448

ERA18LA258

TT_16

0.571

ERA16FA170

TT_16

0.447

FTW98LA150

TT_16

0.559

LAX98LA164

TT_16

0.445

ANC01LA025

TT_16

0.559

LAX98LA164

TT_16

0.445

ANC01LA025

TT_16

0.558

ERA10LA302

TT_16

0.442

IAD04LA005

TT_16

0.552

ERA10LA446

TT_16

0.441

ANC06LA105

TT_16

0.548

CHI05CA219

TT_16

0.441

ATL05LA140

TT_16

0.538

GAA17CA337

TT_16

0.440

CHI00LA216

TT_16

0.523

LAX98LA196

TT_16

0.437

FTW99LA272

TT_16

0.508

IAD05LA038

TT_16

0.434

GAA18CA358

TT_16

0.508

SEA05FA125

TT_16

0.433

IAD03LA002

TT_16

0.507

NYC00FA240

TT_16

0.433

ATL05CA030

TT_16

0.495

FTW02FA004

TT_16

0.432

ERA09LA435

TT_16

0.486

CHI08LA273

TT_16

0.429

FTW00LA036

TT_16

0.482

WPR15FA021

TT_16

0.428

WPR17FA063

TT_16

0.477

CEN15LA280

TT_16

0.428

FTW99FA153

TT_16

0.471

NYC99FA216

TT_16

0.428

FTW99FA153

TT_16

0.467

WPR14LA153

TT_16

0.428

FTW99FA223

TT_16

0.459

SEA04LA183

TT_16

0.425

DFW06LA209

TT_16

0.455

LAX05LA283

TT_16

0.425

CHI03LA122

TT_16

0.452

ANC00LA014

TT_16

0.423

IAD05LA039

TT_16

0.450

CEN13LA342

TT_16

0.419

GAA18CA234

TT_16

0.449

FTW99LA084

TT_16

0.418

NYC98LA169

TT_16

0.449

ERA17FA115

TT_16

0.417

SEA01LA087

TT_16

0.449

FTW02LA073

TT_16

0.414

ANC01LA082

Note. The topic label is Instructional. The topic terms include +instructor, +instruction, +instructional
flight, instructional, +student. The plus (+) indicates a parent term.
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Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

TT_17

0.443

LAX06LA056

TT_17

0.346

ERA09FA116

TT_17

0.443

LAX06LA056

TT_17

0.345

NYC04FA033

TT_17

0.441

NYC05LA002

TT_17

0.345

NYC04FA033

TT_17

0.441

NYC05LA002

TT_17

0.341

DEN99FA077

TT_17

0.416

CEN16FA333

TT_17

0.341

DEN99FA077

TT_17

0.404

SEA04LA048

TT_17

0.341

NYC08FA056

TT_17

0.401

SEA01TA050

TT_17

0.338

FTW03LA022

TT_17

0.388

IAD05LA099

TT_17

0.337

NYC00LA243

TT_17

0.382

CEN11FA008

TT_17

0.336

WPR16LA061

TT_17

0.372

SEA08FA116

TT_17

0.335

NYC98FA060

TT_17

0.372

SEA08FA116

TT_17

0.335

IAD02LA025

TT_17

0.369

ERA14LA181

TT_17

0.333

NYC08FA046

TT_17

0.369

ERA14LA181

TT_17

0.333

ERA14TA435

TT_17

0.367

CHI01LA050

TT_17

0.332

CEN11FA417

TT_17

0.364

NYC05FA021

TT_17

0.332

SEA08LA057

TT_17

0.362

WPR13FA296

TT_17

0.332

SEA08LA057

TT_17

0.362

WPR13FA296

TT_17

0.331

IAD00LA027

TT_17

0.357

ERA15LA084

TT_17

0.331

IAD00LA027

TT_17

0.357

ERA15LA084

TT_17

0.330

ERA15LA257

TT_17

0.356

IAD00FA082

TT_17

0.330

NYC05LA106

TT_17

0.355

IAD01LA068

TT_17

0.329

CEN12LA629

TT_17

0.355

WPR16LA093

TT_17

0.329

CEN12LA629

TT_17

0.353

CHI00MA066

TT_17

0.327

DEN00LA036

TT_17

0.353

NYC04FA100

TT_17

0.326

NYC06MA192

TT_17

0.351

NYC02LA167

TT_17

0.325

FTW01FA033

Note. The topic label is Unstable Approach. The topic terms include +approach, +runway, final, +airport,
+end. The plus (+) indicates a parent term.

231
Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

TT_18

0.737

ERA12LA575

TT_18

0.502

CEN17LA295

TT_18

0.685

ERA17LA341

TT_18

0.498

NYC98LA078

TT_18

0.662

ERA13LA269

TT_18

0.495

WPR14LA232

TT_18

0.661

ERA16LA270

TT_18

0.490

ANC16CA056

TT_18

0.621

ERA16LA281

TT_18

0.490

CEN15LA292

TT_18

0.609

CEN14LA134

TT_18

0.486

WPR11LA359

TT_18

0.599

FTW00LA175

TT_18

0.480

IAD02LA034

TT_18

0.596

CEN13LA398

TT_18

0.475

ANC13CA056

TT_18

0.592

CEN12LA175

TT_18

0.475

ANC04LA031

TT_18

0.585

CEN14LA161

TT_18

0.473

CEN12LA477

TT_18

0.565

CEN18LA151

TT_18

0.471

DEN00LA054

TT_18

0.544

GAA16CA393

TT_18

0.463

CEN14LA244

TT_18

0.539

CEN19LA015

TT_18

0.462

ANC09LA036

TT_18

0.530

WPR13CA252

TT_18

0.461

NYC01LA060

TT_18

0.527

CHI07CA169

TT_18

0.459

NYC06LA167

TT_18

0.526

ANC01LA029

TT_18

0.458

NYC07LA085

TT_18

0.524

CEN16LA349

TT_18

0.452

ERA15LA063

TT_18

0.524

ANC04LA045

TT_18

0.451

LAX98LA107

TT_18

0.522

ERA12LA432

TT_18

0.449

ATL07CA075

TT_18

0.520

ANC04LA003

TT_18

0.448

WPR14LA147

TT_18

0.518

CEN17FA332

TT_18

0.446

CEN18LA013

TT_18

0.513

NYC06LA193

TT_18

0.444

ERA18TA255

TT_18

0.512

MIA03LA035

TT_18

0.444

IAD05LA101

TT_18

0.504

CHI01LA328

TT_18

0.442

ERA18LA162

TT_18

0.503

NYC03LA055

TT_18

0.441

LAX05LA163

Note. The topic label is Carburetor Icing. The topic terms include +carburetor, +heat, icing, carburetor heat,
ice. The plus (+) indicates a parent term.
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Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

TT_19

0.544

LAX06LA183

TT_19

0.439

NYC01FA193

TT_19

0.519

NYC03FA153

TT_19

0.435

ERA15FA361

TT_19

0.505

ERA10LA162

TT_19

0.432

LAX06LA214

TT_19

0.501

WPR13LA147

TT_19

0.428

LAX00FA151

TT_19

0.500

ERA15LA030

TT_19

0.426

ATL06LA028

TT_19

0.496

CEN16LA296

TT_19

0.424

WPR16LA048

TT_19

0.490

ERA17FA327

TT_19

0.420

LAX05LA173

TT_19

0.478

ERA10LA222

TT_19

0.418

SEA08LA073

TT_19

0.476

ATL06LA114

TT_19

0.417

LAX01FA027

TT_19

0.476

WPR09LA324

TT_19

0.417

ERA17FA139

TT_19

0.468

ERA17FA107

TT_19

0.416

MIA08LA142

TT_19

0.461

WPR15LA131

TT_19

0.414

ERA12LA442

TT_19

0.457

ERA14LA389

TT_19

0.414

ERA15FA191

TT_19

0.455

WPR18FA150

TT_19

0.412

WPR09LA364

TT_19

0.453

WPR14LA199

TT_19

0.410

WPR11LA374

TT_19

0.452

FTW03FA067

TT_19

0.410

NYC05LA086

TT_19

0.451

LAX06LA153

TT_19

0.408

WPR12LA394

TT_19

0.449

ATL07LA067

TT_19

0.407

WPR10LA053

TT_19

0.447

ERA10LA151

TT_19

0.407

MIA99FA246

TT_19

0.446

MIA05FA085

TT_19

0.406

WPR18LA002

TT_19

0.445

CEN18LA285

TT_19

0.405

WPR16LA005

TT_19

0.443

ERA16LA152

TT_19

0.404

FTW02LA023

TT_19

0.443

ERA14FA074

TT_19

0.403

CEN14FA219

TT_19

0.440

ERA17FA112

TT_19

0.403

MIA02LA057

TT_19

0.440

LAX00LA247

TT_19

0.402

LAX03LA012

Note. The topic label is Loss of Power. The topic terms include +pump, +magneto, +valve, +cylinder,
+spark. The plus (+) indicates a parent term.
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Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

TT_20

0.450

IAD04FA017

TT_20

0.329

CEN14FA163

TT_20

0.449

WPR13LA050

TT_20

0.328

DFW05FA055

TT_20

0.448

IAD03FA035

TT_20

0.326

CEN16FA172

TT_20

0.423

WPR12FA326

TT_20

0.324

CEN13FA044

TT_20

0.414

NYC02FA089

TT_20

0.322

IAD00LA047

TT_20

0.411

SEA08FA013

TT_20

0.321

LAX04FA226

TT_20

0.403

IAD03FA039

TT_20

0.321

DEN00FA175

TT_20

0.399

SEA03FA106

TT_20

0.320

SEA05LA098

TT_20

0.393

CEN09FA518

TT_20

0.317

FTW98FA127

TT_20

0.382

SEA98FA083

TT_20

0.316

CHI02FA120

TT_20

0.378

FTW03FA174

TT_20

0.314

MIA06FA120

TT_20

0.378

CHI98FA187

TT_20

0.309

NYC01FA223

TT_20

0.376

FTW04FA204

TT_20

0.309

FTW99FA199

TT_20

0.376

LAX08FA286

TT_20

0.306

ATL07CA061

TT_20

0.366

SEA04FA009

TT_20

0.306

DFW06FA140

TT_20

0.361

LAX00FA213

TT_20

0.305

CHI02FA262

TT_20

0.357

CHI06FA067

TT_20

0.305

DEN99FA113

TT_20

0.355

LAX02LA010

TT_20

0.303

IAD02FA018

TT_20

0.353

CHI99FA052

TT_20

0.303

CEN15LA059

TT_20

0.346

CHI99MA269

TT_20

0.303

FTW04FA144

TT_20

0.345

SEA00LA186

TT_20

0.301

IAD00FA003

TT_20

0.340

CHI98FA123

TT_20

0.301

CHI98LA270

TT_20

0.339

DEN05FA047

TT_20

0.301

NYC00LA184

TT_20

0.335

CHI07LA013

TT_20

0.300

ERA11FA222

TT_20

0.333

NYC02LA129

TT_20

0.300

WPR11FA166

Note. The topic label is Slow Flight - Stalls. The topic terms include +witness, left, +hear, +state, +turn.
The plus (+) indicates a parent term.
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Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

TT_21

0.582

ERA13FA256

TT_21

0.491

ERA11FA210

TT_21

0.577

MIA02FA148

TT_21

0.484

ANC15FA050

TT_21

0.573

WPR18FA116

TT_21

0.483

MIA08FA027

TT_21

0.567

ATL05FA048

TT_21

0.480

CEN13FA476

TT_21

0.566

CEN13FA219

TT_21

0.479

IAD01FA013

TT_21

0.555

ERA19FA010

TT_21

0.475

ATL99FA081

TT_21

0.551

ATL07FA038

TT_21

0.475

CEN15FA378

TT_21

0.546

CEN14FA467

TT_21

0.474

WPR10FA162

TT_21

0.545

ERA16FA032

TT_21

0.474

ATL02FA008

TT_21

0.538

ERA16FA169

TT_21

0.473

ERA13FA348

TT_21

0.532

CEN17FA028

TT_21

0.470

CEN13FA172

TT_21

0.531

NYC02FA126

TT_21

0.469

LAX06FA289

TT_21

0.531

ERA15FA330

TT_21

0.469

ERA14LA330

TT_21

0.527

CEN18FA147

TT_21

0.465

NYC05FA117

TT_21

0.526

ERA13FA349

TT_21

0.465

NYC05FA117

TT_21

0.518

ATL05FA041

TT_21

0.464

CEN18FA003

TT_21

0.510

ATL99FA074

TT_21

0.464

DEN06FA013

TT_21

0.510

ERA12FA093

TT_21

0.462

ATL06FA038

TT_21

0.510

CEN16FA361

TT_21

0.460

ATL04FA016

TT_21

0.508

ATL03FA049

TT_21

0.460

CEN10FA322

TT_21

0.504

ATL05FA128

TT_21

0.458

CHI01FA291

TT_21

0.500

ATL04FA130

TT_21

0.457

ERA11FA431

TT_21

0.496

ERA11FA462

TT_21

0.456

ERA12FA484

TT_21

0.492

ATL04FA099

TT_21

0.456

ATL0FFA082

TT_21

0.491

ATL00FA016

TT_21

0.455

ATL04FA056

Note. The topic label is Flight Control. The topic terms include +attach, +aileron, +control, +cable,
+remain. The plus (+) indicates a parent term.
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Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

TT_22

0.592

CHI06FA206

TT_22

0.354

GAA19CA079

TT_22

0.592

CHI06FA206

TT_22

0.351

LAX02LA274

TT_22

0.493

WPR09LA024

TT_22

0.349

MIA04LA074

TT_22

0.493

WPR09LA024

TT_22

0.348

NYC08LA004

TT_22

0.470

ERA11LA361

TT_22

0.347

WPR15LA154

TT_22

0.470

ERA11LA361

TT_22

0.347

WPR15LA154

TT_22

0.435

CEN09LA182

TT_22

0.339

WPR11CA171

TT_22

0.435

CEN09LA182

TT_22

0.336

ANC09LA069

TT_22

0.419

CHI01IA248

TT_22

0.334

CHI03LA280

TT_22

0.419

CHI01IA248

TT_22

0.333

NYC98LA189

TT_22

0.411

FTW98LA317

TT_22

0.328

LAX00LA011

TT_22

0.411

FTW98LA317

TT_22

0.327

WPR18LA118

TT_22

0.410

DEN08CA115

TT_22

0.325

CEN15FA386

TT_22

0.398

ERA16LA225

TT_22

0.325

SEA07LA081

TT_22

0.386

MIA00FA103

TT_22

0.325

SEA07LA081

TT_22

0.383

FTW99LA245

TT_22

0.3232

LAX08LA235

TT_22

0.383

FTW99LA245

TT_22

0.322

NYC02LA006

TT_22

0.367

LAX99LA025

TT_22

0.322

NYC02LA006

TT_22

0.367

LAX99LA025

TT_22

0.319

ANC03CA006

TT_22

0.366

IAD05LA043

TT_22

0.317

MIA98LA111

TT_22

0.366

IAD05LA043

TT_22

0.317

SEA99LA009

TT_22

0.358

SEA98LA187

TT_22

0.316

FTW02LA047

TT_22

0.357

WPR09IA128

TT_22

0.316

FTW02LA047

TT_22

0.355

MIA01LA012

TT_22

0.315

LAX07CA157

TT_22

0.355

MIA01LA012

TT_22

0.308

FTW99LA232

Note. The topic label is Surface Accidents. The topic terms include +taxiway, +taxi, +runway, +park, +fire.
The plus (+) indicates a parent term.

236
Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

TT_23

0.582

WPR17LA038

TT_23

0.395

DEN08IA044

TT_23

0.544

LAX99LA111

TT_23

0.386

WPR15LA101

TT_23

0.521

WPR15LA220

TT_23

0.386

CEN17LA292

TT_23

0.500

CEN13LA233

TT_23

0.386

CEN10LA123

TT_23

0.496

CEN10IA059

TT_23

0.383

NYC00LA187

TT_23

0.495

MIA02LA107

TT_23

0.382

SEA03LA113

TT_23

0.478

NYC01LA013

TT_23

0.381

CEN13LA103

TT_23

0.468

CEN16LA218

TT_23

0.378

ERA15LA225

TT_23

0.463

ATL06LA050

TT_23

0.378

WPR14LA079

TT_23

0.463

WPR10LA248

TT_23

0.378

MIA01LA168

TT_23

0.458

DEN07IA066

TT_23

0.377

CEN16LA107

TT_23

0.455

SEA01LA067

TT_23

0.375

WPR10LA130

TT_23

0.453

CHI07IA017

TT_23

0.369

CEN10LA037

TT_23

0.437

LAX08LA168

TT_23

0.368

CHI04LA144

TT_23

0.435

LAX99LA201

TT_23

0.367

CEN17LA333

TT_23

0.433

NYC06LA089

TT_23

0.366

WPR16LA047

TT_23

0.430

WPR11LA102

TT_23

0.364

MIA99LA166

TT_23

0.426

ERA13LA382

TT_23

0.362

ERA09LA050

TT_23

0.413

MIA04LA127

TT_23

0.358

DEN00IA093

TT_23

0.408

NYC01IA211

TT_23

0.357

ERA13LA112

TT_23

0.406

CHI02LA100

TT_23

0.355

CHI02LA179

TT_23

0.404

NYC98LA074

TT_23

0.349

WPR15LA175

TT_23

0.404

SEA98TA152

TT_23

0.348

CHI04LA187

TT_23

0.401

CEN12LA326

TT_23

0.346

ERA17LA194

TT_23

0.396

LAX02LA204

TT_23

0.346

ERA12LA274

Note. The topic label is Engine Component Failure. The topic terms include +fracture, +bolt, +rod, fatigue,
+surface. The plus (+) indicates a parent term.
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Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

TT_24

0.418

CEN11FA479

TT_24

0.300

CEN10LA470

TT_24

0.380

CEN12LA203

TT_24

0.300

CHI01FA204

TT_24

0.369

CEN15LA026

TT_24

0.300

LAX08FA122

TT_24

0.362

CEN09FA043

TT_24

0.300

MIA07LA009

TT_24

0.362

WPR15FA016

TT_24

0.300

WPR10LA297

TT_24

0.361

DFW08LA157

TT_24

0.299

CHI00LA282

TT_24

0.350

WPR11FA268

TT_24

0.296

WPR09LA308

TT_24

0.347

CEN13LA046

TT_24

0.294

WPR12FA062

TT_24

0.336

SEA08LA145

TT_24

0.294

LAX08LA231

TT_24

0.332

WPR11LA223

TT_24

0.293

WPR10FA399

TT_24

0.327

CHI01LA294

TT_24

0.293

WPR14LA230

TT_24

0.325

SEA04LA168

TT_24

0.292

ERA09LA230

TT_24

0.325

CEN09LA311

TT_24

0.292

CEN14LA485

TT_24

0.321

CHI99LA137

TT_24

0.291

NYC07LA098

TT_24

0.320

CEN09LA263

TT_24

0.290

WPR14FA355

TT_24

0.318

SEA08LA158

TT_24

0.290

CEN15FA291

TT_24

0.316

CEN16FA346

TT_24

0.289

WPR11FA333

TT_24

0.315

ERA15FA139

TT_24

0.289

WPR13LA002

TT_24

0.313

CEN09LA061

TT_24

0.286

ERA16LA201

TT_24

0.307

WPR09LA026

TT_24

0.286

CEN09LA385

TT_24

0.305

LAX00FA170

TT_24

0.284

LAX04LA110

TT_24

0.305

WPR13FA269

TT_24

0.284

WPR12FA044

TT_24

0.303

ERA12FA271

TT_24

0.283

LAX06LA170

TT_24

0.303

ATL05LA121

TT_24

0.282

CEN11LA090

TT_24

0.301

ERA10LA280

TT_24

0.280

LAX04FA223

Note. The topic label is Medical. The topic terms include +detect, +witness, medical, +test, +brake. The
plus (+) indicates a parent term.
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Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

Text Topic

Weight

Report ID

TT_25

0.237

LAX03FA116

TT_25

0.175

DEN04FA104

TT_25

0.221

SEA02FA109

TT_25

0.173

CHI07FA052

TT_25

0.219

CHI98FA187

TT_25

0.173

MIA07CA099

TT_25

0.215

FTW03LA017

TT_25

0.172

SEA05LA162

TT_25

0.207

CHI04FA205

TT_25

0.171

FTW00LA185

TT_25

0.204

CHI99FA140

TT_25

0.171

MIA00FA126

TT_25

0.203

DEN03FA137

TT_25

0.171

ANC06LA058

TT_25

0.202

NYC06FA162

TT_25

0.170

DFW05LA081

TT_25

0.201

WPR09FA316

TT_25

0.170

ATL05CA123

TT_25

0.195

DEN05FA003

TT_25

0.170

ERA14LA149

TT_25

0.194

NYC06FA029

TT_25

0.169

IAD05FA125

TT_25

0.190

NYC02FA082

TT_25

0.169

ATL03FA136

TT_25

0.188

IAD02FA075

TT_25

0.168

CEN14FA051

TT_25

0.188

MIA98LA204

TT_25

0.168

WPR12LA047

TT_25

0.187

DEN01FA110

TT_25

0.166

SEA07FA189

TT_25

0.187

WPR10LA171

TT_25

0.165

LAX03FA135

TT_25

0.185

NYC99FA213

TT_25

0.164

CEN12FA188

TT_25

0.183

DFW06FA187

TT_25

0.164

NYC07FA056

TT_25

0.180

CHI99FA223

TT_25

0.164

ATL99FA132

TT_25

0.179

CHI01FA024

TT_25

0.164

LAX99FA270

TT_25

0.178

LAX04FA019

TT_25

0.163

ANC99LA078

TT_25

0.178

MIA08FA070

TT_25

0.162

ANC02FA038

TT_25

0.177

IAD03FA050

TT_25

0.162

ERA12LA287

TT_25

0.176

CHI00FA237

TT_25

0.162

CHI00LA038

TT_25

0.176

FTW04LA191

TT_25

0.160

DFW05FA058

Note. The topic label is Obstructions. The topic terms include +tree, +runway, main, +landing gear, +tank.
The plus (+) indicates a parent term.
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Figures
B1

Accident Aircraft Engine Types

B2

Accident Aircraft Engine Numbers

B3

Accident Aircraft Landing Gear Types

B4

Accident Aircraft Manufacture Types

B5

Accident Pilot Total Flight Hours

B6

Accident Pilot Total Flight Hours in Aircraft Make

B7

Accident Pilot Total Flight Hours in Single-engine Aircraft

B8

Accident Pilot Total Pilot-in-Command Flight Hours

B9

Accident Pilot Total Hours at Night

B10

Accident Pilot Total Hours—Last 90-days

B11

Accident Pilot Total Hours—Last 30-days
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Figure B1
Accident Aircraft Engine Types
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Electric

0
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Type of Aircraft engine

Note. Reciprocating engines are piston engines that use a propeller for thrust. A
representative aircraft from the accident database using a reciprocating engine is a Cessna
172. A turboprop engine integrates a turbine to drive a propeller (El-Sayed, 2017). A
representative aircraft from the accident database is a DeHavilland DHC-3. Very simply,
a turbofan engine has a ducted fan as an internal propeller. It operates with two air
sources, one through the structure like a turbojet engine, the other through the fan (ElSayed, 2017). A representative aircraft from the accident database is a Gulfstream G-V.
A turbojet engine creates thrust from the turbine exhaust gas (El-Sayed, 2017). A
representative aircraft from the accident database is the Aero Vodochody L-39. The sole
electric engine in the accident database powered a Yuneec E430 airplane.
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Figure B2
Accident Aircraft Engine Numbers
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90%
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Note. The number of single-engine aircraft = 23,501; multi-engine aircraft = 2,553. There
were 333 reports that did not specify engine numbers.
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Figure B3
Accident Aircraft Landing Gear Types
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Other
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Note. The number of aircraft with tricycle landing gear = 17,553; tailwheel gear = 7,779;
other gear types = 539. There were 513 reports that did not specify landing gear type.
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Figure B4
Accident Aircraft Manufacture Types

15%

85%
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Note. The number of homebuilt aircraft = 3,967; factory built = 22,413. There were seven
reports that did not specify a manufacture type.
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Figure B5
Accident Pilot Total Flight Hours

Note. The bars represent 500-hr increments. The blue bar contains the median = 1,000
total flight hours.
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Figure B6
Accident Pilot Total Flight Hours in Aircraft Make

Note. The bars represent 500-hr increments. The blue bar contains the median = 122 total
flight hours in the accident aircraft make.
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Figure B7
Accident Pilot Total Flight Hours in Single-engine Aircraft

Note. The bars represent 500-hr increments. The blue bar contains the median = 728 total
flight hours in single-engine aircraft.
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Figure B8
Accident Pilot Total Pilot-in-Command Flight Hours

Note. The bars represent 500-hr increments. The blue bar contains the median = 848 total
flight as pilot-in-command.
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Figure B9
Accident Pilot Total Hours at Night

Note. The bars represent 500-hr increments. The blue bar contains the median = 57 total
flight hours as pilot-in-command.
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Figure B10
Accident Pilot Total Hours—Last 90-days

Note. The bars represent 10-hr increments. The blue bar contains the median = 26 total
flight hours in the previous 90-days.
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Figure B11
Accident Pilot Total Hours—Last 30-days

Note. The bars represent 5-hr increments. The blue bar contains the median = 11 total
flight hours in the previous 30-days.
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Appendix C
Variable Dictionary
C1

Variable Dictionary

C2

As-built Modeling Variables
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Table C1
Variable Dictionary
Variable Name

Variable Description

Age

Age of the pilot

Air-medical flight

The aircraft was an air medical

Variable Type

Measure

Interval

Years

Categorical

Y/N

Categorical

Damage Type

Interval

Year

Categorical

Y/N

Categorical

Location Code

Categorical

Airspace Code

Categorical

Light Code

Categorical

VMC / IMC

Categorical

Y/N

flight
Aircraft damage

Damage categories: destroyed,
substantial, minor, or none

Aircraft year

Aircraft year of manufacture

Airplane rating

Mishap pilot rating in more than
one aircraft

Airport location to crash

Accident location in reference to
the airport: OFAP, ONAP, ONAS

Airspace

Type of airspace where the mishap
took place

Atmospheric lighting

Records the prevailing light
condition

Basic weather conditions

Basic conditions at the accident
site

Biennial flight review

A biennial flight review was
accomplished

Cause narrative

Probable cause narrative

Text

Unstructured

Causes

Combined cause descriptions

Text

Unstructured

Crew position code

Pilot category (pilot, copilot,

Categorical

Type

Categorical

Event code

student, check pilot)
Defining events

Investigator assigned defining
event

Engine type

Accident aircraft engine type

Categorical

Type Code

Event state

State where the accident took

Categorical

State ID

Interval

HH:MM

place
Event time

Time the accident took place

Factors

Combined factors descriptions

Text

Unstructured

Factual narrative

Factual narrative

Text

Unstructured

Fixed-retractable gear

Fixed or retractable gear

Categorical

F/R

Flight plan activated

Flight plan activated with ATC

Categorical

Y/N

Flight plan type

Type of flight plan filed

Categorical

Plan Type
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Variable Name

Variable Description

Variable Type

Measure

Flight purpose

Reason for the flight

Categorical

Reason Code

Ground collision

Accident involved a ground

Categorical

Y/N

collision
Highest certificate

Highest pilot certificate

Categorical

Cert type

Homebuilt

Amateur built or manufactured

Categorical

Y/N

Hours last 24-hours

Hours last 24-hrs, all a/c

Interval

Hours

Hours last 30-days

Hours last 30-days, all a/c

Interval

Hours

Hours last 90-days

Hours last 90-days, all a/c

Interval

Hours

IFR equipped

The aircraft was IFR avionics

Categorical

Y/N

Text

Unstructured

equipped
Incident narrative

FAA Incident Narr (8020-5)

Instructional

Instructional flight

Categorical

Y/N

Instructor

Mishap pilot holds an instructor

Categorical

Y/N

rating
Med certificate validity

Medical certificate validity

Categorical

Med Val Code

Medical certificate

Medical certificate held by the

Categorical

Med Cert Code

Categorical

Y/N

pilot
Mid-air

Accident involved a midair
collision

Multi-engine aircraft

Multi-engine a/c

Categorical

Y/N

Multi-platform instructor

Mishap pilot holds an instrument

Categorical

Y/N

rating
Occurrence_combined

Combined occurrence descriptions

Text

Unstructured

Professional pilot

Employed professionally as a pilot

Categorical

Y/N

Report narrative

Narrative summary released at

Text

Unstructured

completion of accident
Runway condition

Condition of the runway

Categorical

Runway Code

Seat occupied by pilot

Seat where the pilot was sitting /

Categorical

Seat Code

controlling the aircraft from
Second pilot on board

A second pilot was on the aircraft

Categorical

Y/N

Sex

Sex of the pilot

Categorical

M/F

Sightseeing flight

The aircraft was a site-seeing

Categorical

Y/N

flight
Solo student pilot

Student on a solo flight

Categorical

Y/N

TARGET

Accident Injury level

Categorical

F / NF

Total flight hours

Total flight hours, all a/c

Interval

Hours

254
Variable Name

Variable Description

Variable Type

Measure

Total hours make

Total hours in a/c make

Interval

Hours

Total hours multi-engine

Total multi-engine hours

Interval

Hours

Total hours night

Total night hours

Interval

Hours

Total hours single-engine

Total single-engine hours

Interval

Hours

Total PIC hours

PIC hours, all a/c

Interval

Hours

VFR approach

Type of VFR approach being

Categorical

Approach Code

Continuous

Statute Miles

Categorical

Y/N

Continuous

Nautical Miles

Categorical

Y/N

flown
Visibility

Prevailing visibility in statute
miles

Weather factors

Mishap had a weather component
cited

Wind gust speed

Gust wind speed in nautical miles
per hour

Wind gusts indicated

Indicates whether gusts were
present
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Table C2
As-built Modeling Variables
Variable

Description

Status

Age

Pilot age

Included

Airport location to crash

Proximity to airport

Included

Airspace

Airspace

Included

Atmospheric lighting

Lighting condition

Included

Basic weather conditions

Basic weather condition

Included

Crew position code

Pilot category

Included

Engine type

Engine type

Included

Flight plan type

Type of flight plan filed

Included

Flight purpose

Flight purpose

Included

Gear

Gear type

Ground-collision

On ground collision

Included

Highest certificate

Highest pilot certificate

Included

Highest instructor certificate

Highest instructor rating

Included (new)

Homebuilt

Homebuilt aircraft

Included

Hours last 30-days

Hours last 30-days, all a/c

Included

Hours last 90-days

Hours last 90-days, all a/c

Included

Instructor

Pilot possessed instructor rating

Included (new)

Loss of control

Loss of control (air or ground)

Included (new)

Med Certificate validity

Medical certificate validity

Included

Mid-air

Mid air collision

Included

Multi-engine aircraft

Multi-engine a/c

Included

Multi-platform instructor

Instructor rated in multiple a/c

Included (new)

Number of engines

Number of engines

Included (new)

Professional pilot

Professional pilot

Included

Report narrative

Accident summary/report

Included

Runway condition

Runway condition

Included (new)

Seat occupied by pilot

Seat position of accident pilot

Included (new)

Second pilot on board

Second pilot on board

Solo student pilot

Solo student pilot

Included (new)

Systems failure

System failure cited

Included (new)

TARGET

Accident Injury level

Included

Total flight hours

Total flight hours, all a/c

Included

Included (new)

Included
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Variable

Description

Status

Total hours make

Total hours in a/c make

Included

Total hours night

Total night hours

Included

Total hours single-engine

Total single-engine hours

Included

Total PIC hours

PIC hours, all a/c

Included

Weather not a factor

Weather not a factor

Wind gust indicated

Gusts indicated

Air-medical flight

Air medical flight

Rejected on review

Cause narrative

Probable cause narrative

Rejected on review

Causes

Combined cause descriptions

Rejected on review

Defining events

Defining event

Rejected on import

Factors

Combined factors descriptions

Rejected on review

Factual narrative

Factual narrative

Rejected on review

Fixed-retractable gear

Gear type

Rejected on import

Hours last 24-hours

Hours last 24-hrs, all a/c

Rejected on import

Incident narrative

FAA Incident Narrative (8020-5)

Rejected on review

Occurrences

Combined occurrence descriptions

Rejected on import

Sex

Pilot sex

Rejected on review

Sightseeing flight

Sightseeing flight

Rejected on review

Total hours multi-engine

Total multi-engine hours

Rejected on review

Wind factors (TT 1)

+knot, +wind, +degree, +runway, +gust

Included

Fuel issues (TT 2)

+fuel, +tank, +gallon, +fuel tank,

Included

Included (new)
Included

+selector
IMC Flight (TT 3)

+controller, +radar, +advise,

Included

+acknowledge, +tower
LOC-stalls (TT 4)

+propeller, +nose, aft, +blade,

Included

+approximately
Student pilots (TT 5)

+student, +student pilot, solo, +solo

Included

flight, instructional
Forced landings (TT 6)

+engine, +power, forced, +forced

Included

landing, +loss
Landing gear (TT 7)

+gear, gear, +landing gear, +landing,

Included

+extend
Flight envelope exceedance (TT

aircraft, +approximately, +refer, +find,

8)

accident aircraft

Weather factors (TT 9)

+foot, +cloud, +mile, +visibility,
+ceiling

Included
Included
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Variable

Description

Status

Flight hours (TT 10)

+hour, total, +time, +engine, +logbook

Included

Engine oil loss (TT 11)

+oil, +rod, +connect, +cylinder,

Included

+number
Directional LOC (TT 12)

+normal operation, +preclude,

Included

+malfunction, +failure, +operation
Braking issues (TT 13)

+brake, +brake, +apply, +rudder, +wheel

Included

Water-remote airstrips

+airstrip, +passenger, +water, +lake,

Included

(TT 14)

+seat

Excess Weight (TT 15)

+takeoff, +weight, +foot, +pound, +end

Included

Instructional (TT 16)

+instructor, +instruction, +instructional

Included

flight, instructional, +student
Unstable approach (TT 17)

+approach, +runway, final, +airport,

Included

+end
Carburetor icing (TT 18)

+carburetor, +heat, icing, carburetor

Included

heat, ice
Loss of power (TT 19)

+pump, +magneto, +valve, +cylinder,

Included

+spark
Slow flight-stalls (TT 20)

+witness, left, +hear, +state, +turn

Included

Flight control (TT 21)

+attach, +aileron, +control, +cable,

Included

+remain
Surface accidents (TT 22)

+taxiway, +taxi, +runway, +park, +fire

Included

Engine component failure (TT

+fracture, +bolt, +rod, fatigue, +surface

Included

Medical (TT 24)

+detect, +witness, medical, +test, +brake

Included

Obstructions (TT 25)

+tree, +runway, main, +landing gear,

Included

23)

+tank
TextCluster_1

+landing +report +runway +gear left

Not used in modeling

+land +condition visual +damage
+plan +student +nose +prevail +state
+time
TextCluster_2

+power +engine +fuel +tank +hour
+position +reveal medical last +record
+issue +hold +wing +damage
+instrument

Not used in modeling
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Variable

Description

TextCluster_3

+record weather last medical +locate

Status
Not used in modeling

+hold +issue +instrument +mile +hour
+impact +knot +turn +instructor
+wind
TextCluster_4

+report +runway left +landing

Not used in modeling

+condition visual +plan +land
+damage +state +prevail +sustain
+time +nose +operate
TextCluster_SVD1

Text Cluster SVD variable

Not used in modeling

TextCluster_SVD2

Text Cluster SVD variable

Not used in modeling

TextCluster_SVD3

Text Cluster SVD variable

Not used in modeling

TextCluster_SVD4

Text Cluster SVD variable

Not used in modeling

TextCluster_SVD5

Text Cluster SVD variable

Not used in modeling

TextCluster_SVD6

Text Cluster SVD variable

Not used in modeling

TextCluster_SVD7

Text Cluster SVD variable

Not used in modeling

TextCluster_SVD8

Text Cluster SVD variable

Not used in modeling

TextCluster_SVD9

Text Cluster SVD variable

Not used in modeling

TextCluster_SVD10

Text Cluster SVD variable

Not used in modeling

TextCluster_SVD11

Text Cluster SVD variable

Not used in modeling

TextCluster_SVD12

Text Cluster SVD variable

Not used in modeling

TextCluster_SVD13

Text Cluster SVD variable

Not used in modeling

TextCluster_SVD14

Text Cluster SVD variable

Not used in modeling

TextCluster_SVD15

Text Cluster SVD variable

Not used in modeling

TextCluster_SVD16

Text Cluster SVD variable

Not used in modeling

TextCluster_SVD17

Text Cluster SVD variable

Not used in modeling

TextCluster_SVD18

Text Cluster SVD variable

Not used in modeling

TextCluster_SVD19

Text Cluster SVD variable

Not used in modeling

TextCluster_SVD20

Text Cluster SVD variable

Not used in modeling

TextCluster_SVD21

Text Cluster SVD variable

Not used in modeling

TextCluster_SVD22

Text Cluster SVD variable

Not used in modeling

TextCluster_SVD23

Text Cluster SVD variable

Not used in modeling

TextCluster_SVD24

Text Cluster SVD variable

Not used in modeling
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Appendix D
NTSB Most Wanted List Areas
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NTSB Most Wanted List Areas
Year

Issue Area

2019-2000

Eliminate Distractions

2019-2000

End Alcohol and Other Drug Impairment

2019-2000

Improve the Safety of Part 135 Aircraft Flight Operations

2019-2000

Reduce Fatigue-Related Accidents

2019-2000

Strengthen Occupant Protection

2017-2018

Eliminate Distractions

2017-2018

End Alcohol and Other Drug Impairment

2017-2018

Ensure the Safety Shipment of Hazardous Materials

2017-2018

Expand Recorder Use to Enhance Safety

2017-2018

Prevent Loss of Control in Flight in General Aviation

2017-2018

Reduce Fatigue-Related Accidents

2017-2018

Require Medical Fitness

2017-2018

Strengthen Occupant Protection

2016

Disconnect from Deadly Distractions

2016

End Substance Impairment in Transportation

2016

Expand the Use of Recorders to Enhance Transportation Safety

2016

Prevent Loss of Control in Flight in General Aviation

2016

Reduce Fatigue-Related Accidents

2016

Require Medical Fitness for Duty

2016

Strengthen Occupant Protection

2015

Disconnect from Deadly Distractions

2015

End Substance Impairment in Transportation

2015

Enhance Public Helicopter Safety

2015

Prevent Loss of Control in Flight in General Aviation

2015

Require Medical Fitness for Duty

2015

Strengthen Procedural Compliance

2014

Address Unique Characteristics of Helicopter Operations

2014

Eliminate Distraction in Transportation
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Year

Issue Area

2014

General Aviation: Identify and Communicate Hazardous Weather

2014

Improve Fire Safety in Transportation

2014

Strengthen Occupant Protection in Transportation

2013

Eliminate Distraction in Transportation

2013

Improve Fire Safety in Transportation

2013

Improve General Aviation Safety

2013

Improve Safety of Airport Surface Operations

2013

Preserve the Integrity of Transportation Infrastructure

2011-2012

Addressing Human Fatigue

2011-2012

General Aviation Safety

2011-2012

Pilot & Air Traffic Controller Professionalism

2011-2012

Recorders

2011-2012

Runway Safety

2011-2012

Safety Management Systems

Note. Adapted from NTSB (2020a) and NTSB (n.d.b).

262
Appendix E
FAA GA Safety Enhancement Topic Fact Sheets
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FAA GA Safety Enhancement Topic Fact Sheets
The following list of fact sheets was compiled from the FAA Safety Briefing site (FAA,
2020a):
Topic Area

Title

Aerodynamics

Angle of Attack Awareness
Best Glide Speed and Distance

Aeromedical

Flight After Use of Medication with Sedating
Effects
Pilots and Medication
Spatial Disorientation

Aeronautical Decision Making

Aeronautical Decision Making
Compliance Philosophy
Flight Data Monitoring
Flight Risk Assessment Tools (FRAT)
Introduction to Safety Risk Management
Managing Distractions
Managing Unexpected Events
Personal Minimums
Single-pilot Crew Resource Management
Startle Response

Controlled Flight Into Terrain

CFIT/Automation Overreliance
Controlled Flight Into Terrain

Expanding Your Horizons

General Aviation Survival
Mountain Flying
Pilot Proficiency Training
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Topic Area

Title

Flight Training and Proficiency

Avoiding Pilot Deviations
Emergency Procedures Training
Enhanced Vision Systems
Experimental/Amateur-Built Flight Testing
Flight Training after Period of Inactivity
Fly the Aircraft First
Maneuvering Flight
Runway Safety
Transition Training
VMC Scenario Training

Mechanical, Maintenance, and Systems

Advanced Preflight After Maintenance
Approval for Return to Service
Engine Maintenance and Performance
Monitoring
Fuel Monitoring
Ignition Systems/FADEC
Maintenance Placards
Regulatory Roadblock Reduction
Smart Cockpit Technology

Takeoff and Landing

Aircraft Performance and Calculations
Aircraft Performance and Monitoring
Stabilized Approach and Landing

Weather

Personal Minimums and Weather Cameras
Personal Minimums for Wind
Use of Weather Information.
Weather Technology
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APPENDIX F
Data Mining Checklist
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Dissertation TM Checklist
using SAS® Enterprise Miner™
1. Text Pre-Processing
Determine Data Sources
Download Data
Clean Data
Determine Variables
Text Import

Complete
Complete
Complete
Complete
Complete

2. Text Parsing
Text Parsing Node
Setup Node
Complete
Run Node
Complete
Review Results
Complete
Make Adjustments
As req.
Detect Properties
Different Parts of Speech
Yes
Noun Groups
On
Multi-word Terms
As req.
Find Entities
None
Custom Entities
-Ignore Properties
Ignore Parts of Speech
As req.
Ignore Types of Entities
-Ignore Types of Attributes
As req.
Synonyms Properties
Stem Terms
Yes
Synonyms
As req.
Filter Properties
Start List
As req.
Stop List
As req.
Select Languages
As req.
Text Parsing Node Report Properties
Number of Terms to Display
20,000
3. Transformation
Text Filter Node
Setup Node
Complete
Run Node
Complete
Review Results
Complete
Make Adjustments
As Required
Spelling Properties
Check Spelling
No

Weightings Properties
Frequency Weighting
None
Term Weight
Inverse Doc Freq
Term Filters Properties
Min Number of Documents
Max Number of Terms
Import Synonyms
As req.
Document Filters Properties
Search Expression
Subset Documents
Results Properties
Filter Viewer
Spell-Checking Results
Exported Synonyms
Text Filter Node Report Properties
Terms to View
Number of Terms to Display
4. Document Analysis
Text Cluster Node
Setup Node
Complete
Run Node
Complete
Review Results
Complete
Make Adjustments
As req.
General Train Properties
Variables
As req.
Transform Properties
SVD Resolution
Low
Max SVD Resolution
100
Cluster Properties
Exact or Max #
Default
# of Clusters
40
Cluster Algorithm
Hierarchical
Descriptive Terms
Default
Results Properties
Topic Viewer
15
Text Topic Node

Setup Node
Complete
Run Node
Complete
Review Results
Complete
Make Adjustments
As Required
General Train Properties
Variables
Edit as required
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User Topics

Edit as required
Term Topic Properties
# of Single-term Topics
Default
Learned Topics Properties
# of Multi-term Topics
Default
Correlated Topics
Default
Results Properties
Topic Viewer
Edit as required
Text Profile Node
Setup Node
Complete
Run Node
Complete
Review Results
Complete
Make Adjustments
As Req.
Train Properties
Variables
Default
Max # of Terms
Default
Date Binning Interval
Default
Text Rule Builder Node
Setup Node
Complete
Run Node
Complete
Review Results
Complete
Make Adjustments
As Req.
Train Properties
Variables
Default
Generalization Error
Medium
Purity of Rules
Medium
Exhaustiveness
Medium
Score Properties
Content Cat. Code
Change Target Values

Dissertation DM Checklist
using SAS® Enterprise Miner™
1. Data Pre-Processing
Determine Data Sources
Download Data
Clean Data
Determine Variables
Data Import

Complete
Complete
Complete
Complete
Complete

2. Sample

Data Partition Node
Setup Node
Complete
Run Node
Complete
Review Results
Complete
Make Adjustments
As Req.
Train Properties
Variables
As Req.
Output Type
Data
Partitioning Method
Default
Random Seed
12345
Data Set Allocation
Training
60
Validation
20
Test
20
Report Properties
Interval Targets
Yes
Class Targets
Yes
3. Explore

StatExplore Node
Setup Node
Complete
Run Node
Complete
Review Results
Complete
Make Adjustments
As Req.
Train Properties
Variables
As Req.
Number of Observations
100000
Validation
No
Test
No
Interval Distributions
Yes
Class Distributions
Yes
Level Summary
Yes
Use Segment Variables
No
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Cross-Tabulation
Hide Rejected Variables
# of Selected Variables
Chi-square
Interval Variables
Number of Bins
Correlations
Pearson Correlations
Spearman Correlations

As Req.
Yes
1000
Yes
No
5
Yes
Yes
No

4. Modify

Impute Node
Setup Node
Complete
Run Node
Complete
Review Results
Complete
Make Adjustments
As Required
Train Properties
Variables
Non-Missing Variables
Missing Cutoff
Class Variables
Default Input Method
Default Target Method
Normalize Values
Interval Properties
Default Input Method
Default Target Method
Default Constant Value
Default Character Value
Default Number Value
Method Options
Random Seed
Tuning Parameters
Tree Imputation
Score Properties
Hide Original Variables

Type
Source
Role

Indicator Variables

Report Properties

Validation and Test Data
Distribution of Missing

No

Transform Variables Node
Setup Node
Complete
Run Node
Complete
Review Results
Complete
Make Adjustments
As Req.
Train Properties
Variables
Formulas
Interactions
SAS Code
Default Methods
Interval Inputs
Interval Targets
Class Inputs
Class Targets
Treat Missing as Level
Sample Properties
Method
Size
Random Seed
12345
Number of Bins
Missing Values

Optimal Binning
Grouping Method

Cutoff Value
Group Missing
No
Number of Bins
Add Min. Value to Offset Value
Offset Value
Score Properties
Use Meta Transformation
Hide
Reject
Report Properties
Summary Statistics
Yes
5. Model

AutoNeural Node
Setup Node
Complete
Run Node
Complete
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Review Results
Make Adjustments

Complete
As Required
Train Properties
Variables
As Req.
Model Options
Architecture
Single Layer
Termination
Overfitting
Train Action
Search
Target Layer Error Function
Default
Maximum Iterations
8
Number of Hidden Units
2
Tolerance
Medium
Total Time
One Hour
Increment and Search
Adjust Iterations
Yes
Freeze Connections
No
Total # of Hidden Units
30
Final Training
Yes
Final Iterations
5
Activation Functions
Direct
Yes
Exponential
No
Identity
No
Logistic
No
Normal
Yes
Reciprocal
No
Sine
Yes
Softmax
No
Square
No
Tanh
Yes
Score Properties
Hidden Units
No
Residuals
Yes
Standardization
No
Neural Network Node
Setup Node
Complete
Run Node
Complete
Review Results
Complete
Make Adjustments
As Req.
Decision Tree Node
Setup Node
Complete
Run Node
Complete
Review Results
Complete

Make Adjustments

As Req.
Train Properties
Variables
As Req.
Interactive
As Req.
Import Tree Model
No
Tree Model Data Set
-Use Frozen Tree
No
Use Multiple Targets
No
Splitting Rule
Interval Target Criterion
ProbF
Nominal Target Criterion
ProbChisq
Ordinal Target Criterion
Entropy
Significance Level
0.2
Missing Values
Most corr. Branch
Use Input Once
No
Maximum Branch
2
Maximum Depth
6
Minimum Categorical Size
5
Node
Leaf Size
5
Number of Rules
5
Number of Surrogate Rules
0
Split Size
.
Split Search
Use Decision
No
Use Priors
No
Exhaustive
5000
Node Sample
20000
Subtree
Method
Assessment
Number of Leaves
1
Assess. Measure
Misclassification
Assessment Fraction
.25
Cross Validation
Perform Cross Validation
NO
Number of Subsets
10
Number of Repeats
1
Seed
12345
Observation-Base importance
Obs.-based Importance
No
Number single Var Importance
5
P-Value Adjustments
Bonferroni Adjustment
Yes
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Time of Bonferroni Adjust.
Before
Inputs
Number of Inputs
1
Depth Adjustment
Yes
Output Variables
Leaf Variable
Yes
Interactive Sample
Create Sample
Default
Sample Method
Random
Sample Size
10000
Sample Seed
12345
Performance
Disk
Score Properties
Variable Selection
Yes
Leaf Role
Segment
Report Properties
Precision
4
Tree Precision
4
Class Target Node Color
% … Class.
Interval Target Node Color
AVE
Node Text
Gradient Boosting Node
Setup Node
Complete
Run Node
Complete
Review Results
Complete
Make Adjustments
As Required
Train Properties
Variables
As Required
Series Options
N Iterations
50
Seed
12345
Shrinkage
Train Proportion

0.1
60
Splitting Rule
Huber M-Regression
No
Maximum Branch
2
Maximum Depth
2
Minimum Categorical Size
5
Re-use Variable
1
Categorical Bins
30
Interval Bins
100
Missing Values
Use in search

Performance

Disk
Node
Leaf Fraction
0.001
Number of Surrogate Rules
0
Split Size
.
Split Search
Exhaustive
5000
Node Sample
20000
Subtree
Asses. Measure
Misclassification
Score Properties
Subseries
Best Assess. Value
Number of Iterations
1
Create H Statistic
No
Variable Selection
Yes
Report Properties
Observation Based Importance
No
Number Single Var Importance
5
Regression Node

Setup Node
Run Node
Review Results
Make Adjustments

Complete
Complete
Complete
As Required
Train Properties
Variables
As Required
Equations
Main Effects
Yes
Two-Factor Interactions
No
Polynomial Terms
No
Polynomial Degree
2
User Terms
No
Term Editor
-Class Targets
Regression Type
Log. Regression
Link Function
Logit
Model Options
Suppress Intercept
No
Input Coding
Deviation
Model Selection
Selection Model
Stepwise
Selection Criteria
None
Use Selection Defaults
Yes
Selection Option
--
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Optimization Options
Technique
Default
Default Optimization
Yes
Max Iterations
0
Max Function Cells
0
Maximum Time
1 hour
Convergence Criteria
Uses Defaults
Yes
Options
-Output Options
Confidence Limits
No
Save Covariance
No
Covariance
No
Correlation
Yes
Statistics
No
Suppress Output
No
Details
Yes
Design Matrix
No
Score Properties
Excluded Variables
Reject
HP Forest Node

Setup Node
Run Node
Review Results
Make Adjustments

Complete
Complete
Complete
As Required
Train Properties
Variables
As Req.
Tree Options
Maximum Number of Trees
100
Seed
12345

Type of Sample
Proportion
Prop. of Obs in Each Sample
.6
Number of Obs in Each Sample
-Splitting Rule Options
Maximum Depth
20
Missing Values
Use in Search
Minimum Use in Search
1
# of vars to consider
Significance Level
0.05
Max Categories in Split Search
30
Minimum Category Size
5
Exhaustive
5000
Node Options
Method for Leaf Size
Default
Smallest % of Obs in Node
.00001
Smallest # of Obs in Node
1
Split Size
Use as Modeling Node
Yes
Score Properties
Variable Selection
Variable Importance Method
Number of Variables to Consider
Cutoff Fraction
6. Assess
Model Comparison Node
Setup Node
Complete
Run Node
Complete
Review Results
Complete
Make Adjustments
As Required

